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ABSTRACT 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON GOVERNANCE AT THE NATIONAL                                        
AND CORPORATE LEVEL 
 
By 
 
Laura S. Miller 
 
ESSAY 1 
We examine the effect of governance environment on the composition of a country’s 
external capital structure, specifically foreign equity investment.  In addition to the 
absolute quality of the host country’s governance environment, we consider the host 
country’s governance quality relative to that of the source (investor) country.  Unlike 
previous studies, which utilize country totals, we examine foreign investment positions 
between pairs of individual countries.  Our sample includes 3,891 bilateral investment 
positions among 49 source countries and 69 host countries for years 2009 through 2011. 
We find that relative governance, rather than absolute governance, plays a role in foreign 
investment.  Specifically, a host country with lower governance quality relative to the 
source country (a greater difference) attracts less FDI as a share of foreign equity 
investment.  Our results suggest that prior studies, which identified absolute governance 
as a significant factor, were evaluating an incomplete picture.  When the focus is solely 
on the host country, the policy prescription appears rather straightforward—all countries 
should pursue higher governance quality to attract more foreign investment from all 
sources.  We challenge this notion by showing that:  a) different source countries evaluate 
host-country governance differently; and b) this evaluation is influenced by the difference 
between the governance environments of the two countries.  
 
ESSAY 2 
Highly publicized governance failures in recent years have renewed research efforts to 
investigate the consequences of specific governance mechanisms. A better understanding 
of executive compensation contracts, specifically golden parachutes, is especially critical 
given their notorious status in the corporate governance debate. Instead of examining the 
explicit incentive role of golden parachutes (GPs) in influencing managerial behavior, we 
study their role as a tool for screening and recruiting reputable CEOs in a situation where 
recruitment would otherwise be difficult—severe financial distress that eventually leads 
to Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  If GPs enable distressed firms to recruit reputable CEOs, there 
should be an observable link between the presence of GPs in employment contracts for 
newly hired CEOs and value-preserving firm outcomes.  For our sample of firms, all of 
which filed for bankruptcy, this can be measured by the outcome of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, specifically the avoidance of liquidation.  Thus, we hypothesize a negative 
relationship between the presence of GPs for newly hired CEOs and the probability of 
liquidation in bankruptcy.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms led by 
newly hired CEOs with GPs are liquidated less often than other firms.  This suggests that, 
regardless of their efficacy as corporate governance mechanisms, GPs can create value 
for shareholders.   
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CHAPTER I 
       
       
Introduction 
 
Importance of the Problem 
Determinants of international capital flows and their impact on economic growth 
are among the most important issues in the international finance literature (Alfaro, 
Kalemi-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008).  In the environment of uncertainty created by the 
recent global financial crisis, understanding the drivers of international capital flows 
becomes more important.  Since the beginning of the crisis, cross-border investment has 
slowed substantially amid a general re-pricing of risk, and many fear that financial 
globalization could be reversed (Cornelius, Juttmann, & Langelaar, 2009).  Research 
suggests that the external capital structure of countries (i.e., relative shares of foreign 
direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, and external debt) may be a determinant 
of economic performance and susceptibility to financial crises (Levchenko & Mauro, 
2007).   
Debt financing, especially short-term debt, can be harmful because it is driven by 
speculative considerations regarding interest rates and exchange rates, rather than long-
term considerations (Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias, 2000).  In contrast, equity financing 
is preferable because it facilitates risk sharing between domestic producers and foreign 
investors (Rogoff, 1999).  This risk sharing can help stabilize domestic consumption and 
improve domestic producers’ ability to pursue projects with higher risk and return.  
Moreover, abrupt shifts in equity flows are less likely to trigger liquidity crises than 
similar disruptions in debt flows Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Levchenko & 
Mauro, 2007).  Finally, a specific form of equity finance, foreign direct investment, is 
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especially attractive because it is associated with technological transfer (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). 
Given the different benefits and costs of various external capital components, the 
strategic adjustment of capital structure is a worthwhile objective of public policy.  
However, before such policy initiatives can be formed, it is necessary to understand the 
factors that explain the existing capital structures of countries.  One such factor that has 
received attention in the recent literature is governance environment, also termed 
institutional infrastructure.  The governance environment of a country largely defines its 
investment environment, for both domestic and foreign investors, and thus its potential 
for economic growth (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002).  Most studies of external capital 
structure focus on a single component, usually FDI, since it is considered the most 
desired form of investment in terms of benefits to the host country.  Relatively few 
studies consider the factors that affect other forms of foreign investment, such as FPI, or 
the relative shares of the different components (Faria & Mauro, 2009; Li & Filer, 2007).  
 
The Research Problem  
We examine the effect of governance environment on the composition of a 
country’s external capital structure, specifically foreign equity investment.  In addition to 
the absolute quality of the host country’s governance environment, we consider the host 
country’s governance quality relative to that of the source (investor) country.  Our 
research questions include the following: 
• Does the quality of a host country’s governance environment relative to that of a 
source country impact the composition of foreign equity investment between the 
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two countries, specifically foreign direct investment as a fraction of total equity 
investment (foreign direct investment plus foreign portfolio investment)? 
• Does the level of insider ownership in the host country mediate the relationship 
between  
relative governance quality and the composition of foreign equity investment? 
 
Contributions of the Study 
Unlike previous studies, which utilize country totals, we examine foreign 
investment positions between pairs of individual countries (i.e., bilateral investment 
positions).  This is important because policy initiatives aimed at influencing a country’s 
external capital structure will impact investments from individual countries, which may 
or may not lead to the desired effect at the aggregate level.  Another contribution of our 
study is the introduction of a new measure of governance environment.  While existing 
studies have examined only the absolute quality of the host country’s governance 
environment, we also consider the host country’s governance quality relative to that of 
the source country.  
 By examining bilateral investment positions and relative governance quality, we 
investigate how a policy change can impact a country’s aggregate external capital 
structure through separate (and perhaps offsetting) effects on investments from individual 
countries.  The potential for offsetting effects at the individual country level challenges 
the notion of universal policy prescriptions for attracting foreign investment.  Finally, we 
also examine the influence of a country’s aggregate level of insider ownership on its 
external capital structure, specifically whether this relationship affects (mediates) the 
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influence of relative governance.  The existence of such a mediating relationship would 
suggest additional complexity in governance policy decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
discussion of the existing literature regarding the relationship between governance quality 
and foreign investment.  Chapter 3 builds the research hypotheses for our study, which 
address the new relative governance variable and the potential mediating effect of insider 
ownership.  Chapter 4 describes the empirical methodology and results.  Finally, a 
summary and discussion of the results are provided in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
Review of Literature 
 
 
International Equity Flows 
International equity flows are the primary feature of the globalization of capital 
markets, both in developing and developed economies (Goldstein & Razin, 2006).  These 
equity flows can generally be classified as either foreign direct investment (FDI) or 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI).  Officially, FDI and FPI are defined as the acquisition 
of more or less than some specific fraction (e.g., 5% or 10%) of a foreign firm’s shares.  
From an economic perspective, FDI is more than just the purchase of a substantial share 
in a foreign firm—it is an actual exercise of control and management (Razin, Sadka, & 
Yuen, 1998).  Likewise, the critical feature of FPI is the foreign investor’s lack of control 
over management.  Thus, FDI investors take both ownership and control positions in 
foreign firms, while FPI investors gain ownership without control (Goldstein & Razin, 
2006). 
Leblang (2010) notes that, within a country, opportunities for FPI are constrained 
by the shares issued by corporate entities, while FDI opportunities are diverse in terms of 
both content and ownership stake.  Leblang (2010) also highlights the greater 
heterogeneity of FDI relative to FPI.  While portfolio investors choose from equity stakes 
that are offered by issuing firms on an organized exchange, direct investors can acquire 
any number of different ownership stakes across a variety of asset classes.  In addition to 
a greater breadth of opportunity, FDI also differs from FPI in its greater risk of 
expropriation (Leblang, 2010).  Portfolio investments, in contrast, are made in assets that 
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are publicly issued by corporations, for which information is more readily available.  
Finally, because FPI is more liquid (i.e., it can be easily moved among markets and asset 
classes), it requires less information than FDI (Leblang, 2010). 
 
Role of Institutions in Financial Markets 
New institutional economics, grounded in neoclassical theory, emphasizes the 
role of institutions in the effective functioning of market-based economies (Rutherford, 
2001).  Scott (2001, p. 49-50) defines institutions as “multifaceted, durable social 
structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources” that 
“provide guidelines and resources for acting as well as prohibitions and constraints on 
action.”  Institutional theory is primarily concerned with how institutions facilitate or 
obstruct economic activities by increasing or reducing transaction costs (North, 1990).  
Guler and Guillen (2010) identify three institutional factors that are relevant to 
investments in general, and to cross-border investments in particular:  corporate law, 
equity markets, and political stability.  
 
Corporate Law 
Firms and investors prefer to operate in an environment where they are enabled 
and protected by legal institutions (Trevino, 1996).  Research (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) has documented that owners’ interests are defined and 
protected differently, depending on the legal tradition that provides the foundation for 
corporate law.  The two broad legal traditions that influence corporate law and investor 
protection are the English common law tradition and the civil law tradition (La Porta et 
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al., 1998).  A comparative analysis of corporate legal traditions, performed by La Porta et 
al. (1998), concludes that the English common law tradition provides stronger protection 
of investors’ rights against potential agency conflicts than does the civil law tradition.  
  
Equity Markets  
Financial markets are the component of the institutional infrastructure that enables 
the founding and growth of organizations (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003).  The stock market is 
particularly critical for equity investors, who do not intend to hold their investments 
indefinitely but rather seek to realize gains upon sale (Black & Gilson, 1998).  Large and 
active equity markets, which offer better prospects for eventually exiting an investment, 
thus serve to attract, reallocate, and reward investors’ capital (Guler & Guillen, 2010). 
 
Policy Stability  
Firms also benefit from the predictable execution of public policy (Trevino, 1996).  
Guler and Guillen (2010) note that, even with appropriate legal institutions to protect 
investors’ rights and the availability of financial markets in which to realize capital gains, 
there remains the possibility that policymakers may change the rules governing these 
institutions in order to expropriate investors’ returns.  According to Scott (2001), laws, 
rules, and regulations are rarely completely objective, and the extent of potential changes 
creates uncertainty for the regulated. 
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Institutional Quality and External Capital Structure 
Institutional deficiencies, such as unpredictable regulation, red tape, confiscatory 
taxation, and difficulties in enforcing contracts, are deterrents to private business in 
general, and especially to foreign investment (Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, & Zettlemeyer, 
2002).  Thus, institutional quality is a potentially important determinant of external 
capital structure, a link that supports a growing research focus on institutional variables in 
explaining economic development (Alfaro et al., 2008; Lothian, 2006).  Moreover, recent 
research (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2004) has identified a relationship between 
weak institutions and severe crises, although the mechanism underlying this relationship 
has not been identified.  Faria and Mauro (2009) suggest that, if institutional quality is 
associated with a more crisis-prone external capital structure, this could be the 
mechanism through which weak institutions influence the frequency and severity of 
crises.   
According to Guler and Guillen (2010), specific institutional factors that make a 
country attractive to one type of investor may not be as relevant for other types of 
investors.  For example, the legal protection of owners’ rights is certainly important to the 
portfolio investor but may be less so to the direct investor, who is able to exercise more 
control.  Similarly, the size and activity of a country’s equity market is critical to decision 
making in portfolio investments, where liquidity demands are higher, but much less 
relevant to direct investment.  Finally, although policy stability may be of concern to a 
portfolio investor, it impacts direct investors to a much greater extent. 
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Theory   
Faria and Mauro (2009) conjecture that weak institutional quality has the potential 
to deter both FDI and FPI.  Investors considering FDI may be especially concerned about 
the likelihood of exposure to requests for bribes and the need to work through red tape, 
while lack of transparency in the corporate sector and weak corporate governance may 
deter international portfolio investors.  Beyond such general propositions, the literature 
offers several formal hypotheses to explain the impact of institutions on the composition 
of external capital structures.  Wei (2001) suggests that weak institutions may reduce the 
relative proportion of FDI.  He explains that foreign banks are more likely than foreign 
direct investors to be bailed out in the event of a crisis and are thus more willing to invest 
(lend) in countries with weaker institutions.  Thus, if countries with weaker institutions 
are more susceptible to crisis, they will tend to have a smaller share of FDI in their 
external capital structures.   
Albuquerque (2003) explores the problems of expropriation and imperfect 
enforcement of financial contracts in international investments.  He suggests that, 
because much FDI is intangible in nature (e.g., technology, brand names), it is generally 
less subject to expropriation than other forms of international investment.  Under this 
assumption, the optimal contract between international investors and financially 
constrained countries (in which expropriation is more likely) will usually be FDI.  Thus, 
Albuquerque’s (2003) theory predicts that such countries will be financed primarily 
through FDI.   
Razin et al. (1998) focus on the role of information asymmetries, suggesting the 
existence of a “pecking order” in countries’ external capital structures, similar to the 
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corporate finance literature.  Under this theory, firms will pursue financing first through 
FDI (akin to retained earnings or internal equity), then through debt, and finally through 
portfolio equity (external equity).  Razin et al. (1998) suggest that, in the face of 
information barriers, foreign investors prefer FDI because it lets them place their own 
managers in the host country.  This proximity allows FDI investors to be more informed 
than FPI investors regarding changes in the prospects of the firm.  To the extent that 
weak institutional quality indicates informational asymmetries, it is expected to lead to a 
larger share of FDI and lower share of FPI in the external capital structure. 
Building upon Razin et al.’s (1998) model, Goldstein and Razin (2006) develop a 
theory that explains the higher volatility of FPI relative to FDI.  Like Razin et al. (1998), 
Goldstein and Razin (2006) note that, when information asymmetries exist, FDI 
facilitates more efficient management than FPI.  However, Goldstein and Razin (2006) 
also recognize information asymmetries as a source of weakness for FDI.  This weakness 
results from the possibility that investors may need to sell their investments in the case of 
liquidity shocks.  In this situation, the seller faces the “lemons problem” described in 
Akerlof’s (1970) landmark paper, which occurs when potential buyers know that the 
seller has more information.  Thus, an FDI investor bears the cost of receiving a lower 
price if/when it is necessary to sell the investment prematurely.   
According to Goldstein and Razin (2006), the tradeoff between management 
efficiency and liquidity (both sides of which are driven by information asymmetries) 
contributes to a high volatility of FPI relative to FDI.  Specifically, investors with high 
liquidity needs value liquidity over management efficiency and will thus choose FPI, 
while investors with low liquidity needs will choose FDI.  This is consistent with the 
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observation that FDI investors are often large multinational corporations with low 
liquidity needs, while FPI investors (e.g., global mutual funds) are more vulnerable to 
liquidity shocks. 
Goldstein and Razin’s (2006) theory is also consistent with several empirical 
observations.  First, developed economies attract larger shares of FPI than developing 
economies.  According to Goldstein and Razin (2006), this is because the greater 
transparency in developed economies alters the tradeoff and makes FPI more efficient.  
Second, since investors with high liquidity needs are attracted to FPI, this model can 
explain the high observed withdrawal rates of FPI relative to FDI, which contributes to 
the high volatility of the former relative to the latter.  Finally, consistent with 
observations, developed economies with greater transparency are expected to have 
smaller differences between the volatility of FPI and FDI because the high efficiency of 
FPI in these economies attracts more investors with low liquidity needs. 
Another information-based model is presented by Razin and Sadka (2007).  This 
model addresses the roles of the source country’s industry specialization and the host 
country’s transparency in differentiating FDI from other forms of capital flows, such as 
FPI.  Specifically, Razin and Sadka (2007) suggest that industry specialization in the 
source country provides a comparative advantage to potential FDI investors relative to 
domestic investors and FPI investors. Importantly, this comparative advantage is 
dependent on the accuracy of productivity signals in the host country, as reflected in 
corporate transparency and institutional quality.  When the signals are more accurate, the 
advantage of FDI investors is less pronounced, and FDI flows to the country decrease.  
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Thus, higher institutional quality is expected to decrease the share of FDI in total capital 
flows. 
 
Empirical Studies  
Existing research has not adequately addressed the role of governance quality in 
determining external capital structure.  Early studies of foreign investment drivers (e.g., 
Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2000, 2001) tested a limited number of factors, such as openness, 
economic size, and per-capita GDP.  Later studies that consider governance variables 
have produced mixed results, largely due to differences in measurement.  Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) identify governance environment as a significant determinant of FDI 
flows for a broad sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1995 to 
1997.  Their results suggest this relationship is stronger for developing countries.  Alfaro 
et al. (2008) examine determinants of equity capital inflows (including both FDI and FPI) 
for 47 countries averaged over the period 1970 to 2000.  They find that institutional 
quality (measured with a composite index of political safety variables), along with legal 
origin, has a first-order effect over policies in explaining the pattern of capital flows. 
Garibaldi et al. (2002) examine a wide range of potential determinants of both 
FDI and FPI inflows to a sample of 25 transition economies during the 1990s.  Their 
results show that the cross-country pattern of FDI flows can be explained reasonably well 
by standard macroeconomic variables that measure economic reform and trade 
liberalization.  In contrast, they find that FPI flows are much more difficult to model.  Of 
the numerous factors tested, only two—financial market infrastructure and a measure of 
the protection of property rights—are found to be significant, and the explanatory power 
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of the model is low (R2 of 0.40, vs. 0.90 for the FDI model).  According to Li and Filer 
(2007), this finding is likely due to the lack of development of portfolio markets in 
transition economies. 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) find no relationship, or possibly a 
negative relationship, between governance quality and the share of FDI in total capital 
inflows for 61 countries over the period 1996 to 1998.  Similarly, in a panel including 
both advanced and developing countries, Albuquerque (2003) observes that the share of 
FDI in total capital flows is negatively related to good credit ratings but unrelated to 
factors representing governance quality.  In contrast, Wei (2000a, 2000b, 2001) finds that 
weaker institutions shift capital inflows toward bank loans and away from FDI, which is 
consistent with his hypothesis that FDI investors are less likely than banks to be bailed 
out in the event of a crisis.   
Li and Filer (2007) examine the relationship between governance environment 
and the composition of foreign capital inflows for 44 countries in the late 1990s.  Their 
primary contribution to the literature is utilization of a broader measure of governance 
quality that includes not only government institutions, but also public institutions 
comprising culture and information infrastructure.  Consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2002), Li and Filer (2007) identify a significant positive 
relationship between their “governance environment index” (GEI) and FDI.  More 
importantly, they identify a significant negative relationship between GEI and the share 
of FDI in relation to total foreign capital inflows.  Together, these results imply that, the 
higher the quality of a country’s governance environment, the more FDI it will receive; 
however, FDI will constitute a smaller share of total foreign capital inflows. 
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A recent study by Faria and Mauro (2009) differs from most earlier studies in that 
it examines capital stocks rather than capital flows.  This approach is used because stocks 
are the object of capital structure theory in the finance literature, and empirical studies of 
the determinants of domestic capital structure usually test liability stocks.  For 94 
countries from year 1996 to 2004, Faria and Mauro (2009) examine the relationship 
between changes in governance quality and changes in the share of total equity in the 
external capital structure.  Their primary and most robust finding is that governance 
quality is significantly positively related to the share of total equity.  This result suggests 
that, holding other factors constant, a stronger governance environment shifts countries’ 
external capital structures toward equity and away from debt. 
 
Informational v. Institutional Effects 
A shortcoming of the existing literature, particularly with regard to the application 
of theory, is the treatment of information frictions and institutional deficiencies as one in 
the same.  In a very broad sense, both represent market failures—institutional 
deficiencies imply absent or poorly functioning markets, which serve as a mechanism 
that allows information asymmetries to persist.  From this conceptual standpoint, the 
theories of Albuquerque (2003) and Goldstein and Razin (2006) appear to tell the same 
story.  Specifically, in the presence of information frictions and/or market deficiencies, 
FDI is the more efficient form of foreign investment because it implies greater 
managerial control and better information.  In other words, with FDI, the firm substitutes 
for a functioning market mechanism. 
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 Daude and Fratzscher (2008) consider a different perspective, recognizing that 
information frictions and institutions may have different, although closely linked, effects 
on the composition of foreign investment.  They empirically test this proposition by 
separately examining the relationships between these two factors and all components of 
external capital structure for 77 countries:  FDI, bank loans, portfolio equity, and 
portfolio debt.  Daude and Fratzscher (2008) find that both information frictions and 
institutions have a significant impact on the pecking order of foreign capital.  Specifically, 
FDI and bank loans are the most sensitive to information frictions, while FPI equity and 
FPI debt are the least sensitive.  In contrast, their results show that portfolio investment, 
particularly portfolio equity, is much more sensitive than FDI or bank loans to a broad set 
of institutional indicators.  This finding holds even for corruption, which contradicts the 
common hypothesis that corruption is particularly detrimental to FDI.  Another key 
finding is that portfolio investment is substantially more sensitive to various measures of 
financial development than FDI or bank loans. 
 
Beyond Host Governance 
Source Country Governance   
While most studies examining the influence of governance quality on foreign 
investment have considered only the governance environment of the host country, Kim, 
Sung, and Wei (2011) take a different approach, focusing on governance characteristics 
in the source country.  Specifically, they examine whether differences across investors in 
terms of corporate governance features affect their patterns of FPI abroad.  They explain 
that, if weak corporate governance carries a risk that is not fully reflected in market prices, 
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investors should prefer well-governed companies in well-governed countries (i.e., a 
“preference for good governance”), regardless of their source countries.  This is because 
investors from poorly-governed countries prefer a higher expected return just as much as 
investors from well-governed countries.  However, if governance risks are fully 
discounted in market prices, then risk and return concerns alone cannot justify the 
preference for good governance that is documented in the literature.  Rather, some 
alternative explanation is required. 
According to Kim et al. (2011), a potential explanation is the “familiarity bias,” 
which refers to investors favoring companies that are closer to the source country in 
terms of geography or culture.  They extend this notion to characteristics of corporate 
governance, suggesting that the preference for good governance may be weaker for 
investors from countries with poor governance.  Thus, the quality of corporate 
governance in the source country matters.  Kim et al. (2011) test their hypothesis by 
examining foreign institutional investors’ holdings of Korean stocks that are 
characterized by a significant control-ownership disparity.  They find that investors from 
low-disparity countries disfavor high-disparity Korean stocks, but investors from high-
disparity countries are indifferent.  This suggests that the nature of corporate governance 
in international investors’ home countries influences their portfolio choices abroad.  In 
addition to control-ownership disparity, Kim et al. (2011) find that other common 
country-level governance measures, including legal origin and an anti-self dealing index, 
influence foreign investment patterns. 
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A New Application of the Gravity Model   
In addition to highlighting the importance of governance characteristics in the 
source country, the results of Kim et al.’s (2011) study also draw attention to differences 
between the host and source countries.  Specifically, their study finds that control-
ownership disparity in the source country influences FPI only when it differs from 
control-ownership disparity in the host country.  The proposition that country differences 
can explain foreign investment bears resemblance to the gravity model of international 
trade, which predicts trade flows based on various “distance” factors between countries. 
Tinbergen (1962) was the first to apply Newton’s model of the gravitational force 
between two bodies to commodity trade, and Anderson (1979) showed how it can be 
derived from trade theory.  The standard gravity model predicts bilateral trade flows 
based on the sizes of two economies (usually measured by GDP) and the geographic 
distance between them.  Although the gravity model was initially introduced to explain 
international trade, it has since been applied to a number of international finance topics.  
Empirical studies of FDI and FPI (e.g., Portes & Rey, 1998, 2005) have shown that the 
gravity model can be used to explain financial asset trade as well as commodity trade.  In 
such applications, the geographic distance variable is interpreted as a proxy for 
transaction and transportation costs, information asymmetries, currency risk, and 
institutional differences.   
 
Other Concepts of Distance 
Portes and Rey (2005) added several additional variables to the gravity model to 
capture information asymmetries.  Hypothesizing that geographically close countries are 
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more familiar with each other because of direct contact through business and tourism, 
they examined the number of telephone calls between countries, the number of 
overlapping trading hours, foreign bank branches, and the degree of financial 
sophistication.  The addition of these variables reduced the role of geographic distance in 
their models, confirming that distance acts as a proxy for information effects.  Empirical 
results such as these suggest the existence of other distance factors in addition to 
geographic distance.  In a recent study, Aggarwal, Kearney, and Lucey (2012) model FPI 
as a function of three distinct sets of variables:  1) basic gravity variables; 2) variables 
that capture variation in institutional strength and information quality; and 3) cultural 
variables.  Importantly, the set of cultural variables includes not only measures for both 
the host and source countries, but also a measure of cultural distance between the two 
countries. 
While previous studies note the relevance of institutional differences between 
countries to foreign capital flows, Mian (2006) was the first to use and define the term 
“institutional distance.”  To investigate the widely held belief that globalization facilitates 
the financial development of emerging economies, Mian (2006) studies the banking 
sector in Pakistan, a traditionally underdeveloped market that has recently experienced a 
substantial expansion in foreign banking operations.  He finds that, compared to domestic 
banks, foreign banks systematically avoid lending to “soft-information” firms that require 
relational contracting.  Moreover, foreign banks are less likely to renegotiate in the case 
of default and less successful at recovering defaults.  These results indicate that, while 
foreign banks are willing to offer arm’s-length loans based on hard information, they are 
at a comparative disadvantage with regard to soft-information based loans.   
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Mian’s (2006) explanation for these results is that, when foreign banks open a 
branch or subsidiary in a “distant” economy, they face extra information and agency costs 
in making relational loans.  According to Mian (2006), distance in this context could 
reflect a number of factors, such as physical distance between the foreign bank’s 
headquarters and the subsidiary, cultural distance, intrabank hierarchical distance due to 
bank size, or institutional distance between the foreign bank’s country and that of the 
subsidiary.  Mian (2006) hypothesizes that the reluctance of foreign banks to engage in 
relational lending could reflect the additional costs of such distance constraints.  To test 
whether this hypothesis is valid and, if so, which distance factors are most relevant, Mian 
(2006) examines variation among foreign banks in their “distance travelled.”  He finds 
that both geographical and cultural distance are important factors in explaining the 
lending, recovery, and renegotiation differences between domestic and foreign banks 
lending in Pakistan.  Moreover, he finds that these distance constraints are more likely to 
be driven by informational and agency costs rather than enforcement problems. 
 
Insider Ownership as a Mediating Factor 
Another unique empirical contribution of our study is the examination of insider 
ownership as a mediating variable in the relationship between relative governance quality 
and the composition of foreign equity investment.  The identification of such a mediating 
relationship has significant implications.  If the relationship is direct, then countries 
seeking to increase FPI inflows relative to FDI inflows should focus their efforts on 
strengthening institutions that support decentralized ownership.  However, if the 
relationship is mediated by insider ownership, the prescription is more complicated 
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because insider ownership is likely to be influenced by a number of factors other than 
governance.   
 
Home Bias   
Although the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) prescribes that 
individuals should hold equities around the world in proportion to market capitalizations, 
this does not describe actual international investment behavior.  Instead, research has 
documented disproportionately large allocations of capital to investors’ home countries.  
French and Poterba (1991) argue that investors prefer domestic assets as a result of what 
they call “familiarity effects.”  More specifically, Tesar and Werner (1995) attribute the 
phenomenon to factors such as language and institutional differences.  Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) explain the home bias in terms of information asymmetries, arguing 
that investors have access to better information about assets sold in markets that are 
geographically closer.  More recently, it has been proposed that “cultural affinity,” rather 
than familiarity or geographic proximity, may be the key driver of the home bias (Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2005).   
 
Optimal Insider Ownership 
Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2009) note that corporate insiders around the world 
display a unique form of home bias, specifically a tendency to overweight personal 
investment holdings of the firms they control.  In an attempt to explain this concentration, 
Kho et al. (2009) apply corporate agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which 
predicts that firm value is maximized when corporate insiders have greater ownership, 
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because this helps align their interests with those of minority shareholders.  Under this 
theory, insider ownership should be larger when agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders are stronger.  Research suggests that agency conflicts are stronger when 
institutions that protect investors are weaker (Stulz, 2005).  Thus, Kho et al. (2009) 
propose that weak governance increases the optimal level of insider ownership, which 
limits portfolio holdings by foreign investors and thereby increases the home bias. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), conflicts created by controlling 
shareholders are mitigated by the presence of investors who actively monitor the 
controlling shareholders.  Kho et al. (2009) suggest that, by changing the incentives for 
foreign investors to engage in such monitoring activity, governance can impact the 
composition of foreign investment.  Specifically, they propose that FDI investors from 
countries with better governance than the host country are limited in their ability to 
consume the private benefits enjoyed by domestic insiders.  As a result, FDI investors 
have a comparative advantage in monitoring controlling shareholders and strong 
incentives to use their information to limit insider benefits.  Kho et al. (2009) predict that, 
as the governance of the host country improves, the benefits of monitoring decrease and 
FDI becomes less attractive relative to FPI.   
The existence of an optimal level of insider ownership and an important role for 
monitoring shareholders forms the basis for Kho et al.’s (2009) “optimal corporate 
ownership theory of the home bias.”  As explained above, this theory proposes that an 
improvement in governance has an effect on the home bias, since it allows firm value to 
be maximized with less insider ownership and, thus, greater holdings by portfolio 
investors (including foreign investors).  Under this theory, governance also impacts the 
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composition of foreign investment, because the same forces that reduce the optimal level 
of insider ownership also reduce the benefits of FDI compared to FPI.  The key insight of 
Kho et al.’s (2009) theory is that share ownership does not depend only on the demand 
for shares by portfolio investors.  Rather, there is an optimal level of ownership by 
insiders, which reduces the shares available to portfolio investors.  Since insiders are 
more likely to be domestic investors, greater insider ownership should be associated with 
lower holdings by foreign investors. 
Kho et al. (2009) predict that the share of FDI in total foreign investment is 
negatively related to the quality of governance and positively related to the fraction of 
shares held by insiders.  They empirically test this theory, examining changes in U.S. 
equity investments in 34 countries between 1994 and 2004.  Consistent with expectations, 
they find that the share of U.S. FDI relative to FPI decreases when insider ownership 
decreases.  Importantly, once insider ownership is accounted for, they find no significant 
relationship between the composition of U.S. foreign equity investment and several 
governance variables.  These results indicate that governance affects the composition of 
U.S. foreign equity investments (as reflected in changes in the home bias) through its 
impact on corporate ownership by insiders and monitoring shareholders. 
 
Governance and Insider Ownership  
La Porta et al. (1998) shed further light on the relationship between governance 
and insider ownership.  They propose that firms in countries with poor investor protection 
have more concentrated ownership, citing two specific reasons for this pattern.  First, 
large shareholders who monitor managers may need to own more capital, all else equal, 
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to exercise control rights.  Second, when they have poor protection, small investors may 
be willing to buy shares only at such low prices that make it unattractive for firms to 
issue new shares.  According to La Porta et al. (1998), such low demand for shares by 
minority investors would indirectly fuel ownership concentration.  La Porta et al. (1998) 
test their hypothesis by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and 
several measures of investor protection in 45 countries.  They find that countries with 
better accounting standards, stronger anti-director rights, and mandatory dividend rules 
have lower ownership concentration.  These results suggest that concentrated ownership 
is a response to, and possibly a substitute for, weak investor protection in a corporate 
governance system. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
 
Relative Governance 
 The literature provides several theories of how governance impacts foreign 
investment.  Recognizing that certain governance factors are more or less relevant to 
certain types of investors, these theories predict a relationship between governance and 
the relative components of foreign investment, such as FDI relative to FPI.  The practical 
implication is that countries seeking to change their external capital structures should 
focus on specific governance variables that are most relevant to the specific type of 
investor they want to attract.  Clearly, the issue is more complex than suggested by 
universal prescriptions for “good” governance.  Although existing theory considers 
relativity in the dependent factor (i.e., the impact on foreign investment), it views the 
explanatory factor (governance) in absolute terms—looking only at the host country.  
This narrow view may partially explain the failure of empirical studies to establish a clear 
link between governance quality and variables reflecting countries’ external capital 
structures.   
As previously discussed, empirical studies utilizing the gravity model have 
identified a significant relationship between geographic distance and foreign investment.  
This distance factor is interpreted as proxying for a number of different effects, including 
informational asymmetries and institutional differences between the host and source 
countries.  Mian (2006) explicitly recognized the role of such differences by examining 
an “institutional distance” variable that reflects the higher informational and agency costs
 
25 
 
 
 
of foreign banks operating abroad.  Kim et al. (2011) contributed to the literature by 
showing that source-country, as well as host-country, governance characteristics 
influence foreign investment patterns.  If, as the literature suggests, governance 
characteristics of both the source and host countries are significant factors in explaining 
foreign investment, then the difference in governance quality between the source and host 
countries (akin to the notion of institutional distance) is likely to play a role.  Our primary 
contribution to the literature is the introduction of a new measure of governance 
environment to explain foreign investment.  In addition to the absolute quality of the host 
country’s governance environment, we consider the host country’s governance quality 
relative to that of the source country.   
 
Relative Shares of Foreign Investment  
We investigate this relative concept of governance as a potential driver of the 
composition of a country’s external capital structure, i.e., relative shares of foreign 
investment components.  Specifically, the dependent variable of interest is FDI as a share 
of total foreign equity investment (FDI / FE).  Predicting the impact of relative 
governance on this fraction requires consideration of separate effects on the numerator 
and denominator.  As previously noted, there is empirical evidence that FPI, particularly 
equity FPI, is much more sensitive than FDI to institutional factors (Daude & Fratzscher, 
2008).  Thus, we expect relative governance to impact the composition of foreign equity 
investment primarily through its impact on FPI.  
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Research Hypotheses 
Although previous studies have examined various governance factors in relation 
to foreign investment, their results do not offer strong implications for our primary 
research question.  First, the results of these studies are not consistent and are not 
strongly linked to theory.  Moreover, they conceptualize governance in terms of the host 
country only, without any   consideration of potential source country effects.  Our key 
proposition is that relative governance plays a different, and perhaps more important, role 
than absolute governance in explaining foreign investment.  Thus, previous studies that 
address only absolute governance may be of limited value in predicting relationships for 
relative governance.  Moreover, as noted above, the ratio nature of the dependent variable 
introduces further complexity.   
Of the various studies reviewed herein, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) provide the 
most useful direction for developing our hypotheses.  They find that institutional factors 
have the greatest impact on FPI, which suggests that relative governance will influence 
the ratio FDI / FE primarily through its influence on the denominator, which includes 
both FDI and FPI.  As previously discussed, the literature is much more developed with 
regard to individual components of foreign investment (i.e., FDI or FPI) than to relative 
shares of these components. The general consensus is that FDI is explained by factors 
such as foreign market size and costs of production, while FPI is motivated more by 
yield-seeking and risk reduction through portfolio diversification.   
Aurelio (2006) shows that growth in U.S. foreign investment over the period 1990 
to 2004 was fueled primarily by investment in foreign corporate stocks (i.e., FPI).  
Moreover, he examines three potential factors that may explain why U.S. investors have 
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become more inclined to invest in some foreign markets but not others—institutional 
elements, levels of return, and opportunities for risk diversification.  Aurelio (2006) finds 
that foreign markets with low betas measured relative to the world market portfolio 
attract more U.S. investment, concluding that risk diversification is the best explanation.  
Desai and Dharmapala (2008) highlight the importance of taxes in evaluating the yield 
and diversification benefits of FPI.  Although it is often argued that investors can achieve 
foreign diversification either through FPI or by investing in domestic multinational 
corporations that invest abroad, differential tax treatment creates an advantage for FPI 
(i.e., higher after-tax yields).   
Thus, yield and diversification concerns should be considered in predicting the 
impact of relative governance on FPI.  Employing this perspective, host countries with 
weaker governance may be more attractive to FPI investors, especially those in countries 
with stronger governance.  In other words, the governance quality of both the host and 
source—that is, relative governance—matters.  Investors in source countries with 
stronger governance are more likely to seek yield and diversification from FPI, which is 
provided by host countries with weaker governance (Aurelio, 2006).  Thus, a higher 
governance disparity reflects a “match” between what source country investors seek from 
FPI and what the host country offers.  Our first hypothesis flows from this reasoning: 
H1. Countries with a lower quality of governance environment relative to that of 
another country (i.e., a greater difference) will attract a smaller share of FDI 
from that country. 
 On the surface, this may appear to contradict existing theory.  As previously 
explained, the general consensus is that FDI should be the more efficient (and thus 
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preferred) means of foreign investment when informational asymmetries exist, because it 
allows for greater control.  This would seem to suggest a positive relationship between 
relative governance and FDI / FE— a greater governance disparity leads to a larger share 
of FDI.  While this comparative evaluation may apply in certain contexts, it is not useful:  
1) for predicting aggregate results; 2) if FDI and FPI investors are segregated to some 
extent; 3) with the latter being more sensitive to governance factors.                            
 With regard to the first of these three conditions, it is important to note that our 
study examines the “choice” of a source country between FDI and FPI, not an individual 
investor.  The aggregate effect at the country level results from the combination of many 
individual investors.  The next question (the second condition) is whether individual 
investors evaluate this decision differently.  According to Goldstein and Razin (2006), 
they do.  A key implication of their theory, which is explicitly noted in Razin and 
Serechetapongse (2011), is that the choice between FDI and FPI is related to investors’ 
sensitivity to liquidity risk.  Specifically, in a separating equilibrium, high liquidity risk 
investors tend to choose FPI, while low liquidity risk investors tend to choose FDI.  
Finally, as previously noted, the empirical results of Daude and Fratzscher (2008) address 
the third condition, suggesting a stronger governance effect for FPI than for FDI. Under 
these conditions, a greater governance disparity will increase FDI but will increase FPI 
more.  Thus, existing theory is not wrong but rather incomplete with regard to our 
specific research questions. 
 Our first research hypothesis contemplates a direct relationship between relative 
governance and external capital structure.  This notion is challenged by Kho et al.’s (2009) 
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optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias, which suggests the relationship 
between governance environment and the composition of foreign investment (specifically, 
FDI relative to FPI) is mediated by insider ownership.  In other words, governance affects 
foreign investment not directly, but rather through its impact on insider ownership:  better 
governance reduces the optimal level of insider ownership, which makes more shares 
available to foreign portfolio investors.  To determine whether the relationship in H1 is 
mediated by insider ownership, as proposed by Kho et al. (2009), an additional 
hypothesis is tested:  
H2. The relationship between a country’s quality of governance environment 
relative to that of another country and its share of FDI from that country is 
mediated by the host country’s aggregate level of insider ownership.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
Methodology and Results 
 
Variables and Data Sources 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable we examine is FDI as a share of total foreign equity 
investment (FDI plus FPI).  Unlike previous studies, which utilize country totals, we 
examine foreign investment between pairs of individual countries.  Data for bilateral 
investment positions are from the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) and 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) compiled by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  The CDIS, which is available beginning in year 2009, collects 
comprehensive data on FDI positions by economy of direct investor (for inward FDI) and 
by economy of investment (for outward FDI).  It also provides several breakdowns, 
including separate data on equity and debt positions.  The CPIS, which is available 
beginning in year 1997, collects information on the stock of cross-border holdings of 
equity and debt securities broken down by the issuer’s economy of residence. 
 
Explanatory Variables  
The two primary factors we examine are absolute governance (ABS GOV), the 
governance environment quality of the host country, and relative governance (REL GOV), 
the governance environment quality of the source country relative to that of the host 
country (source minus host).  Following Faria and Mauro (2009), absolute governance is 
measured as the simple average of six institutional indicators drawn from the Worldwide 
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Governance Indicators (WGI) project, a research dataset that is sponsored and distributed 
by the World Bank.  The six indicators measure six broad dimensions of governance, 
including:   
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – captures the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as the freedoms of 
expression and association and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) – captures the likelihood of a 
country’s government being destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – captures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressure, the 
quality of policy development and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – captures the ability of the government to develop and 
implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector 
development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL) – captures the extent to which agents have confidence in the 
rules of society, especially the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC) – captures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain. 
These governance indicators are subjective in nature, compiled from 30 individual data 
sources that combine the perceptions of many enterprise, citizen, and expert survey 
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respondents.  The WGI project reports the indicators for 215 industrial and developing 
countries beginning in year 1996.  Each index ranges from -2 (representing weak 
governance) to +2 (representing strong governance) for most countries, with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one.   
The relative governance measure is a new contribution of our study.  It is 
measured as the simple average of the six institutional indicators for the source country 
minus that for the host country.  This measurement (i.e., differences) mitigates the impact 
of potential bias due to the subjective nature of the governance indicators.  In addition to 
the governance measures, the other explanatory factor of interest (for H2) is insider 
ownership (IO) in the host country.  Data for this variable are from Kho et al. (2009), 
who measured aggregate insider ownership for 44 countries in 2004.  These measures, 
including both an equal-weighted average and a value-weighted average, were 
aggregated from firm-level block holdings reported by WorldScope.   
 
Regression Models 
The following linear regression models are used to examine the two research 
hypotheses: 
1. FDI / FEi = b0 + b1(ABS GOVi,) + b2(REL GOVi) +bkXki + Ei 
2. FDI / FEi = b0 + b1(ABS GOVi) + b2(REL GOVi) + b3(IOi) + bkXki + Ei 
where ABS GOV is the absolute governance measure for the host country, REL GOV is 
the relative governance measure between the host and source countries (source minus 
host), and X represents a vector of control variables.  The regressions are estimated 
including ABS GOV only (specification A) and both ABS GOV and REL GOV 
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(specification B).  To test for potential nonlinearities in the relationship between the 
dependent variable and REL GOV, a squared version of this explanatory variable is 
included in a third specification (C).   
 
Controls 
The selection of control variables is based on previous empirical work, which has 
focused primarily on the determinants of FDI.  First is the strength of minority 
shareholder rights in the host country, measured by Djankov et al.’s (2008) “anti-self 
dealing index.”  Since this variable represents an element of governance, it is treated 
herein as an auxiliary governance variable, the behavior of which can be compared to the 
composite measure (WGI index) for further insight.  Faria and Mauro (2009) identify 
several other factors that are related to host countries’ capital structures, especially FDI:  
size of the economy, economic development, credit markets development, openness, 
natural resources, and whether the country is a transition economy.  These are considered 
“pull” factors, since they represent characteristics of the host country that attract (i.e., pull) 
investment from other countries.  Other control factors employed in previous studies (e.g., 
Garibaldi et al., 2002; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002, 2003; Hausmann et al., 2000; Kim et 
al., 2011) include physical distance between the source and host countries, host stock 
market development, host legal origin, and host tax burden.  Finally, following Portes and 
Rey (2005), bilateral trade flows (i.e., trade flows between individual pairs of countries) 
are included in the model, with a lag of one year to avoid endogeneity issues.  Definitions 
and data sources for all control variables are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Control Variables 
Name Abbrev. Description Source 
Host Anti-
Self Dealing 
Index 
HSELF Index of the strength of minority 
shareholder protection against 
self dealing by controlling 
shareholders, based on legal rules 
prevailing in 2003 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
Trade Flows TRAD Exports reported by source to 
host if available; otherwise, 
imports reported by host from 
source  
OECD International 
Trade by Commodity 
Statistics (ICTS), 
Harmonised System 
1988, All Commodities 
Physical 
Distance 
DIST Greater circle distance; shortest 
distance between borders for 
country pairs including large 
countries (Brazil, Canada, China, 
India, Russia & U.S.) and 
distance between capitals for all 
other countries; measured in 
deciles  
Geographic coordinates 
from CIA World 
Factbook 
Host Size HSIZ Natural log of total GDP in 
constant 2009 dollars 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host 
Economic 
Development 
HECON Natural log of per-capita GDP in 
constant 2009 dollars 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host Stock 
Market 
Development 
HSTOCK Stock market capitalization as % 
of GDP 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host Credit 
Markets 
Development 
HCRED Domestic credit to private sector 
as % of GDP 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host 
Openness 
HOPEN Sum of exports and imports as % 
of GDP 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host Natural 
Resources 
HNAT Ores and metals exports as % of 
merchandise exports 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host Tax 
Burden 
HTAX Amount of taxes and mandatory 
contributions payable by 
businesses, after accounting for 
allowable deductions and 
exemptions, as % of commercial 
profits 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Host Legal 
Origin 
HLEG Indicator variable for English, 
French, German or Scandinavian 
origin 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
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Host 
Transition 
Economy 
HTRANS An indicator variable that equals 
one if the host country belonged 
to the former USSR, former 
Yugoslavia, or ex-communist 
countries 
N/A 
 
Table 2 presents expected directions of the relationships for the control variables, 
along with the previous study (or studies) on which the expectation is based.  
Albuquerque (2003), Hausmann et al. (2000), and Li & Filer (2007) are the most directly 
applicable references, as their dependent variables are ratios similar to ours.  From other 
studies that examined only FDI or FPI, we inferred the relative impact on our ratio of 
interest (FDI / FE).  Two control variables for which we have no clear expectation are 
Host Anti-Self Dealing Index and Tax Burden.  HSELF is included in our model as an 
auxiliary governance variable to serve as a reference point for our primary governance 
variable.  If relative governance (rather than host governance) is the driving factor in our 
model, and HSELF acts as a governance variable, then we do not expect it to show 
significance.  Although HTAX has been tested in previous studies, it has not been 
identified as a significant factor.  We nonetheless include it in our model since taxes may 
be more likely to play a role in explaining the relative share of FDI and FPI than either 
component individually.  Because higher taxes imply lower after-tax returns, this factor 
should negatively impact both FDI and FPI.  Given the tax advantage of FPI noted by 
Desai and Dharmapala (2008), the impact on FDI is expected to be greater, suggesting a 
negative relationship for the ratio FDI / FE. 
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Table 2 
Expected Signs of Control Variables 
Variable Sign Source 
HSELF N/A Kim et al. (2011) 
TRAD Positive Portes & Rey (2005) 
DIST Positive Hausmann et al. (2000) 
HSIZ Negative Hausmann et al. (2000) 
HECON Negative Albuquerque, 2003; Hausmann et al. (2000) 
HSTOCK Negative Faria & Mauro (2009), Garibaldi et al. (2002), Lane 
& Milesi-Ferretti (2003) 
HCRED Negative Hausmann et al. (2000) 
HOPEN Positive Hausmann et al. (2000), Li & Filer (2007) 
HNAT Positive Faria & Mauro (2009), Garibaldi et al. (2002), 
Hausmann et al. (2000) 
HTAX Negative Alfaro et al. (2008), Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2003) 
HTRANS Negative Faria & Mauro (2009) 
 
Sample 
Our sample includes all pairs of countries for which the necessary data are 
available for years 2009 (the first year that bilateral FDI investment positions are 
available) through 2011.  Of the two investment data sets, CPIS and CDIS, the former 
contains the greater number of country-pair observations.  For each year, the sample 
begins with the total number of CPIS observations and is reduced as follows: 
• Remove observations with no/confidential CDIS data 
• Remove observations with negative CDIS data 
• Remove observations with no/confidential CPIS data 
• Remove observations with negative CPIS data 
• Remove observations that would create zero-denominator fractions in the 
dependent variables 
• Remove countries with no WGI data (for the governance factor) 
 
37 
 
 
 
This process results in 8,682 observations across the three subject years.  Of this total, 
control data are available for 3,891 observations, which determines the size of the final 
sample.  This sample includes observations for 49 different source countries and 69 host 
countries, the distribution of which is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Distribution of Sample Countries  
 
Source Host  Source Host 
Country    #  %  # % Country      #  %  # % 
Argentina 7 0.18%     48  1.23% Kenya  0.00%     19  0.49% 
Australia 52 1.34%     92  2.36% Korea, Rep. 187 4.81%     83  2.13% 
Austria 140 3.60%     81  2.08% Latvia 47 1.21%     38  0.98% 
Belgium 108 2.78%     91  2.34% Lithuania 81 2.08%     43  1.11% 
Bolivia 
 
0.00%     19  0.49% Luxembourg 67 1.72%     96  2.47% 
Brazil 55 1.41%     67  1.72% Malaysia 17 0.44%     51  1.31% 
Bulgaria 8 0.21%     49  1.26% Mexico 52 1.34%     71  1.82% 
Chile 17 0.44%     63  1.62% Morocco  0.00%     31  0.80% 
China  0.00%     69  1.77% Netherlands 180 4.63%   108  2.78% 
China, H.K. 28 0.72%     78  2.00% New Zealand 16 0.41%     43  1.11% 
Colombia 8 0.21%     37  0.95% Nigeria  0.00%     38  0.98% 
Croatia  0.00%     42  1.08% Pakistan 20 0.51%     27  0.69% 
Czech Repub. 96 2.47%     71  1.82% Panama 7 0.18%     18  0.46% 
Denmark 171 4.39%     83  2.13% Peru  0.00%     34  0.87% 
Ecuador 
 
0.00%     23  0.59% Philippines 22 0.57%     44  1.13% 
Egypt 6 0.15%     45  1.16% Poland 85 2.18%     84  2.16% 
El Salvador  0.00%     20  0.51% Portugal 113 2.90%     71  1.82% 
Finland 96 2.47%     78  2.00% Russian Fed. 79 2.03%     68  1.75% 
France 150 3.86%   102  2.62% Singapore 18 0.46%     59  1.52% 
Germany 183 4.70%   106  2.72% South Africa 81 2.08%     67  1.72% 
Ghana 
 
0.00%     27  0.69% Spain 61 1.57%     92  2.36% 
Greece 95 2.44%     70  1.80% Sri Lanka  0.00%     27  0.69% 
Hungary 144 3.70%     81  2.08% Sweden 137 3.52%     88  2.26% 
Iceland 97 2.49%     37  0.95% Switzerland 155 3.98%     91  2.34% 
India 47 1.21%     67  1.72% Thailand 70 1.80%     57  1.46% 
Indonesia 4 0.10%     52  1.34% Tunisia  0.00%     29  0.75% 
Ireland 73 1.88%     89  2.29% Turkey 135 3.47%     74  1.90% 
Israel 79 2.03%     62  1.59% Uganda  0.00%     11  0.28% 
Italy 165 4.24%   101  2.60% Ukraine  0.00%     51  1.31% 
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Jamaica 
 
0.00%     17  0.44% U.K. 111 2.85%   112  2.88% 
Japan 77 1.98%     86  2.21% U.S. 175 4.50%   119  3.06% 
Jordan 
 
0.00%     24  0.62% Venezuela 2 0.05%     35  0.90% 
Kazakhstan 67 1.72%     35  0.90%      
 
As illustrated in Table 3, no single country represents more than 5% of the sample 
as host or source.  The top ten source countries comprise 42.4% of the sample, while the 
top ten host countries comprise 26.2% of the sample.  This indicates that concentration in 
the sample is higher on the source side, which is explained by the nature of the 
investment databases.   Specifically, in the CPIS database, investment positions are 
reported from the source side only. Thus, if a source country does not participate in the 
survey, its outward investment positions cannot be inferred from data reported by other 
participants.  This data limitation is noted in other studies that utilize CPIS data (e.g., 
Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, & Tamirisa, 2010).  Finally, Table 3 shows that the observations 
are allocated rather evenly across the three years—34.1% in 2009, 34.6% in 2010, and 
31.3% in 2011.  
 
Empirical Results 
Descriptives 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables, and pairwise 
correlations of the continuous explanatory variables are reported in Table 5.  As 
illustrated in Table 5, several of the explanatory variables are significantly correlated.   
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI / FE 0.620 0.352 0.000 1.000 
ABS GOV 0.588 0.876 -1.610 1.859 
REL GOV 0.244 1.229 -3.249 3.319 
HSELF 0.476 0.239 0.080 1.000 
TRAD 20.661 2.177 8.730 26.200 
DIST 3.164 2.160 1.000 10.000 
HSIZ  26.800 1.519 23.214 30.339 
HECON 9.749 1.151 6.171 11.646 
HSTOCK 0.734 0.700 0.010 4.721 
HCRED 1.112 0.622 0.133 2.336 
HOPEN 0.975 0.786 0.221 4.461 
HNAT 0.711 0.112 0.002 0.645 
HTAX 0.450 0.154 0.208 1.082 
HLEG (Eng) 0.270 0.446 0.000 1.000 
HLEG (Scand) 0.070 0.261 0.000 1.000 
HLEG (Germ) 0.230 0.419 0.000 1.000 
HTRANS 0.140 0.352 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 5 
Pairwise Correlations 
 
ABS 
GOV 
1 
REL 
GOV 
2 
H 
SELF 
3 
TRAD 
4 
DIST 
5 
H   
SIZ 
6 
H  
ECON 
7 
H 
STOCK 
8 
H   
CRED 
9 
H 
OPEN 
10 
H 
NAT 
11 
H 
TAX 
12 
1 1            2 -.773 1           
3 .055 -.033 1          
4 .128 -.085 .066 1         
5 -.115 .062 .261 -.274 1        
6 .127 -.144 .171 .499 -.002 1       
7 .753 -.627 .024 .215 -.166 .311 1      
8 .171 -.148 .448 .075 .153 .103 .278 1     
9 .568 -.490 .278 .207 -.119 .338 .706 .430 1    
10 .225 -.156 .201 -.098 -.047 -.358 .283 .552 .251 1   
11 .032 .012 .129 -.155 .295 -.161 -.086 .169 -.137 -.105 1  
12 -.230 .173 -.297 .114 .029 .297 -.198 -.393 -.342 -.442 -.166 1 
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Regressions 
Our regression results are presented in Table 6.  The three specifications present 
different pictures of the significance of the governance variables.  In specification A, 
which includes only ABS GOV, this variable is highly significant with a positive 
coefficient.  This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies that examined 
only host-country governance.  However, when REL GOV is added in specification B, 
the significance of ABS GOV is reduced, and its sign changes.  REL GOV is highly 
significant with a negative coefficient of substantial magnitude.  Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, this suggests that a host country with lower governance quality relative to 
the source country (a greater difference) attracts less FDI as a share of foreign equity 
investment.   
 
Table 6 
OLS Regressions 
Model 1:  FDI / FE 
 
A B C 
 
Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value 
INTERCEPT 1.782 .000 *** 1.909 .000 *** 1.855 .000 *** 
ABS GOV .091 .000 *** -.056 .063 *  -.025 .420   
REL GOV       -.195 .000 *** -.189 .000 *** 
REL GOV SQ             .093 .000 *** 
HSELF .028 .230 
 
.034 .138 
 
.043 .062 * 
TRAD .244 .000 *** .252 .000 *** .263 .000 *** 
DIST .007 .691 
 
.000 .995 
 
-.004 .838 
 HSIZ -.203 .000 *** -.215 .000 *** -.224 .000 *** 
HECON -.224 .000 *** -.252 .000 *** -.244 .000 *** 
HSTOCK -.046 .055 * -.047 .050 ** -.055 .021 ** 
HCRED -.013 .618 
 
-.016 .531 
 
-.009 .711 
 HOPEN .042 .101   .043 .091 * .046 .071 * 
HNAT .019 .304   .025 .175   .033 .065 *  
HTAX .050 .010 ** .054 .005 *** .060 .002 *** 
HLEG (Eng) -.081 .001 *** -.080 .001 *** -.083 .000 *** 
HLEG (Scand) -.062 .000 *** -.062 .000 *** -.071 .000 *** 
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HLEG (Germ) -.018 .317   -.017 .361   -.009 .612   
HTRANS .098 .000 *** .098 .000 *** .099 .000 *** 
Year 2009 -.027 .140   -.058 .001 *** -.054 .003 *** 
Year 2010 -.249 .000 *** -.251 .000 *** -.250 .000 *** 
  
        
F-Stat 54.164 .000 *** 55.854 .000 *** 55.213 .000 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.189 0.202 0.209 
Observations 3891 3891 3891 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Specification C, which shows that REL GOV is also significant in its squared 
form, suggests the negative relationship between relative governance and FDI / FE is 
non-linear— decreasing at a decreasing rate.  In other words, greater governance 
disparities have a lesser negative impact on the share of FDI.  The adjusted R2 for the 
three specifications of Model 1 ranges from 0.189 to 0.209.  This is comparable to the 
explanatory value of previous studies that examine shares of foreign investment (e.g., 
Albuquerque, 2003; Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Li & Filer, 2007). 
Consistent with expectations, the auxiliary governance variable, HSELF, is not 
significant in specifications A and B and only marginally significant in specification C.  
Thus, it does not appear to contribute explanatory value distinct from other aspects of 
governance.  All of the other control variables are highly significant except for Physical 
Distance, Host Credit Markets Development, Host Openness, and Host Natural 
Resources.  DIST and HCRED are not significant in any of the three specifications, while 
HOPEN and HNAT are marginally significant only in specification C.  This finding for 
DIST supports the interpretation in previous studies that physical distance can act as a 
proxy for institutional differences, which we explicitly address.  Because our set of 
controls is more comprehensive than the previous studies from which the individual 
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controls were identified, and several of the factors have notable correlations, lack of 
significance for a few factors is not surprising.   
Contrary to expectations, HTAX has a positive sign.  A potential explanation for 
this finding is provided by Globerman and Shapiro (2002), who highlight the fact that 
average tax rates do not measure the impact of taxation at the margin.  They proffer that 
the conceptually appropriate measure for tax differences across countries is the marginal 
effective tax rate, which is not employed in empirical studies due to difficulties in 
measurement.  For example, marginal tax rates can differ among industries and even 
across regions within a country (Chen, 2000).  Moreover, any aversion to high taxes may 
be moderated by their link to superior infrastructure, which is highly valuable to foreign 
investors (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002). 
Another significant control with an unexpected sign is HTRANS.  Our 
expectation of a negative relationship for this factor was based on Faria and Mauro 
(2009), who examined foreign equity investment as a share of total foreign investment.  
In contrast, we identified a significant positive relationship.  Interpreting the results of the 
two studies together, it appears that host transition economies attract more FDI and less 
FPI, with a stronger impact on FPI.  This explains a negative relationship for the share of 
equity investment in Faria and Mauro (2009) and a positive relationship for the share of 
FDI in our study. 
In Model 2, insider ownership (INS) is added as an explanatory variable.  The 
purpose of this model is to test Kho et al.’s (2009) optimal corporate ownership theory of 
the home bias, which suggests a negative relationship between governance quality and 
the share of FDI.  Specifically, because lower governance quality implies greater 
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information asymmetries, foreign investors are more likely to be large monitoring 
shareholders than atomistic portfolio investors.  Importantly, Kho et al.’s (2009) theory 
predicts this relationship is mediated by insider ownership, because the optimal level of 
insider ownership determines the amount of shares available to foreign portfolio investors. 
 The insider ownership measure is available for only 40 of our sample countries, 
which reduces the sample size for this model to 2,939 observations.  In the regression 
results, INS is significant with a negative coefficient when measured with equal weights 
(Table 7) and not significant when measured with value weights (Table 8).  With either 
measure of INS (equal or value weights), REL GOV remains highly significant in 
specifications B and C.  Moreover, for all three specifications, the primary governance 
variables are similar to Model 1 in terms of both significance and size/magnitude of the 
coefficients.   
Table 7 
OLS Regressions 
Model 2:  FDI / FE with INS (Equal Weights) 
 
A B C 
 
Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value 
INTERCEPT 1.854 .000 *** 1.996 .000 *** 1.886 .000 *** 
ABSGOV .183 .000 *** .030 .383   .052 .131   
RELGOV       -.211 .000 *** -.184 .000 *** 
RELGOV SQ             .078 .000 *** 
HSELF .066 .033 ** .071 .020 ** .078 .010 ** 
TRAD .226 .000 *** .241 .000 *** .248 .000 *** 
DIST -.004 .846   -.010 .621   -.015 .474   
HSIZ -.128 .000 *** -.142 .000 *** -.143 .000 *** 
HECON -.286 .000 *** -.298 .000 *** -.278 .000 *** 
HSTOCK .009 .752   .005 .851   -.002 .946   
HCRED -.060 .064 * -.060 .060 * -.060 .060 * 
HOPEN .056 .097 * .060 .071 * .060 .073 * 
HNAT -.036 .136   -.026 .265   -.020 .403   
HTAX .042 .094 * .047 .062 * .047 .060 * 
HLEG (Eng) -.197 .000 *** -.194 .000 *** -.200 .000 *** 
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HLEG (Scand) -.138 .000 *** -.136 .000 *** -.146 .000 *** 
HLEG (Germ) -.081 .000 *** -.077 .001 *** -.079 .000 *** 
HTRANS .054 .010 ** .051 .014 ** .058 .005 *** 
Year 2009 -.007 .761   -.041 .060 * -.039 .069 * 
Year 2010 -.243 .000 *** -.245 .000 *** -.244 .000 *** 
INS Equal -.070 .013 ** -.069 .014 ** -.072 .010 ** 
          F-Stat 29.720 .000 *** 32.376 .000 *** 31.866 .000 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.150 0.169 0.174 
Observations 2939 2939 2939 
 
Table 8 
OLS Regressions 
Model 2:  FDI / FE with INS (Value Weights) 
 
A B C 
 
Beta p-value Beta p-value Beta p-value 
INTERCEPT 1.843 .000 *** 1.972 .000 *** 1.846 .000 *** 
ABSGOV .184 .000 *** .031 .365   .053 .126   
RELGOV       -.210 .000 *** -.185 .000 *** 
RELGOV SQ             .077 .000 *** 
HSELF .070 .025 ** .074 .016 ** .081 .009 *** 
TRAD .224 .000 *** .240 .000 *** .247 .000 *** 
DIST .001 .971   -.005 .803   -.009 .665   
HSIZ -.135 .000 *** -.148 .000 *** -.149 .000 *** 
HECON -.298 .000 *** -.310 .000 *** -.289 .000 *** 
HSTOCK .005 .868   .002 .955   -.005 .861   
HCRED -.029 .313   -.029 .312   -.026 .364   
HOPEN .049 .151   .052 .122   .050 .139   
HNAT -.035 .141   -.026 .273   -.019 .415   
HTAX .052 .038 ** .056 .023 ** .057 .020 ** 
HLEG (Eng) -.178 .000 *** -.173 .000 *** -.174 .000 *** 
HLEG (Scand) -.119 .000 *** -.116 .000 *** -.123 .000 *** 
HLEG (Germ) -.073 .001 *** -.068 .002 *** -.070 .002 *** 
HTRANS .070 .000 *** .067 .001 *** .076 .000 *** 
Year 2009 -.008 .694   -.043 .049 **  -.041 .055 * 
Year 2010 -.244 .000 *** -.246 .000 *** -.245 .000 *** 
INS Value -.033 .219   -.028 .288   -.024 .363   
          F-Stat 29.416 .000 *** 32.062 .000 *** 31.510 .000 *** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.148 0.167 0.172 
Observations 2939 2939 2939 
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The adjusted R2 for Model 2 is lower than Model 1, indicating that insider 
ownership adds no explanatory value.  More importantly, these results do not show a 
mediating relationship between governance and FDI / FE, so Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported.  This implies that, contrary to Kho et al.’s (2009) theory, governance has a 
direct impact on a country’s external capital structure aside from any effects on insider 
ownership.  The similarity of the results for Models 1 and 2 is particularly interesting 
when considering the reduced sample size for Model 2, which does not include smaller 
developing countries.  The dominance of developed countries in the reduced sample is 
reflected in a higher mean ABS GOV (0.792 for Model 2 v. 0.588 for Model 1) and a 
lower REL GOV (-0.007 for Model 2 v. 0.244 for Model 1).
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The key finding of our study is that relative governance, rather than absolute 
governance, plays a role in foreign investment.  Prior studies, which identified absolute 
governance as a significant factor, were evaluating an incomplete picture.  We capture a 
broader perspective that reveals a more complex relationship between governance quality 
and foreign capital flows than previously envisioned.  When the focus is solely on the 
host country, the prescription appears rather straightforward—all countries should pursue 
higher governance quality to attract more foreign investment from all sources.  Our 
results challenge this notion by showing that:  a) different source countries evaluate host-
country governance differently; and b) this evaluation is influenced by the difference 
between the governance environments of the two countries.  This implies that a broad 
goal, such as increasing FDI inflows, cannot be effectively addressed with policy.  Rather, 
a host country must identify specific source countries to target and then evaluate its 
governance environment relative to those countries. 
Another layer of complexity is added when considering the composition (relative 
shares) of foreign investment rather than specific components in isolation.  From the 
latter perspective, both FPI and FDI should arguably be pursued, since each is beneficial 
to the host country in certain respects.  However, different forms of foreign capital must 
be evaluated together, since a country’s overall capital structure is the issue of primary 
consequence to economic growth and stability, especially for developing economies.  
Specifically, research (e.g., Levchenko & Mauro, 2007; Lipsey, 2001; Sarno & Taylor, 
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1999) has shown FDI to be more persistent and resilient, and thus less likely to trigger a 
financial crisis, than portfolio flows.  This approach presents an empirical challenge, 
since explaining shares of foreign investment (e.g., FDI / FE) is more difficult than 
explaining individual components.  When dealing with ratios, one must consider not only 
the directions of changes in the individual components (numerator v. denominator), but 
also the magnitudes of the changes.  This fact limits the practical applicability of most 
existing research, which investigates the impact of governance on FDI flows alone.  Our 
results suggest that governance effects are not limited to FDI but are actually stronger for 
FPI.   
One of the noted goals for our study was to inform the strategic adjustment of 
capital structure.  Conventional wisdom suggests that, because FDI is “bolted down” 
(unlike FPI, which constitutes unstable “hot money”), a higher share of FDI is better 
(Hattari & Rajan, 2011, p. 505).  In contrast, our results suggest that an increase in the 
share of FDI actually paints a negative picture of a country’s governance environment, 
since it likely reflects a decrease in FPI.  Thus, it appears that strategic adjustment of 
external capital structure is not an appropriate undertaking because the target is not a 
valid measure of an economy’s health.  Moreover, given the complexities just discussed, 
it is not a clearly attainable objective.  Countries should instead focus on improving the 
governance environment for all investment—both domestic and foreign.  This is the 
engine for growth, which is the ultimate driver of all capital inflows, even from countries 
with higher governance standards.  Recognizing that comprehensive governance 
improvement is the proper long-term goal, targeted efforts (such as focusing on 
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institutions that are most critical for a country’s high-growth industries) are more likely 
to achieve short-term results. 
We also contribute to the literature by challenging Kho et al.’s (2009) optimal 
corporate ownership theory of the home bias, which suggests that any relationship 
between governance quality and the composition of foreign investment is mediated by the 
host country’s optimal level of insider ownership.  As previously noted, our regression 
results are not changed by the addition of an insider ownership factor (in Model 2) and 
thus do not indicate a mediating relationship.  Our results challenge Kho et al.’s (2009) 
“key insight” that stock ownership “does not depend on the demand for shares by 
portfolio investors alone” and is better explained by information asymmetries in the 
context of agency models.  We find the opposite—that FPI is driven more by demand 
considerations.  Specifically, liquidity preferences determine the identity of foreign 
portfolio investors, and yield/diversification considerations (which are impacted by 
relative governance) influence their selection of host markets.  Importantly, we do not 
challenge the implications of agency theory for the optimal level of insider ownership; 
rather, we challenge Kho et al.’s (2009) assumption that a country’s actual level of 
insider ownership can be fully explained in this context. 
It should be noted that Kho et al. (2009) interpret their findings as evidence that 
governance affects foreign investment through its impact on insider ownership at the 
country level.  Our study investigates whether this relationship is observed in investment 
positions between specific pairs of countries, which is an entirely different issue.  The 
divergent results of these two studies suggest that valuable information about bilateral 
foreign investment is lost when positions are aggregated.  Our results also highlight the 
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noted limitations of Kho et al.’s (2009) study, including its limited sample size (including 
only U.S. outward investment to 40 countries) and few controls.  It is likely that the 
insider ownership factor in their model was acting as a proxy for determinants of stock 
ownership (domestic and/or foreign) unrelated to governance. 
In conclusion, it appears that foreign investment is very much a relative issue.  
Relative shares of different foreign capital components are the focus of countries’ 
strategic policy initiatives, which aim to promote those components with the greatest 
welfare benefits.  Such aggregate effects are a function of investment flows from 
individual countries and ultimately individual investors, whose decisions are driven by 
relative evaluations of costs and benefits.  In other words, certain factors that make a 
country attractive to one type of investor may not be as relevant for other types of 
investors, and each investor will evaluate the factors differently.  We have identified one 
such factor as the relative governance environment of the host v. the source country.  
Understanding these relative conditions, it becomes clear that a universal concept of 
“good” governance is neither valid nor useful. 
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CHAPTER I 
       
       
Introduction 
 
Corporate Governance 
Both academic and public interest in corporate governance has peaked in recent 
years, precipitated by the financial scandals of 2000-2001 (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and 
Tyco) and the global financial crisis of 2008.  Highly compensated managers were 
viewed as key contributors to these problems, begging the question of why their harmful 
behavior was not effectively controlled by corporate governance mechanisms, 
particularly the board of directors and compensation methods.  These perceived 
governance failures have led to proposals of governance reform initiatives from a variety 
of sources and renewed research efforts to investigate the consequences of specific 
governance mechanisms.  In the current environment of enhanced regulation and 
shareholder skepticism, it is now more than ever necessary for companies to understand 
the importance of governance structure and how it can influence firm outcomes (Maskara, 
Maskara, & Aggarwal, 2013).  Although this issue has been widely examined in the 
academic literature, researchers have yet to identify a set of “best practices” for corporate 
governance.  Rather, the emerging consensus seems to be that no governance structure is 
suitable for all firms at all times because the relative costs and benefits of specific 
mechanisms are contingent upon the firm’s unique circumstances.
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Executive Compensation 
An important aspect of corporate governance is executive compensation, which 
“plays a fundamental role in attracting and maintaining quality managers and provides 
motivation for executives to perform their duties in shareholders’ best interests” 
(Anderson & Bizjak, 2003, p. 1324).  Despite widespread agreement on what executive 
compensation is intended to accomplish, there is no consensus on how it operates.  If a 
competitive market for managerial labor exists, then one would expect the forces of 
supply and demand to set the proper “price” of this labor.  Many researchers have 
embraced this market perspective, which views executive compensation as the product of 
optimal contracting between boards and managers.  Others adopt a more sociological 
perspective, highlighting the influence of network dynamics on the evaluation of 
executive worth and related wage negotiations.  When such dynamics allow managers to 
accumulate power over the board, this power can be exercised to extract rent in the form 
of excessive compensation.  This argument is often applied to the compensation of CEOs, 
given the inherent power they possess in the organizational structure.   
Public opinion that executive compensation is excessive and inequitable has been 
fueled by the enormous growth of CEO pay relative to the wages of lower-level 
employees (Evans & Hefner, 2009).  The Economic Policy Institute reports that, from 
1978 to 2011, CEO compensation grew more than 725%— an increase much higher than 
the 5.7% wage growth experienced by the average worker, as well as stock market 
appreciation during the same period (Mishel & Sabadish, 2012).  This vast discrepancy in 
growth rates is also reflected in the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio, which increased 
from 18.4x in 1978 to 209.4x in 2011.  Such statistics illustrate the fact that CEOs have 
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fared much better than the average worker, the stock market, or the U.S. economy over 
the last several decades.  This apparent inequity has been the subject of research in the 
field of corporate ethics, where it is identified as a highly contentious issue for 
stakeholders, particularly in takeover contexts (Carr & Valinezhad, 2004; Matsumara & 
Shin, 2005; Nichols & Subramaniam, 2001; Rodgers & Gago, 2003). 
 
Managerial Incentives 
 In addition to the proper amount of executive compensation, another contentious 
issue is its proper form.  According to agency theory, compensation contracts should be 
structured to maximize the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests.  
Popular agency-based prescriptions include bonuses tied to the achievement of certain 
targets (i.e., pay for performance) and the awarding of stock options or grants.  Such 
mechanisms serve as explicit incentives for managers to promote shareholder wealth.  
Although compensation contracts certainly influence managerial incentives, the literature 
also recognizes the role of emergent factors such as organizational politics and 
interpersonal relationships (Milkovich & Newman, 2005).  For example, managers’ 
behavior may be motivated by implicit incentives to protect their human capital value (or 
reputation), a concept known as career concerns (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992).  The 
practical implication of this concept is that an optimal compensation “contract” should 
address not only explicit incentives provided by contractual provisions, but also the 
implicit incentives provided by career concerns. 
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Golden Parachutes 
Golden parachutes are a specific type of managerial compensation that takes 
effect upon a change in control of the firm, such as a merger or acquisition.  These 
severance contracts are designed to protect CEOs from the personal costs that takeovers 
can impose, so they will not resist wealth-maximizing takeover attempts (Buchholtz & 
Ribbens, 1994).  Post-acquisition dismissal is a valid threat to CEOs because dismissals 
following a change in control are often unrelated to performance (Kidder & Buchholtz, 
2002).  Moreover, personal costs of displacement are significant, including loss of 
compensation and diminished reputation (Jensen, 1988).  By offering compensation that 
is contingent upon a change in control, golden parachutes can reduce the risk faced by 
CEOs.  Despite this seemingly rational explanation, golden parachutes are often 
perceived as an example of excessive executive compensation because they award senior 
management with large payouts in situations where other stakeholders, such as 
employees and business partners, suffer negative consequences (Brown, 2006). 
 
The Research Problem 
Existing research on the value of golden parachutes can be categorized into two 
broad streams.  The first stream attempts to capture investors’ perceptions of value by 
examining stock price reactions to announcements of golden parachutes.  Another stream 
of research has focused on the effects of golden parachutes in takeover contexts, 
specifically the probability of acquisition and the magnitude of shareholder gains in 
acquisitions.  This second stream considers how the presence or absence of a golden 
parachute impacts managerial incentives to act in the best interests of shareholders.  The 
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results of such studies have been mixed, offering no clear conclusions for the welfare 
effects of golden parachutes.  This ambiguity supports the proposition of a contingent 
nature of corporate governance—that specific mechanisms should be evaluated in 
specific contexts. 
Instead of examining the explicit incentive role of golden parachutes (GPs) in 
influencing managerial behavior, we study their role as a tool for screening and recruiting 
reputable CEOs in a situation where recruitment would otherwise be difficult—severe 
financial distress.  As previously noted, GPs provide a form of insurance for human 
capital value by protecting CEOs from the personal costs of takeovers.  We focus on this 
risk-mitigation function of GPs by examining a sample of financially distressed firms that 
eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Because firms in financial distress are 
takeover targets, this situation presents greater risk to the reputable CEO and thus 
enhances the perceived value of the golden parachute.   
If GPs enable distressed firms to recruit reputable CEOs, there should be an 
observable link between the presence of GPs in employment contracts for newly hired 
CEOs and value-preserving firm outcomes.  For our sample of firms, all of which filed 
for bankruptcy, this can be measured by the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings, 
specifically the avoidance of liquidation.  Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship 
between the presence of GPs for newly hired CEOs and the probability of liquidation in 
bankruptcy.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms led by newly hired CEOs 
with GPs are liquidated less often than other firms.  This suggests that, regardless of their 
efficacy as corporate governance mechanisms, GPs can create value for shareholders.  
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We demonstrate this in a specific context—for firms in financial distress facing the 
possibility of bankruptcy.   
 
Importance of the Problem 
Although corporate governance has historically been perceived as a means of 
mitigating the classic manager-shareholder conflict, it addresses much broader issues 
such as the deployment of organizational resources and the resolution of conflicts among 
all types of participants in organizations (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  Given this 
central role, governance is an issue of interest to many players both inside and outside the 
corporation, including managers, shareholders, regulatory bodies, and researchers 
(Dowell, Shackell, & Stuart, 2011).  As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737), “the 
subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical importance.”  Such direct 
relevance creates an opportunity to bridge the gap between theory and practice, which has 
been a stimulant for research in the field of corporate governance.  Given this strong 
potential influence, it is important to know whether the guidance offered by the literature 
is truly being embraced in practice and, if so, whether it is producing the intended results. 
A better understanding of executive compensation contracts, specifically golden 
parachutes, is especially critical given their notorious status in the corporate governance 
debate.  Criticisms of golden parachutes as a governance mechanism may be justified, but 
this does not preclude their potential for some value contribution.  This proposition 
highlights an adverse consequence of the current focus on corporate governance.  
Although deficiencies in governance certainly constitute a problem, this is not the only 
problem and is likely not the most important problem facing a given firm at a given point 
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in time.  Thus, it is not helpful to characterize and evaluate golden parachutes (or any 
other such device) in general terms.  Rather, a proper evaluation requires clearly 
delineating a specific problem in a specific context. 
 
Contributions of the Study 
 As previously noted, the dominance of agency theory in both corporate 
governance research and practice has produced an oversimplified perspective of 
managerial incentives and executive compensation.  Pay-for-performance schemes are 
universally prescribed as a means of aligning managerial and shareholder interests.  In 
contrast, severance contracts such as golden parachutes are negatively viewed as 
indicators of managerial entrenchment, creating pressure for regulations that limit the 
adoption of these practices.  Such arguments focus only on the short-term marginal costs 
of CEO pay without considering potential long-term benefits.  Alternative perspectives of 
managerial incentives, based on social exchange theory, identify several such benefits, 
including mitigation of CEO risk, preservation of the CEO’s psychological contract with 
the firm, and the encouragement of innovation (Evans & Hefner, 2009; Kidder & 
Buchholtz, 2002). 
Our research setting offers unique insight on how explicit and implicit incentives 
in the CEO compensation contract interact to promote value-preserving behavior.  
Reputable CEOs, who require a compensation premium, are thought to enhance 
shareholder value through their superior abilities.  Assuming that reputation is indeed an 
indicator of ability, hiring a reputable CEO captures only the potential for value creation.  
To actually realize this value, agency theory suggests that some explicit incentive is 
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necessary for the CEO to direct his or her superior abilities toward the pursuit of 
shareholder interests.  However, if reputation also indicates an implicit incentive to 
protect that reputation, a reputable CEO may act to preserve shareholder wealth even 
without explicit incentives to do so.  With our sample of bankrupt firms, we are able to 
test both the efficacy of a golden parachute in recruiting a reputable CEO and the value 
created by the reputable CEO’s implicit incentive to continue working for the 
shareholders after the bankruptcy filing, when the GP loses its explicit incentive value.  
Thus, bankruptcy provides a unique setting where only implicit incentives are present.   
We seek to identify a link between a specific governance mechanism (golden 
parachutes) and a specific firm outcome (avoidance of liquidation) in a specific context 
(bankruptcy).  Such a focused approach is a departure from previous studies, which 
examine numerous mechanisms or a composite index and broad firm outcomes such as 
performance or financial distress.  Narrowing the focus of this study facilitates the 
application of theory to not only predict a relationship, but also to explain the relationship 
and interpret its implications.  Importantly, the theoretical framework for our study 
extends beyond the confines of agency theory, which has so far failed to adequately 
capture the complexities of managerial incentives.  Another unique aspect of our 
empirical approach is consideration of the different components of golden parachute 
contracts.  Unlike most previous studies, which utilize a generic definition that captures 
multiple types of benefits, we consider the different benefits to identify specific one/s that 
contribute to the incentive functions addressed in our research questions.  
In addition to its implications for managerial incentives and executive contracting, 
our study helps to explain the failure of research to identify a relationship between 
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governance structure and firm outcomes.  While there is no doubt that corporate 
governance matters to the firm, the empirical literature has yet to provide clear evidence 
of how and why.  This is attributable in part to the measurement difficulties involved in 
studies that attempt to connect general governance factors (such as board characteristics) 
with corporate performance.  Our study highlights the importance of context in research 
examining the efficacy of any corporate mechanism, a factor that has been largely 
ignored in previous studies.  If context does indeed matter, there can be no universal 
prescriptions for governance structure, including executive compensation.   
A final contribution of our study is the insight gained from interviews with 
several of the CEOs from our sample, i.e., the individuals serving as CEO at the time of 
bankruptcy filings.  Specifically, we were able to contact eight of these CEOs, who 
provided information about their decision to accept employment at the firm, the contract 
negotiation process, the condition of the firm at the time of hire, and the personal 
consequences of the bankruptcy.  This information was useful in both developing our 
hypotheses and interpreting our results.  Moreover, it supports the practical implications 
of the study. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 builds a 
foundation from the literature, highlighting the critical role of the CEO and discussing the 
incentive effects of various contracting mechanisms, including golden parachutes.  This 
discussion considers not only the classic agency perspective, but also a sociological 
perspective that offers a more comprehensive picture of the CEO.  Drawing on both 
perspectives, Chapter 3 builds the research hypotheses for the study, which examine 
golden parachutes a tool for distressed firms to recruit reputable CEOs.  Chapter 4 
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describes the empirical methodology and results.  Finally, a summary and discussion of 
the results are provided in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II 
       
       
Review of Literature 
 
Corporate Governance Defined 
Corporate governance encompasses the processes and policies used by 
organizations to ensure that business is conducted for the mutual benefit of both the 
corporation and society as a whole (Maskara et al., 2013).  Although numerous 
definitions exist, which are framed from the perspective of different stakeholders, 
researchers agree that the resolution of agency problems is the core purpose of corporate 
governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  The extant literature on corporate governance is 
quite deep, with different researchers focusing on different aspects of this broad concept.  
According to Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano (2008), the board of directors (BOD), 
shareholder meetings/voting, and executive compensation are the basic parts of a 
corporate governance system.  Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) embrace a wider 
perspective, identifying seven areas of corporate governance:  shareholders and 
shareholder activism, directors, executive compensation, controlling shareholders, 
comparative corporate governance, cross-border investments in global capital markets, 
and the political economy of corporate governance.  
 
The Dominant Paradigm:  Agency Theory 
For many years, the dominant theoretical paradigm in corporate governance 
research has been agency theory.  In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
introduced agency theory to explain the existence of public corporations, where 
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ownership is separate from control.  Although the public firm operates for the benefit of 
its shareholders, whose interests are protected by the board of directors, day-to-day 
decision making is performed by managers.  The magnitude of managerial power has 
long been recognized, as evidenced by the observation of Berle and Means (1932, p. 139) 
that corporate executives “have almost complete discretion in management.”  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explained how this separation of ownership and control can lead to self-
interested behavior by managers, because managers do not bear the entire wealth effects 
of their decisions.   
Self-interested behavior by managers can be manifested in a variety of ways.  For 
example, managers can shirk their work responsibilities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) or 
consume excessive perquisites like lavish offices and private jets (Jensen, 1988).  They 
can also make decisions according to the shorter time horizon of their expected job tenure 
rather than the longer time horizon over which shareholder value should be maximized 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Yet another example is when managers forego risky 
investments to enhance their job security (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994).  As a result of 
this potential conflict of interest, the firm must incur various types of agency costs, such 
as monitoring mechanisms designed to protect shareholders.  According to Daily et al. 
(2003), the popularity of agency theory in corporate governance research is attributable to 
two factors.  First, it is a simple theory in which corporations are reduced to only two 
participants—managers and shareholders—whose interests are clear and consistent.  
Second, the idea of humans as self-interested actors has long been embraced in economic 
study.   
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The Agency Problem in Corporate Takeovers  
 It is well documented in the literature that corporate mergers and takeovers are 
favorable events for the target firm’s shareholders (Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, 1988; 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  In contrast, senior executives of target firms face a loss of their 
firm-specific investments in human capital.  Following an acquisition, this investment 
may be lost if different firm-specific skills are needed to succeed in the new firm, if the 
executive’s position is duplicated by others, or if the new firm does not base executive 
pay on past performance of the acquired firm (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994).  Factors such 
as these explain empirical findings that managers of acquired firms often suffer loss of 
employment and diminished prospects for future employment (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 
1989; Gilson, 1989; Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Walsh, 1988).  Thus, the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders is enhanced when a firm becomes a 
takeover target.  Born, Faria, and Trahan (1999, p. 13) proffer, “Although other principal-
agent conflicts exist within the firm, few are as public or as well documented as those 
that arise during a contest for control.” 
 
The Managerial Labor Market 
A Changing Landscape 
Organizational restructuring in recent decades has drastically changed the 
landscape of the managerial labor market.  Guarantees of lifetime (or even long-term) 
employment no longer exist, representing a shift of employment risk from firms to 
managers (Jacoby, 1999).  Frydman (2007) documents an increase in the occupational 
mobility of top managers over the course of the 20th Century.  Because managers are 
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moving more frequently between employers, the importance of cross-firm labor markets 
for managers has increased (Martin & Wajcman, 2004).  In this environment, 
“organization assets” (i.e., the “capital” that managers create through their structural 
positions in stable organizations) have lost value, prompting managers to seek new forms 
of human capital that are less risky (Martin, 2005).   According to Wajcman and Martin 
(2001), managers now view their relationships with companies in an entirely different 
way, rejecting any notion of “company man” loyalty.  Rather than investing in 
organization assets, managers are seeking to develop dynamic skills and abilities that 
many companies need and are willing to pay for. 
 
General Skills 
A major impact of organizational change is a shift in the types of skills required 
of managers.  Job-specific skills have been replaced by demands for vague capacities 
such as strategic thinking, adaptability, and leadership (Brown & Hesketh, 2004; Meyer, 
2001).  This trend is well-documented in the literature.  For example, Frydman (2007) 
notes a rapid increase in the fraction of top managers with MBA degrees, from 10% in 
1960 to more than 50% by the end of the century.  In earlier years, managers were more 
likely to have technical degrees (e.g., science or engineering) or law degrees.  Bertrand 
(2009) attributes the growing importance of general skills to the compression of firms’ 
structural hierarchy at the senior management level.  In other words, firms have become 
flatter at the top, with more managers reporting directly to the CEO rather than to 
intermediaries.  Because CEOs are now interacting with a larger group of employees, 
they need a broader set of skills to effectively communicate. 
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External Recruitment 
Along with an increase in the occupational mobility of managers, Frydman (2007) 
also documents a rising share of external CEO appointments—from 15% in the 1970s to 
30% in the 1990s.  According to Bertrand (2009), this phenomenon is a natural result of 
changes in the relative demand for general versus firm-specific skills.  When general 
skills are more valuable, firms can look outside the firm for CEO candidates.  Thus, a 
more active and competitive market for CEOs has developed, one that is very different 
from internal labor markets of the past (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004, 2007).  In a 
bureaucratically structured internal labor market, decisions regarding managerial 
promotion depend on direct assessment of the individual’s skill within a specific 
organizational setting, along with considerations of seniority and political allegiances 
(Jackall, 1998).  With the growing incidence of external recruitment, this process of the 
internal labor market has lost some relevance (Martin, 2005).  The primary challenge of 
external recruitment is the assessment of skills and abilities, which is more difficult when 
candidates do not have a known performance history with the firm.  Martin (2005, p. 748) 
aptly describes the modern managerial labor market as a setting where “firms must often 
assess managerial candidates about whom they have little direct knowledge for positions 
where the job requirements are quite malleable.” 
 
CEO Risk  
Firm-Specific Human Capital 
As previously discussed, a manifestation of the agency problem is when managers 
take actions to protect their own employment at the expense of shareholders, such as 
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rejecting value-enhancing risky projects or fighting favorable takeover bids.  The desire 
of managers, particularly CEOs, to protect their employment stems from their high level 
of firm-specific investment in human capital (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994).  They 
develop a variety of skills that are specific to their firms, such as specialized experience 
and the ability to work within a specific organizational culture (Coffee, 1988).  Moreover, 
shareholders and managers differ in their respective investments in the firm.  While most 
shareholders have diversified portfolios, most CEOs have only one job (Ahimud & Lev, 
1981).  
 
CEO Turnover Trends 
 Research suggests that the CEO’s job has become riskier over time.  Khurana 
(2002) reports that CEO turnover increased in the 1990s compared to the 1970s and 
1980s.  Other studies (e.g., Murphy & Zabojnik, 2007; Jensen, Murphy, & Wruck, 2004) 
support this trend, although the magnitude of the change they report is quite small.  
Kaplan and Minton (2012) examine a sample that covers years 1992 to 2007, which 
allows for consideration of the post-SOX period in which corporate governance and CEO 
performance/pay have come under intense scrutiny.  They find that the job of CEO in 
large U.S. companies has become increasingly more risky, particularly since 2000.  For 
the entire sample period, annual CEO turnover (including external and internal turnover) 
is 15.8%, implying an average tenure of less than seven years.  Breaking the sample into 
sub-periods, turnover is 12.6% from 1992 to 1999 (tenure of less than eight years) and 
16.8% from 2000 to 2007 (tenure of about six years).  Kaplan and Minton (2012) note 
that a shorter expected tenure likely offsets some of the benefits of observed increases in 
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CEO pay over this period.  Another finding of their study is that the sensitivity of internal 
(board-initiated) turnover to stock performance has become stronger since 2000. 
 
Personal Costs of Financial Distress 
Agency theory suggests that several types of policy decisions are influenced by 
the personal costs that managers incur when their firms default on debt.  Specifically, 
managers will rationally favor investment and financing policies that reduce the 
probability of financial distress (Gilson, 1989).  Examples include pursuing less risky 
investment projects, choosing more conservative levels of debt, diversifying into new 
lines of business, and purchasing insurance and other financial hedges (Smith & Mayers, 
1982; Smith & Stulz, 1985).  This incentive effect is driven by the negative welfare 
impact of job loss, the most severe form of discipline for poor performance.  Managers 
who are forced to resign from their firms face possible losses in income and firm-specific 
human capital, as well as any power, prestige, and other intangible benefits they derived 
from their managerial roles (Gilson, 1989).  Their reputations may also be adversely 
affected, if the departure is viewed as a sign of incompetence (Gilson, 1989). 
 
Distress and Turnover 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) suggest that managers are blamed for a firm’s 
financial distress for at least two reasons.  First, managers of distressed firms are viewed 
as less competent, and the failure is blamed on poor judgment.  Second, when the 
financial condition of a firm deteriorates, managers become more likely to take actions 
that harm the whole firm or certain groups of stakeholders, due to the inefficiency of 
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incentive contracts under these circumstances and the worsening of agency conflicts.  
Regardless of whether managers are actually responsible, corporate finance theory argues 
that states of financial distress, default, and bankruptcy present a fundamental stage in the 
life-cycle of firms that spurs changes in the allocation of rights to manage corporate 
resources (Jensen, 1988).  There is also substantial empirical evidence that the market 
disciplines managers of poorly performing firms.  Gilson (1989) and Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) find that managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to be replaced 
and less likely to find new jobs.  Similarly, a recent study by Ayotte and Morrison (2009) 
reports a 70% turnover rate for senior-level managers of firms that file for bankruptcy.   
 
Economics of Executive Compensation 
Supply and Demand Factors  
Although some interpret the steep rise in CEO pay in recent decades as an 
example of rent extraction (i.e., the managerial power view, discussed later herein), 
others proffer valid market forces as an explanation.  As previously noted, both Frydman 
(2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) argue that a shift from firm-specific skills 
to general skills has spurred external recruitment, resulting in greater competition among 
firms for managerial talent and thus a higher equilibrium rate of compensation for CEOs.  
Bertrand (2009) identifies the bull market of the 1990s as another factor impacting supply 
and demand for managerial talent.  On the demand side, established firms must now 
compete with a growing number of technology firms.  Moreover, increases in the market 
valuations of firms have driven an increase in demand for high-quality managers, given 
the larger financial stakes (Himmelberg & Hubbard, 2000; Hubbard, 2005).  On the 
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supply side, rising salaries offered by Wall Street firms may have raised the expectations 
of general managers. 
 
Optimal Contracting 
The notion of a competitive market for scarce and valuable managerial talent is 
founded on the theory of optimal contracting.  As described by Elson and Ferrere (2013), 
the basic propositions of this view are that:  a) the operation of large complex business 
enterprises is difficult; b) those who can do it well (i.e., talented managers) are rare; and c) 
talented managers can create value for shareholders.  In this context, wages are simply a 
response to the demand for and value of managerial talent, and competition precludes the 
extraction of rents by either contracting party.  Thus, proponents of optimal contracting 
view high CEO compensation as the outcome of efficient bidding for talent and the 
related sorting of managers across firms, all of which is consistent with maximizing 
shareholder value (Elson & Ferrere, 2013). 
 
Superstar CEOs 
In an influential paper, Rosen (1981) provided economic justification for the trend 
of a growing concentration of output and income in a small group of individuals in 
certain occupations, which he called the “phenomenon of superstars.”  He attempted to 
explain how the most talented individuals, comprising only a tiny fraction of the 
population of market participants can dominate the markets for their professions and thus 
capture a substantial share of total rewards in the market.  Rosen’s (1981) explanation 
was based the concepts of joint consumption technology and imperfect substitution in 
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demand.  In other words, the ability of performers (or athletes) to sell their products to a 
large audience with little additional effort, combined with consumers’ preference for only 
the “best,” allows them to capture most of the market (Elson & Ferrere, 2013). 
Some liken the economic dynamics of the market for executives to this 
phenomenon of superstars.  Indeed, the rapid growth of executive compensation, in both 
absolute and relative terms, supports this comparison.  Like a performer reaching a mass 
audience, scholars suggest that a CEO’s talent for shaping and implementing corporate 
policies is made more valuable by the fact this his or her actions can “roll out” to the 
entire firm (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009).  For the largest firms, this implies that a single 
individual can impact the return on billions of dollars of corporate assets.  Continuing 
with the superstars metaphor, the firm becomes the CEO’s “Madison Square Garden” 
(Elson & Ferrere, 2013).  In economics, this multiplicative production function results in 
a “scale of operations” effect. 
 
Theoretical Models 
Gabaix and Landier (2008), along with Tervio (2008), provide models for CEO 
compensation that explain the increase in such compensation over time as an increase in 
returns to CEO talent.  These models utilize the multiplicative production function 
described above.  As firms become larger, CEO talent becomes more valuable to the firm 
(i.e., higher marginal return), which drives an increase in the price of this talent (CEO 
compensation). This implies a positive relationship between managerial talent and firm 
size, where the best managers should be matched with the largest firms in the economy.  
Specifically, the models predict that the elasticity of average compensation to average 
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firm size at a given point in time should equal one.  According to Gabaix and Landier 
(2008), this is consistent with the recent historical trend:  both the average market value 
and the average CEO compensation of the largest 500 firms in the U.S. increased by 500% 
from 1980 to 2003.  More generally, the implication of the models is that compensation 
for a CEO should depend both on changes in the size of the CEO’s firm and changes in 
the size distribution of firms in the economy. 
The “size of stakes” model has been subject to numerous criticisms.  As conceded 
by Gabaix and Landier (2008), the fit is rather weak for the 1970-1980 period.  
Specifically, average CEO compensation increased at a higher rate during this period 
than average size.  Frydman and Saks (2007) observe a stark shift in the 
compensation/size relationship in the 1970s.  Although the relationship has been close to 
one since 1975, it was only 1/10 to 1/3 in the preceding 30 years.  This may indicate that 
market mechanisms were weak until the late 1970s, when organizational changes 
prompted a growing demand for managerial talent.  Another explanation, suggested by 
Levy and Temin (2007), is that more egalitarian labor market institutions and social 
norms in earlier decades constrained the market mechanisms. 
Even when a longer time series is not considered, the fit of the size of stakes 
model is sensitive to both sample selection and size definition (Frydman & Saks, 2007; 
Gordon & Dew-Becker, 2008).  Other weaknesses of the model are highlighted by 
Bertrand (2009).  First, the model does not address the process through which managerial 
talent is discovered and the best managers are matched with the largest firms.  Moreover, 
there is no empirical basis for the assumed distribution of managerial talent (i.e., CEO 
skills are substitutable across firms), which is necessary for the prediction of the unit-
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elastic relationship between compensation and firm size.  A final weakness is the 
assumption of exogenous changes in firm size.  This is not supported by agency theory, 
which suggests that managers may strategically alter firm size for personal advantage 
(Jensen, 1986). 
Despite such criticisms, the conversation generated by the size of stakes model 
has greatly enhanced our understanding of modern managerial labor markets.  Additional 
insight can be gained by considering labor and capital markets together.  As noted by 
Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat (2013), the size of stakes model does not rely on perfect 
efficiency of capital markets. Even if market values are a poor proxy for fundamental 
firm values, the model still applies.  This is because the labor and capital markets are 
highly intertwined:  if shareholders overvalue stock prices, it is a natural market outcome 
that managerial talent is overvalued by the same factor (because shareholders, as owners 
of the firms, have ultimate control over hiring decisions).  This interconnectedness is 
displayed in Gabaix et al.’s (2013) empirical examination of the relationship between 
CEO compensation in the years since the Great Recession.  This is a fairly strong test of 
the size of stakes model, which predicts that proportional changes in compensation 
should be observed as markets drop and rebound.  Gabaix et al.’s (2013) findings are 
largely consistent with this prediction.  From 2007 to 2009, average firm values 
decreased 17.4%, equity values decreased 37.9%, and compensation indices decreased 
27.7%.  From 2009 to 2011, a rebound occurred:  firm values increased 19%, equity 
values increased 27%, and compensation indices increased 22%. 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
Empirical Studies 
As previously discussed, market-based theories predict that CEOs with greater 
ability should earn higher pay.  Since ability cannot be directly observed, it is difficult to 
empirically test this relationship.  Nonetheless, several empirical studies have contributed 
to our understanding of the relationship.  Coles and Li (2010) and Graham, Li and Qui 
(2012) find that manager fixed effects explain a large part of the variation in executive 
compensation, which they interpret as evidence that human capital value is a significant 
driver of CEO compensation.  Using prior stock performance as proxy for managerial 
ability, Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that CEOs of firms with above-average performance 
are more likely to be hired by other firms and receive higher pay at the new firm.  
Similarly, Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2011) document CEO talent (measured by media 
coverage, age at which the executive becomes CEO, and educational background) as an 
important determinant of CEO pay. 
Based on the proposition that general managerial skills have become more 
important than firm-specific skills for CEOs, Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) test 
whether the composition of managerial skills is a determinant of CEO pay.  This is 
accomplished by constructing an index for general managerial skills based on several 
aspects of a CEO’s professional career.  Custodio et al. (2013) observe an increase in this 
index from 1993 to 2007, as well as a positive relationship between the index and CEO 
pay.  The estimated annual pay premium for generalist CEOs relative to specialist CEOs 
is 19%, which represents almost a million dollars per year. 
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Managerial Power View 
In contrast to the concept of optimal contracting, the “managerial power view” 
characterizes executive pay as a manifestation of the agency problem. (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Yermack, 1997).  Interaction between the board 
and managers is viewed not as arm’s-length contracting, but rather as the exercise of 
managerial influence over board decisions, including compensation decisions.  From this 
perspective, executive compensation arrangements act as a means by which managers can 
skim corporate resources for their personal benefit.  “When changing circumstances 
create an opportunity to extract additional rents…managers will seek to take full 
advantage of it and will push firms toward a new equilibrium in which they can do so” 
(Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002, p. 795).  Proponents of the managerial power view 
explain the rise in CEO compensation over time as evidence of an increase in managerial 
entrenchment or a relaxing of social norms against excessive pay (Gabaix & Landier, 
2008). 
Although the two views are very different, the literature does not embrace the 
managerial power view as a complete replacement for the optimal contracting view.  
According to Bebchuk and Fried (2003), compensation arrangements are likely to be 
shaped both by market forces that push toward value-maximization and by managerial 
influence, which leads to deviations from these outcomes to the benefit of managers.  In 
other words, there are limits to what directors will accept and what markets will permit 
(optimal contracting), but these constraints do not prevent managers from obtaining 
compensation arrangements that are substantially more favorable than would result from 
arm’s-length bargaining (managerial power). 
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Contracting for Incentives 
 According to Hall and Liebman (1998, p. 654), aligning the incentives of 
executives with those of shareholders is the “most direct way to mitigate the agency 
problem.”  Thus, the design of performance incentives for managers of public firms is a 
critical issue.  Executive compensation has long been recognized as a tool for influencing 
managerial incentives.  Importantly, it is this role of executive compensation that 
qualifies it as a corporate governance mechanism.  As previously discussed, the 
proposition of the optimal contracting view of executive compensation is that boards are 
able to design compensation schemes that provide managers with efficient incentives to 
take actions that maximize shareholder value.  Although contracting is usually discussed 
in relation to routine annual compensation, Yermack (2006) suggests that understanding 
top management incentives requires looking beyond regular compensation and examining 
one-time events, such as mergers, acquisitions, spinoffs, or even bankruptcies.  He 
describes payouts to CEOs upon such occurrences as a type of “compensation event” in 
which managers can obtain extraordinary one-time rewards in addition to their regular 
annual pay. 
 
Pay for Performance  
Given its roots in agency theory, most governance research conceptualizes 
governance mechanisms as constraints on self-interested behavior by managers (Daily et 
al., 2003).  The goal of such mechanisms is to protect shareholders by maximizing the 
alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
With regard to executive compensation, the agency-based prescription is pay-for-
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performance contracts.  A compensation contract is a legal arrangement specifying the 
criteria used to award compensation, the form of the compensation, and the conditions for 
linking compensation to the established criteria over a finite period of time (Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  According to Walsh and Seward (1990), such contracts are 
the primary means by which boards can influence executive behavior.  They seek to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders by creating a “win-win” scenario where 
compensation is tied to shareholder wealth.  Examples include bonuses tied to the 
attainment of profitability targets and the awarding of stock options.   
The notion of performance-based pay is based on Holmstrom’s (1979) “hidden 
action” model.  Under this model, because the board cannot fully observe the tasks 
performed by managers, it should link compensation to observable outcome variables that 
are correlated with those tasks.  Although this theoretical proposition is widely accepted 
and promoted, empirical research has failed to identify a significant link between 
executive pay and firm performance.  In their seminal study of this issue, Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) find that CEO compensation increases by only $3.25 per $1,000 increase 
in shareholder wealth, which they interpret as being too small to provide significant 
incentives.  They hypothesize that political forces may act to reduce the sensitivity of pay 
to performance from what is predicted by agency theory.  This same question was raised 
years later by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 774) in their survey of corporate governance:  
“Given the large impact of executives’ actions on values of firms, why aren’t very high 
powered incentive contracts used more often in the United States and elsewhere in the 
world?”  
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Equity-Based Pay 
According to Hall and Liebman (1998, p. 656), “The most direct solution to the 
agency problem is to align the incentives of executives with the interests of shareholders 
by granting stock and stock options the CEO.”  Such equity-based pay serves not only to 
minimize managerial shirking and shortsightedness, but also to promote managerial risk 
taking (Haugen & Senbet, 1981).  As previously discussed, due to their high levels of 
firm-specific human capital, CEOs have a tendency to be more risk-averse than 
diversified shareholders.  Agency theorists argue that equity-based pay helps overcome 
this risk-aversion by allowing CEOs to participate in unlimited upside gains, while 
providing a floor for losses.  Indeed, empirical research supports this proposition.  Studies 
have found that managers with stock options are less likely to hedge financial risk with 
derivatives (Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002) and more likely to engage in acquisitions 
(Sanders, 2001), especially risky acquisitions (Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002).   
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) contribute to this line of research by “unpacking” 
the concept of managerial risk taking, distinguishing among three of its major elements:  
size of the outlay, variance of potential outcomes, and likelihood of extreme loss.  Based 
on an examination of three different types of investment spending (R&D, capital 
investment, and acquisition), they find that CEOs with stock options make larger 
investment outlays that result in extreme company performance, with more big losses 
than big gains.  In other words, stock options appear to motivate managers to “swing for 
the fences, hoping to hit home runs but knowing that they also have an increased 
likelihood of striking out” (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007, p. 1061).  These results suggest 
that high levels of stock option pay may induce executives to surpass a prudent degree of 
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risk-taking.  However, Sanders and Hambrick (2007) note that certain features of stock 
option programs, such as vesting periods and frequency of grants, may alter the observed 
relationships.  Moreover, they suggest the use of restricted stock, rather than stock 
options, as a means for encouraging reasonable risk taking.  While both forms of equity 
compensation are related to performance extremeness, the effect is not as negatively 
lopsided for restricted stock. 
Offering a counter-balance to the growing consensus that more equity-based pay 
is better, Zajac and Westphal (1994) highlight the potential costs of such practices.  They 
proffer that, although contingent compensation has desirable motivational properties, it 
can also cause a manager to bear risk that could be more efficiently borne by diversified 
shareholders.  When the agent is risk-averse and the principal is risk-neutral, it is more 
difficult and costly for the agent to bear the risk of firm performance.  If this is true, 
equity-based compensation is more costly for risky firms, and risky firms should use 
lower levels of such compensation.  Consistent with this expectation, Zajac and Westphal 
(1994) find an inverse relationship between firm risk and the use of equity-based 
compensation in a sample of large U.S. firms.  Moreover, they find that CEOs’ 
willingness to accept risky compensation (or, stated differently, the cost to the firm of 
using such compensation) depends on various firm-specific and CEO-specific factors.  
One such firm-specific factor is financial distress.  For distressed firms, which have a 
short-term decision horizon, immediate survival is of greater concern than the long-term 
costs of incentive compensation. 
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Severance Pay 
The common view in the corporate governance literature is that boards should be 
as independent as possible and that any form of CEO entrenchment is harmful to 
shareholders.  Almazan and Suarez (2003) challenge this view, based on their 
identification of a potential conflict between inducing a CEO to improve the effectiveness 
of his management and allowing shareholders to benefit from every valuable managerial 
replacement.  They propose that the solution to the CEO’s incentive problem is in the 
allocation of power with the BOD as well as on traditional devices such as severance pay 
and incentive compensation.  The key insight of their analysis is that, in certain 
circumstances, shareholders may benefit by adding severance pay to governance 
structures that rely on a strong board and, in other circumstances, by shifting to a weak 
board that allows for greater CEO influence.  In both cases, severance pay plays a crucial 
role, and the gain to shareholders is due to savings on incentive compensation.  
Importantly, Almazan and Suarez’s model (2003) suggests that severance pay and weak 
boards are substitutes for costly performance-based managerial compensation. 
 
Golden Parachutes 
Definition 
Golden parachutes are “severance agreements adopted by boards of directors that 
provide various cash and non-cash benefits to senior executives if certain events occur 
following a change in control of the company” (Brusa, Lee, & Shook, 2009).  Examples 
of such events include firings, demotions, or resignations of executives.  Importantly, a 
golden parachute can be established by the BOD without shareholder approval.  Although 
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the term “golden parachute” implies a distinct form of contract, such contracts can vary 
substantially along several dimensions (Fiss, Kennedy, & Davis, 2012).  For example, 
some cover only the CEO or a handful of top executives, while others include dozens of 
managers.  Golden parachutes also differ in regard to the benefits they provide upon a 
change in control.  Some include only a lump-sum payment (often three years’ salary, 
due to tax regulations1), while others extend to stock grants, options, health insurance, 
pension plans, consultancy arrangements, and even use of the corporate jet.  Fiss et al. 
(2012) describe the diffusion of golden parachutes over time.  These contracts emerged in 
the 1970s among a handful of firms and then spread rapidly with the 1980s hostile 
takeover wave.  By the late 1980s, the majority of the largest public corporations in the 
U.S. had golden parachute contracts for their most senior executives.   
 
Two Views of Golden Parachutes  
As previously noted, the agency problem is particularly evident in the context of 
corporate takeovers, where managers may not share in any benefits that accrue to the 
target firm’s shareholders.  Specifically, managers of takeover targets face an explicit loss 
of compensation due to the probability of eventual termination (Small, Smith, & Yildirim, 
2007).  Because CEOs take many years to ascend to the top of the corporate ladder, “the 
notion of losing control and status after years of toil presents a considerable threat to 
earning prospects, career options, and even self-esteem” (Fiss et al., 2012, p. 1078).  
Given this potential conflict, compensation contracts that offer protection to managers 
                                                          
1 Pursuant to Section 280G of the Internal Revenue Code, golden parachute payments that exceed three 
times the individual’s average taxable compensation over the five preceding calendar years result in:  1) 
loss of tax deductions for any excess amount; and 2) a 20% excise tax liability to the individual on such 
amount. 
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upon changes in control can serve to align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
Such reasoning is the basis of the incentive alignment hypothesis, which suggests that 
golden parachutes enhance shareholder value by:  a) allowing the firm to attract and 
retain managerial talent; and b) decreasing managerial resistance to beneficial takeover 
bids and/or creating incentives for managers to negotiate the most favorable deal (Jensen, 
1988; Harris, 1990; Knoeber, 1986).   
This hypothesis is consistent with several bonding models, wherein contingent 
severance pay is promised in advance to managers to provide insurance for their human 
capital value (Yermack, 2006).  According to Knoeber (1986), if we assume that 
managerial performance can be accurately evaluated only in the long run, some form of 
deferred compensation is required for optimal contracting.  However, deferred 
compensation requires credible commitment from shareholders due to the possibility of a 
hostile takeover.  In this situation, a golden parachute can be viewed as a contractual 
response that bonds shareholders to deferred compensation contracts, thereby enhancing 
managerial efforts.  Specifically, golden parachutes may encourage managers to take risk 
(Almazan & Suarez, 2003) and discourage them from entrenching themselves in office or 
shirking when dismissal appears possible (Berkovitch, Israel, & Spiegel, 2000).   
 In contrast, the entrenchment hypothesis, introduced by Manne (1965) and further 
developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989), conjectures that golden parachutes have the 
adverse effect of increasing slack on the part of managers as a result of being less subject 
to discipline by the market for corporate control.  This insulation may impair shareholder 
wealth if:  a) the manager administers the firm less efficiently due to the reduction in 
potential loss from a change in control; or b) the golden parachute increases the cost of a 
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takeover, thus lowering the takeover premium that a bidder is willing to pay (Hall & 
Anderson, 1997).  Moreover, since golden parachutes can be granted by boards without 
shareholder approval, their adoption may signal that managers hold a high level of 
influence over the board (Brusa et al., 2009).  Indeed, empirical evidence supports this 
proposition.  Several studies (e.g., Cochran, Wood, & Jones, 1985; Singh & Harianto, 
1989; Wade, O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990) conclude that the CEO’s influence over the 
board is a significant factor in predicting the adoption of a golden parachute contract.   
 
Welfare Effects of Golden Parachutes 
Empirical research regarding the welfare effects of golden parachute contracts can 
be segregated into two broad categories:  examinations of stock price reactions to 
announcements of golden parachute adoption and examinations of shareholder gains in 
takeover situations.  Studies of the former type have produced mixed results.  Lambert 
and Larcker (1985), who examined a sample of firms that adopted golden parachutes 
between 1975 and 1983, report a positive market reaction to the announcement.  They 
interpret this finding as evidence supporting the incentive alignment hypothesis.  
However, as noted by Jensen (1988), there is no way to know whether these findings 
reflect investors’ belief in the efficacy of golden parachutes or their reaction to a signal 
that adopting firms may become future takeover targets.  In contrast, later studies (e.g., 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Wang, 2014; Brusa et al., 2009; Hall & Anderson, 1997; Mogavero 
& Toyne, 1995) observed a negative stock price reaction for firms adopting golden 
parachutes, as predicted by the entrenchment hypothesis.  Finally, some studies (e.g., 
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Born, Trahan, & Faria, 1993; Davidson, Pilger, & Szakmary, 1998) found no market 
reaction at the time of adoption.   
Studies that investigate takeover gains weigh more heavily on the side of the 
entrenchment hypothesis.  Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) show that golden 
parachutes mitigate (lessen) the positive relationship between managerial incentives and 
target acquisition gains.  Specifically, they found that managers tend to negotiate higher 
acquisition prices to mitigate their personal financial losses, but the presence of a GP 
reduces this tendency.  Subramaniam (2001) found that existence of a golden parachute 
shifts the distribution of synergy gains from the target to the bidder.  Similarly, Hartzell 
et al. (2004) found that target shareholders receive lower acquisition premiums in 
transactions that involve extraordinary personal treatment of the target CEO, including 
golden parachute contracts.  In contrast, Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993) observe a 
positive relationship between golden parachutes and target acquisition premiums, while 
some (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo, 2004; Cotter & Zenner, 1994; Sokolyk, 2011) observe no 
relationship. 
In addition to takeover gains, researchers have examined the impact of golden 
parachutes on the probability of acquisition.  This empirical evidence is inconclusive:  
although several studies (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1998; Bates, Becher, & Lemmon, 
2008; Cotter & Zenner, 1994; Machlin et al., 1993; Sokolyk, 2011) find a positive 
relationship, several others (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo, 2004; Born et al., 1993; Hall & 
Anderson, 1997) find no relationship.  Two recent studies that examine both acquisition 
likelihood and premiums include Bebchuk et al. (2014) and Fich, Tran, and Walkling 
 
87 
 
 
 
(2013).  Such recent evidence is important, given the transformation of corporate 
governance in the past two decades due to enhanced public scrutiny. 
Fich et al. (2013), who examined 857 acquisitions from 1997 to 2007, found that 
the expected acquisition premium (the product of acquisition likelihood and the premium 
conditional on acquisition) is a positive function of the presence of a golden parachute 
contract.  They offer further insight by testing the “importance” of a GP contract to the 
target’s CEO (the value of the GP payout relative to the value of lost compensation due to 
the acquisition), concluding that more important GPs are associated with higher 
completion probabilities but lower conditional acquisition premiums.  This evidence is 
consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis because the expected (unconditional) 
premium to target shareholders remains the same despite an increase in parachute 
importance. 
Bebchuk et al. (2014) tested a longer time series of acquisitions, including 1,418 
initial bids and 1,081 completed acquisitions from 1990 to 2007.  Like Fich et al. (2013), 
they observe a positive relationship between golden parachutes and expected acquisition 
premiums.  Although GPs are associated with lower premiums in the event of an 
acquisition, their association with a higher acquisition likelihood dominates.  To 
investigate whether the positive relationship with expected premiums is driven by 
managerial incentives or signaling, Bebchuk et al. (2014) separately examine older and 
newer golden parachutes.  They reason that, if the relationship is due solely to signaling, 
it should be observed only for newer (recently adopted) GPs.  However, a positive 
relationship is observed for both older and newer GPs, indicating the existence of an 
incentive effect.   
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Managerial Influence on Firm Outcomes 
Classic Views  
Under a competitive market for managerial talent, such as that described by the 
size of stakes model, individual CEOs should not have much impact on firm decisions or 
performance.  Indeed, the neoclassical view of the firm characterizes managers as 
homogenous and selfless inputs in the production process—in other words, perfect 
substitutes.  In contrast, agency theory acknowledges that managers have power in their 
firms, which they can use to alter firm outcomes for personal gain.  Even so, agency 
models do not generally imply that corporate performance will vary with individual 
managers, as they do not address idiosyncratic differences among managers (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003).  In sum, most of the literature has relied on firm-, industry-, or market-
level characteristics to explain corporate behavior and performance. 
 
Empirical Evidence 
Despite this lack of theoretical support, practitioners and the press have long 
recognized the impact of CEOs and other top executives on corporate policy, as well as 
corporate identity (i.e., “tone at the top”).  In recent years (especially in the wake of 
corporate scandals and the financial crisis), individual managerial characteristics have 
started to garner more research attention.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) were among the 
early contributors to this emerging stream of literature.  Using a manager-firm matched 
panel data set, they tracked individual top managers across different firms over time.  
This approach allowed estimation of how much observed variation in firm policies can be 
attributed to manager fixed effects.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found significant 
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heterogeneity across managers in investment, financing, and other organizational strategy 
variables, indicating the existence of differences in “style” across managers.  Moreover, 
they found that some of the managerial differences were systematically related to 
differences in corporate performance and that managers with higher performance were 
more highly compensated.   
A recent study by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) offers confirming evidence 
that personal traits of CEOs (such as risk aversion, time horizon, and optimism) are 
related to financial policies of corporations.  Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) 
observe greater performance variability for firms whose CEOs have more decision-
making power (e.g., the CEO is the founder, the CEO is the only insider on the board, or 
the CEO holds multiple job titles).  In addition to supporting the proposition that 
individual characteristics impact firm performance, this study also suggests that the 
interaction between individual characteristics and organizational characteristics has 
important consequences for firm performance. 
 Ang, Lauterbach, and Vu (2003) examine the hypothesis that the managerial labor 
market and the capital market are integrated and jointly efficient with respect to CEO 
appointments. They define efficiency in the managerial labor market as consisting of two 
components:  a) rational pay – better-quality CEOs who can contribute more to the firm’s 
wealth demand and receive a pay premium; and b) rational expectations – better-quality 
CEOs, who receive a pay premium ex ante, will deliver better future performance.  
Capital market efficiency, which assumes that investors acquire labor market information 
and react rationally to CEO appointments, implies that:  c) positive stock price reactions 
should be observed in response to appointments of better-quality CEOs; and d) these 
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stock price reactions should be a predictor of change in the firm’s future performance.  
Consistent with the notion of jointly efficient and integrated labor and capital markets, 
Ang et al. (2003) find that appointments of better-quality CEOs are accompanied by 
positive stock price reactions and followed by improvements in firm performance.  The 
practical implication is that paying a high-quality CEO a premium is rational because 
high-quality CEOs increase firm value and improve firm performance. 
Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010) employ a similar approach to examine 
whether CEO pay and performance reflect CEO ability.  However, unlike Ang et al. 
(2003), who study CEO appointments, Chang et al. (2010) study CEO departures.  
Another difference is use of the CEO’s prior performance as an indicator of quality, in 
addition to prior pay.  Chang et al.’s (2010) first finding is a negative relationship 
between the stock market’s reaction to news of the CEO’s departure and both the firm’s 
prior performance and the CEO’s prior pay.  Next, the departing CEO’s subsequent labor 
market success is observed to be greater if the firm’s prior performance is better, the 
CEO’s prior pay is higher, and the stock market’s reaction is more negative.  Finally, 
better prior performance, higher prior pay, and a more negative stock market reaction are 
associated with worse post-departure firm performance.  Collectively, these results are 
consistent with Ang et al.’s (2003) findings and support the proposition that CEO pay is 
rationally driven by the CEO’s contribution to firm value.   
Further evidence is provided by Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorenson (2012), who 
examine more than 30 characteristics of CEO candidates for companies involved in 
private equity transactions and relate these characteristics to subsequent firm performance.  
These characteristics are grouped into two broad skill sets:  one that reflects general 
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ability and another that contrasts between interpersonal skills and execution skills.  
Kaplan et al. (2012) find that subsequent performance is positively related to both general 
ability and execution skills.  Finally, Leverty and Grace (2012) investigate the influence 
of managers on firms in distress, focusing on the property-liability insurance industry.  
Unlike previous research, this study defines managerial ability in terms of the efficient 
deployment of firm resources.  Leverty and Grace (2012) find that managerial ability is 
negatively related to the amount of time the firm spends in financial distress, the 
likelihood of the firm’s failure, and the cost of the failure.  These results suggest that, 
contrary to popular perception, managers of failed firms are not intrinsically bad and 
managerial skill can create value even in financial distress. 
 
CEO Compensation in a Sociological Context 
Criticisms of the Market for CEO Talent 
Many have criticized the concept of a competitive market for executive talent, 
particularly the notion of efficiency that it implies.  Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) 
challenge the comparison of corporate executives to entertainment superstars.  For the 
latter, compensation is clearly market-driven:  aggregate consumer preferences determine 
how many concert tickets (or CDs, movies, etc.) are sold and at what price.  In contrast, 
the marginal productivity of executives is not so easily discernible from the organizations 
they run.  “Rather than being a direct factor of production, an executive directs and 
organizes other factors” (Elson & Ferrere, 2013, p. 502).  This ambiguity implies that 
executive compensation is driven, at least to some degree, by non-economic 
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considerations related to board dynamics, as suggested by the managerial entrenchment 
literature.  
According to Elson and Ferrere (2013), a true market for executive talent cannot 
exist because such talent is limited in transferability.  Although some managerial skills 
are general in nature, others are necessarily firm-specific.  Thus, a manager’s productivity 
in his or her specific firm is greater than it would be at another firm, in which case ex post 
negotiations over the sharing of such rents occurs in an indeterminate setting that is 
subject to non-economic factors (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1999).  According to Elson and 
Ferrere (2013, p. 505), “Conventional economic analysis is a blunt tool for understanding 
such a phenomenon where the law of one price is violated.”  Although the concepts of 
supply and demand may set a floor and ceiling for executive compensation, there is a 
wide range for corporate discretion (Elson & Ferrere, 2013). 
 
Peer Benchmarking 
Other researchers have sought to explain executive compensation in a sociological 
or institutional context.  Proponents of this view see substantial ambiguity as essential to 
the nature of any evaluation of executive “value” and to any related negotiations 
regarding compensation.  As a result, rather than being based on fundamental economic 
values, executive compensation is determined through normative practices in a landscape 
of local networks (Elson & Ferrere, 2013).  A common practice utilized by boards to 
resolve this ambiguity is targeting executive compensation to peer companies, known as 
peer benchmarking.  In this practice, boards survey the prevalent compensation practices 
of companies in similar industries and of similar size and complexity (i.e., the peer group) 
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and use this information as a reference point.  For example, boards may set CEO 
compensation at some specific percentile (e.g., 50th, 75th, or 90th percentile) of the peer 
group.  In essence, this process attempts to create a competitive market for executives 
that does not otherwise exist (Elson & Ferrere, 2013).  Some researchers (e.g., Bizjak, 
Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008; Cremers & Grinstein, 2014) find peer benchmarking 
consistent with competitive compensation, while others (e.g., Faulkender & Yang, 2010) 
argue it is used only as means to justify some pre-determined level of compensation. 
 
Retention Considerations  
Although the corporate and academic discourse surrounding CEO pay levels has 
in recent years focused on applications of agency theory (e.g., incentive alignment, pay 
for performance), this was not always the case.  Prior to the 1980s, corporations 
commonly cited retention concerns as a primary justification for executive pay decisions 
(Zajac & Westphal, 1995).  Ironically, over the same period, organizations have become 
more exposed to external labor markets due to higher CEO turnover and a shift from 
internal to external recruitment (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2007).  Voluntary CEO turnover is 
highly problematic for corporations, due to the substantial replacement costs that must be 
incurred.  Companies that are currently in the external market for a CEO face these costs 
directly, while for others such costs represent a threat that motivates boards to proactively 
adjust their compensation packages to stay competitive (Fulmer, 2009).  Thus, in today’s 
active market for CEOs, retention should be a concern for boards, even if they are 
reluctant to publicly disclose this concern.  Fulmer (2009) provides empirical evidence 
that retention is an influential factor in CEO compensation. Specifically, he finds that 
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CEO compensation is strongly related to competitors’ pay levels and that CEOs who are 
especially likely to be “raided” receive higher pay and/or less-risky pay. 
 
Reputational Capital 
Human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974) posits that differential 
wages among employees result in part from their differential levels of human capital.  
Although traditional human capital variables such as education and experience represent 
past actions and accomplishments, they have value in the labor market because they are 
perceived as indicators of likely future performance (Fulmer, 2009).  Spence (1973, p. 
357) states, “The employer cannot directly observe the marginal product prior to hiring.  
What he does observe is a plethora of personal data in the form of observable 
characteristics and attributes of the individual, and it is these that ultimately must 
determine his assessment.”  Aside from providing indications of future performance, 
perceptions of an employee’s human capital can enhance his or her marketability for 
more symbolic reasons.  As suggested by the herding literature, risk considerations may 
cause managers to act in conformity with the general consensus established by other 
managers.  This effect could also be present in a board’s selection of a CEO, given the 
magnitude of the decision.  As noted by Lublin (2005, p. B1), “A sitting or former chief 
can…be a safe choice…Directors realize they won’t be criticized for bringing a top-notch 
CEO in.” 
Understanding the importance of reputation to their marketability, managers are 
using a form of social capital to legitimize and stabilize their human capital claims 
(Wajcman & Martin, 2001).  Specifically, they have developed informal networks for 
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establishing beliefs about each others’ abilities.  According to Martin (2005, p. 752), such 
informal beliefs constitute a manager’s reputational capital, which he defines as “socially 
constructed estimations of the capacities of managers.”  Conceptually, reputation can be 
thought of as the representation of one’s human capital that actually operates in labor 
markets and workplaces, playing a key role hiring decisions, expectations of job 
performance, and evaluations of job performance (Martin, 2005).   
Given the importance of reputational capital, building and preserving this asset 
should be a primary concern for managers.  Although identifying a “good” manager may 
seem like a relatively straightforward function of firm performance, the dynamic nature 
of contemporary organizations undermines this proposition.  Managers do have some 
ability to shape others’ impressions of them, but attempting to stabilize one’s reputation 
is fundamentally difficult (Martin, 2005).  This is because managers often have little 
control over events that destroy firm value, such as a takeover or the failure of a business 
unit.  Given this instability, managers attempt to convert their reputational capital into 
financial capital.  According to Martin (2005), the social capital networks in which 
reputations are formed also serve the labor market exclusion functions that are used by 
managers to restrict competition and raise compensation.  Thus, the success of a 
managerial project that enhances reputational capital serves as the basis for increasing 
managerial income. 
In addition to their reputations among fellow professionals, managers must also 
be mindful of public perception, which is driven primarily by the media.  In his 
influential book, Khurana (2002) proffers that the rise of the business press “has 
introduced new rules according to which an individual’s ability to charm journalists and 
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command their attention becomes a relevant factor in order to be considered a worthy 
candidate for the CEO position” (Bertrand, 2009, p. 125).  For individual shareholders, 
who have insufficient resources to develop an understanding of a corporation’s business 
activity, the reputation of the CEO may be an indication of investment quality.  Rightly 
or wrongly, “with information and technology overload assaulting all audiences, a CEO’s 
reputation can serve as a mental shortcut…and differentiate a company from others in the 
corporate landscape” (Gaines-Ross, 2000, p. 367). 
 
Career Concerns 
Nohel and Todd (2005) characterize human capital value as the present value of 
all future compensation gains or losses that are attributed to the manager’s performance.  
The implication is that managers who perform well (i.e., make good decisions that 
increase shareholder value) can be rewarded with current compensation as well as an 
increase in their human capital value (Elsaid, Davidson, & Benson, 2009).  The literature 
refers to managers’ incentive to protect their human capital value (or reputation) as 
career concerns.  According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), in the presence of career 
concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives, both implicit 
incentives from career concerns and explicit incentives from the compensation contract.  
Due to their implicit incentive effect, career concerns should be considered along with 
contractual provisions (e.g., stock options and pay for performance) as means for 
mitigating agency problems. 
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Wealth Effects of CEO Reputation 
A number of theoretical papers (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1993; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990) 
propose that managers’ career considerations, particularly those related to reputation, 
influence their decisions regarding corporate capital investments.  The basic proposition 
is that a manager may make investment decisions that harm shareholders if these 
decisions will enhance the manager’s reputation.  Given this possibility, high CEO 
reputation can be either beneficial or costly to shareholders.  Under the efficient 
contracting hypothesis, developed by Fama (1980), there is a positive relationship 
between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments.  The central 
theme underlying this hypothesis is that CEOs build their reputations over the course of 
their careers through repeated dealings in the capital markets (Jian & Lee, 2011).  Thus, 
CEOs with better reputations have more at stake in terms of credibility and future 
compensation if they invest in value-reducing projects.  In contrast, the rent extraction 
hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between CEO reputation and the wealth 
effects of corporate capital investments.  This is because managers have incentives to 
make investment decisions that boost their personal reputations but destroy shareholder 
value.  For example, managers may overinvest in projects that can be resolved in the 
short-term and escalate investment in value-reducing projects to avoid conceding failure.   
 Jian and Lee (2011) shed light on these competing hypotheses with an empirical 
study of the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments.  
Based on the stock market’s reaction to announcements of capital investments, they find 
that such investments create more value for firms with reputable CEOs than for those 
with less-reputable CEOs.  In other words, they show that in firms with high agency costs 
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of free cash flow, market responses to capital investments are conditioned by CEO 
reputation.  These results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the 
rent extraction hypothesis.  More importantly, the results identify CEO reputation as a 
factor that can mitigate the agency problem.  Another important implication is that a 
managerial human capital dimension—CEO reputation—plays a role in shaping firm 
outcomes. 
 
The Contingent Nature of Corporate Governance 
 Given the endogenous nature of corporate governance, it is not surprising that 
empirical studies have failed to identify a significant link between governance, 
particularly governance indices, and shareholder value (Bhagat et al., 2008).  Specifically, 
because governance choices are endogenous decisions made by managers and 
shareholders, the choices that are value-maximizing for one firm could be very different 
from the choices that are value-maximizing for another firm (Larcker, Ormazabal, & 
Taylor, 2011). According to Dowell et al. (2011) these different choices are driven by 
different evaluations of the relative costs and benefits of corporate governance 
mechanisms, which are contingent on the firm’s circumstances.  This is an important 
proposition, because it implies that universal regulatory prescriptions for corporate 
governance (as exemplified by SOX and the related stock exchange rules) are not 
appropriate and that governance structure should instead be tailored to the firm’s 
environment as well as its current financial situation and life-cycle stage (Dowell et al., 
2011) . 
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 Two recent empirical studies examine the value of corporate governance under 
specific conditions.  Dowell et al. (2011) investigate the degree to which governance 
mechanisms impact a firm’s survival when it is in financial distress.  They argue that, in 
periods of turbulence, when a firm’s environment is shifting faster than governance 
mechanisms can be adapted, the opportunity exists for inefficient governance to affect 
performance in a significant way.  Thus, while governance may have only a marginal 
effect on survival during routine periods of a firm’s existence, it may have a significant 
effect when there is high risk of failure.  Examining a sample of firms for which survival 
is in question (internet firms in the period following the technology boom and bust of the 
late 1990s), they find that specific governance mechanisms (board independence, board 
size, and CEO power) are associated with the likelihood of firm survival, but only for 
those firms in the sample that are in the greatest financial distress.  This study contributes 
to the literature by providing evidence of the impact of governance during an important 
state of nature for firms:  severe financial distress.   
 Chi and Lee (2010) hypothesize that, if governance structures mitigate agency 
conflicts, then the value of corporate governance should vary with the potential severity 
of agency conflicts.  Based on Jensen’s (1986) proposition that agency costs are 
especially severe when the firm generates substantial free cash flow, Chi and Lee (2010) 
model the relationship between governance and firm value as a function of potential 
agency conflicts.  They highlight the phrase “especially severe” because it suggests that 
the value of governance may increase in a nonlinear fashion as the perception of conflict 
increases.  However, typical empirical studies regress firm value on a governance 
variable unconditionally, a methodology that is weakened by the assumption that the 
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governance effect is the same for all firms across all time (in a pooled sample).  
Consistent with expectations, Chi and Li (2010) find evidence of significant governance 
benefits among firms subject to greater agency conflicts, as proxied by higher free cash 
flow.   
 
Bankruptcy 
Background 
In the United States, bankruptcy is a federal court proceeding that can be initiated 
voluntarily by a financially distressed debtor or involuntarily by the debtor’s creditors.  
For distressed businesses, the Federal Bankruptcy Code (Title 11 of the United States 
Code) allows two alternative forms of bankruptcy filing.  For businesses with limited 
prospects of future successful operation, there is the Chapter 7 filing.  With a Chapter 7 
filing, the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to oversee the closure of the business and 
the sale of its assets, the proceeds of which are used to pay creditors.  An alternative for 
the business that desires to continue operations is the Chapter 11 filing.  The purpose of 
Chapter 11 filing is to give the debtor a temporary opportunity to reorganize its business 
and form a debt repayment plan, with the ultimate goal of emergence as an ongoing entity 
(Campbell, 1997). 
 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Campbell (1997) provides a concise description of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process.  The debtor’s management usually continues to operate the business while a 
reorganization plan is developed.  This plan is drafted by the debtor, ratified by creditor 
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committees, and then voted upon by the creditors after they have been divided into 
classes of similar claims.  If all classes of creditors vote to accept the reorganization plan, 
it is submitted to the bankruptcy court for official approval.  However, if the debtor 
cannot obtain creditor approval within an established time period, the court will order the 
Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding to be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding. 
 
Costs and Benefits of Bankruptcy 
The costs of bankruptcy filing can be described as direct or indirect.  Direct costs 
are the out-of-pocket costs associated with the actual bankruptcy proceeding, including 
filing fees, professional fees, and various administrative costs.  Direct costs are incurred 
in all bankruptcy proceedings, although they are generally higher for Chapter 11 filings 
than for Chapter 7 filings (Campbell, 1997).  Indirect bankruptcy costs include any losses 
that are attributable to adverse impacts on the investment decisions and operations of the 
firm (Gilson, 2012).  Examples include opportunity costs such as lost sales/profits, 
inability to obtain credit, and lost investment opportunities.  These costs can occur not 
only during bankruptcy, but also before and after (Campbell, 1997).  Moreover, they are 
not limited to firms that actually file for bankruptcy but can affect firms with a high 
probability of bankruptcy.  Many studies have examined the direct costs of bankruptcy, 
finding that such costs average 6.5% of the firm’s pre-filing asset value (Hotchkiss, John, 
Mooradian, & Thorburn, 2008).  Indirect costs are thought to be higher, although 
estimating these costs is a challenge since observed performance outcomes around the 
bankruptcy may be the cause, rather than the consequence, of the filing (Gilson, 2012). 
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Another cost of bankruptcy it its price impact on the firm’s stock.  Bankruptcy is 
an extremely negative event for shareholders within only a few days, as shown by studies 
that document an average loss of about 30% of stock value around filing time (Altman, 
1971; Clark & Weinstein, 1983; Lang & Stulz, 1992).  The large magnitude of negative 
stock returns is interpreted as evidence that filing reveals significant new adverse 
information about firm value (Li, 2013).  According to Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995), 
“Bankruptcy filing conveys information about the cash flow prospects of the firm, 
leading to a reassessment of the true value of its assets.”  While recognizing that the new 
information about firm value is one of the factors explaining negative stock returns 
around filing, Li (2013) argues that, theoretically, there is also wealth transfer from 
shareholders to creditors as a result of filing.  Importantly, in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, all 
the firm’s debt needs to be paid off, and shareholders will only receive payouts if the firm 
value turns out to be higher than the total value of this debt.  Prior to filing, the firm only 
needs to honor debt that is immediately due.  Thus, Li (2013) argues that Chapter 11 
filing accelerates payments to creditors, which constitutes a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to creditors.  In Li’s (2013) proposed model, this wealth transfer alone can 
cause shareholder loss even if filing does not provide any new adverse information about 
the firm. 
 As noted by Li (2013), the wealth transfer effect of filing explains the existence of 
involuntary Chapter 11 filing—those cases filed by creditors.  A more puzzling question, 
however, is why we observe voluntary Chapter 11 filings by managers whose interests 
are supposed to be aligned with shareholders.  Despite the negative price impact, Li 
(2013) highlights several benefits of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.  Perhaps the most 
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apparent benefit is its automatic stay feature:  once a firm files for bankruptcy, the court 
prohibits all creditors from pursuing collection efforts against the firm pending an 
approval of a reorganization plan by the court.  This allows valuable time for 
restructuring, which can facilitate the firm’s ultimate survival as an operating entity.  
Chapter 11 also benefits financially distressed firms by helping them raise cash (Gilson, 
2012).  This is attributable to provisions that relieve the firm from making interest or 
principal payments on its debt, offer access to new forms of financing (such as debtor-in-
possession financing), allow the rejection of contracts that threaten its viability, making it 
easier to sell assets, and reducing the firm’s tax burden.  Depending on the relative 
magnitude of the costs and benefits, bankruptcy may either enhance or diminish long-
term shareholder value.  In Li’s (2013) model, which allows for both voluntary and 
involuntary filings, only managers know the true value of the firm and make the decision 
about whether to file bankruptcy in the interest of shareholders. 
 
Bankruptcy as a Strategic Choice 
When a firm’s financial position deteriorates and it defaults on its debt, or is at 
significant risk of defaulting on its debt, its options are straightforward:  a) raise cash 
through asset sales, operating improvements, and new financing; or b) negotiate with 
creditors to reduce or postpone debt payments (Gilson, 2012).  Both of these options for 
dealing with financial distress can be pursued either in bankruptcy court or through an 
agreement outside of court.  In either case, debt restructuring creates value by 
“temporarily enabling overleveraged companies to continue to operate their businesses, 
thereby preserving value that would otherwise be lost if they were shut down or 
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liquidated” (Gilson, 2012, p. 25).  According to Gilson (2012), the choice between 
restructuring debt inside or outside court depends on two things:  1) the relative costs and 
benefits to the company of each option; and 2) the level of consent needed from creditors 
to implement a restructuring plan.  The economically optimal choice is the one that 
maximizes the value of the firm’s assets and thus provides the greatest possible recovery 
to all of the firm’s claimholders.  Balancing of the cost-benefit tradeoff should reflect the 
firm’s specific circumstances, such as its capital structure, the composition of its 
shareholders, the existence of labor contracts, and the magnitude of intangible assets 
(Gilson, 2012). 
 
Efficiency of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy  
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code favors the rehabilitation of financially distressed 
companies that are deemed to be worth saving—those that are worth more as going 
concerns than liquidated in piecemeal form (Gilson, 2012).  Although this may be a 
worthy goal, the efficiency of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process has been long debated 
by legal and financial scholars.  From an ideal standpoint, Chapter 11 filing provides a 
recontracting mechanism among claimholders of the bankrupt firm that mitigates 
transaction costs and bargaining problems related to potentially value-enhancing 
restructuring initiatives (Aivazian & Zhou, 2012).  “The implication is that Chapter 11 
attenuates impediments to rational organizational and strategic changes so that 
collectively rational outcomes emerge for bankrupt firms” (Aivazian & Zhou, 2012, p. 
229).  In contrast, critics argue that it is an overly debtor-friendly process that gives 
 
105 
 
 
 
incumbent managers too much control and fails to liquidate economically inefficient 
firms (Aivazian & Zhou, 2012).   
 Researchers have attempted to shed light on this debate by assessing the firm’s 
operating performance before, during, and after bankruptcy.  Numerous empirical studies 
dating back to the 1980s (e.g., Altman, 1984; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988) document a 
downward spiral of extended decline in performance prior to bankruptcy filing.  Results 
for reorganized firms have been mixed, with early studies showing continuation of poor 
performance and later studies observing more successful reorganization outcomes.  
Relating post-reorganization operating performance to firm and industry characteristics, 
Denis and Rodgers (2007) find that firms that significantly restructure their assets and 
liabilities during Chapter 11 are more likely to achieve positive industry-adjusted 
operating performance in the three years following emergence.  Kalay, Singhal, and 
Tashjian (2007) examine changes in firm operating performance during bankruptcy and 
find that firms experience significant improvement in this metric.  Zhang (2010) shows 
that the competitors of firms that emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy experience 
negative long-term equity returns and deteriorating financial performance.  Finally, 
compared to a group of control firms, Aivazian and Zhou (2012) observe a much greater 
improvement in the operating cash flows of reorganized firms after emerging from 
bankruptcy.   
As summarized above, the recent literature suggests that Chapter 11 
reorganization has a tendency to enhance the operating performance of firms that face 
temporary profitability problems, thus challenging the notion that Chapter 11 is an 
inefficient debtor-friendly mechanism (Aivazian & Zhou, 2012).  Still, Gilson (2012, p. 
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35) notes that, until fairly recently, out-of-court restructuring was thought to dominate the 
formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy process because it was faster and cheaper—“just as a 
plaintiff and defendant litigating over a property dispute would always first seek to settle 
out of court to avoid a costly trial.”  However, he suggests this “calculus has shifted” due 
to legal innovations and institutional changes that have made Chapter 11 a relatively 
more efficient process, as well as a growing appreciation for the numerous benefits that 
Chapter 11 can provide.  Gilson (2012) also suggests this enhanced efficiency played a 
key role in the recovery of the U.S. economy following the recent financial crisis.  He 
notes that, in a relatively short period of time, much of the corporate debt that defaulted 
during the crisis has since been managed down; mass liquidations have been avoided; and 
corporate profits, balance sheets, and stock values have rebounded. 
 
Golden Parachutes in Bankruptcy 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code separates claims into two basic categories—those 
arising before the bankruptcy petition is filed and those arising after.  This distinction is 
important because it implies very different procedural treatment and potential for 
collection (Bartell, 2008).  Pre-petition claims that are not granted priority treatment 
under Section 507 (such as employee wages/retirement contributions, delinquent taxes, 
and customer deposits) are placed in the pool of general unsecured creditors.  Such 
creditors are entitled to a proportionate share of liquidated assets or at least that amount 
through a reorganization plan, a payment that often represents only a small fraction of the 
balance due.  In contrast, post-petition obligations that qualify as administrative expenses 
receive priority treatment, which may result in full payment. 
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Complicating matters, there can be pre-petition contracts that give rise to 
obligations for payment after the bankruptcy filing.  These “straddle” obligations do not 
fall clearly into one of the two basic categories (Bartell, 2008).  Included in the realm of 
straddle obligations are employment contracts and any severance/golden parachute 
agreements contained therein.  Generally, employment contracts are considered 
“executory contracts” under Section 365 of the Code, which can be either assumed or 
rejected at the debtor’s discretion subject to court approval (Gretchko & Bogdanowicz, 
2014).   Although the term “executory contract” is not defined in the Code, it is 
traditionally described as a contract that requires further performance by both parties 
(Lichtenstein, 2006).  Importantly, characterization as an executory contract results in 
pre-petition classification of any claims arising from breach of the contract.  Under 
Section 365, even if the debtor’s obligations required performance after the bankruptcy 
filing, any breach caused by a failure of the debtor to perform under the contract is 
treated as occurring before the filing.  In this way, rejection effectively transforms all the 
debtor’s straddle obligations under the contract into pre-petition obligations giving rise to 
pre-petition claims (Bartell, 2008). 
The only post-petition obligations under rejected executory contracts that are not 
transformed into pre-petition claims are those created by post-petition performance by the 
non-debtor party to the contract (e.g., the employee) (Bartell, 2008).  For example, if an 
employee performs under the contract after the bankruptcy filing, the debtor is obligated 
to pay (as an administrative expense) an amount representing reasonable value for the 
services performed.  This amount may not be the same as the contractual amount payable, 
and any amount owed in excess of the amount actually paid becomes part of the pre-
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petition claims created by the rejection (Bartell, 2008).  Thus, a party to a rejected 
executory contract can have a bifurcated claim including an administrative portion for 
post-petition services and an unsecured portion for the rejection damages (Lichtenstein, 
2006). 
As described above, characterization of claims under executory contracts is 
determined by the provisions of the Code.  However, not all straddle obligations 
constitute executory contracts, and disputes may arise that require some obligations under 
executory contracts to be specifically characterized as pre-petition or post-petition 
(Gretchko & Todhunter, 2012).  A commonly disputed issue is characterization of 
severance and golden parachute payments as part of employment contracts.  With regard 
to these specific provisions of the employment contract, the employee has fully 
performed his or her obligations before the filing, but the debtor’s obligation did not arise 
until after the filing (e.g., due to termination of employment or change in control) (Bartell, 
2008).  There is no clear authority regarding treatment of severance and golden parachute 
payments in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  As with many other bankruptcy issues, the outcome 
depends on the jurisdiction in which the petition is filed.  Nonetheless, as a whole, the 
courts have demonstrated a reluctance to allow post-petition payments to former 
employees on account of severance or golden parachute agreements (Bartell, 2008; 
Lichtenstein, 2006). 
Recent legislation has enhanced the uncertainty surrounding executive 
compensation in bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) introduced several changes to Chapter 11, including 
the treatment of executive compensation plans.  Before, courts utilized the “business 
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judgment” rule on a case-specific basis to evaluate such plans.  With BAPCPA, Congress 
sought to eliminate judicial discretion in this regard by adding Sec. 503(c) to the Code, 
which limits transfers to and obligations incurred for the benefit of insiders of a debtor 
that are intended to induce them to remain with the company through bankruptcy.  
According to the literature (e.g., Rogoff, Sussman, & Cohen, 2006), the effectiveness of 
the new standards remains unresolved.  For plans created post-petition, debtors have 
often been successful in skirting the new standards by re-characterizing retention and 
severance payments as “incentive” payments.  Moreover, is not clear whether the 
standards apply at all to pre-petition executive contracts. 
 
Prepackaged Bankruptcy 
One of the most significant innovations to emerge in the debt restructuring 
industry over the years has been the use of “prepackaged” bankruptcy, which combines 
the most attractive features of Chapter 11 and out-of-court restructuring (Gilson, 2012).  
In a prepackaged bankruptcy, the firm negotiates a restructuring plan with its creditors 
prior to filing for bankruptcy.  Thus, the firm is able to enter bankruptcy with a 
reorganization plan and disclosure statement already in place.  The advantage of this 
approach over a traditional Chapter 11 (or “free fall”) bankruptcy is that it reduces the 
amount of the time the firms spends in bankruptcy court, thereby lowering direct and 
indirect costs (Gilson, 2012). 
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Acquisition in Bankruptcy 
Although there is no federal law that prohibits trading of securities in bankruptcy, 
most companies in this situation are unable to meet the listing standards to continuing 
trading on an organized exchange.  Trading could still continue over-the-counter, but 
such activity is unlikely due its extreme financial risk.  Although a company can emerge 
from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in most instances, its plan of reorganization will cancel the 
existing equity shares, with the creditors and bondholders becoming the new owners.  It 
is also uncommon for stock acquisitions to occur in bankruptcy, as potential buyers have 
a more attractive means of acquiring the bankrupt company’s assets:  through an asset 
sale under Section 363 of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, known as a “363 sale.”  In 
our study, the term “acquisition” represents this type of transaction. 
The 363 sale, which allows a debtor to sells its assets outside the ordinary course 
of business, has become a popular tool for distressed companies seeking to sell 
substantially all their assets.  Although initially intended as a means for the debtor to 
obtain cash to fund a reorganization, it is now being used to sell entire companies and 
dispose of the bankruptcy without a plan (Raykin, 2012).  This type of sale is attractive 
because it is more efficient than a sale under a bankruptcy reorganization plan and offers 
buyers many benefits that cannot be realized in a sale outside bankruptcy.  The primary 
benefit to the seller is speed, i.e., reduced time in bankruptcy.  Most 363 sales take a few 
months, but they can be accomplished in a matter of days.  For example, one of the most 
high-profile examples of a 363 sale in recent years was Lehman Brothers in 2008, whose 
assets (valued at approximately $639 billion) were sold to Barclays within five days of 
filing.  This benefit is particularly important when the assets are rapidly depreciating in 
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value or the debtor cannot obtain financing to continue interim operations.  The primary 
benefit to the buyer is that Sec. 363 provides a degree of finality to the sale that is 
unavailable outside bankruptcy.  Specifically, it allows the assets to be sold “free and 
clear” of existing liens and interests and protects sales made in “good faith” from being 
reversed on appeal.  Because of these protections, buyers may be willing to pay more for 
the assets.   
Another benefit of 363 sales is their ability to capture going-concern value.  This 
is important, as one of the primary justifications of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the 
preservation of going-concern value.  Even if there is insufficient going-concern value to 
warrant reorganization of a bankrupt firm, a 363 sale preserves whatever going-concern 
value may exist by placing the firm’s assets in new hands (Baird & Rasmussen, 2003).  
This benefits not only the debtor by enhancing the bankruptcy recovery, but also society 
as a whole by preserving productive capacity.  According to Baird and Rasmussen (2003, 
p. 691), the opportunity of 363 sales “undercuts the liquidation/reorganization dichotomy 
that marks much discussion about bankruptcy law.”  This dichotomy is the misconception 
that a firm has only two options in bankruptcy:  reorganize consensually in order to 
preserve going-concern value or sell its assets piece-by-piece for only a fraction of their 
value.  Given these benefits to both sellers and buyers, a 363 sale can provide a means for 
a distressed company to fulfill its fiduciary duty to its shareholders by maximizing value 
and minimizing transaction costs. 
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Comparing Bankruptcy Outcomes 
Bankruptcy outcomes are commonly separated into three categories:  liquidated, 
acquired, and reorganized (Kalay et al., 2007).  As discussed above, an efficient 
bankruptcy outcome is one that maximizes the value of the firm’s assets and minimizes 
costs (both direct and indirect).  Depending on the specific circumstances of the bankrupt 
firm, this could be achieved either through reorganization or acquisition.  Despite this 
ambiguity, liquidation, where the firm’s assets are sold on a piecemeal basis at a 
substantial discount, is clearly the least favorable bankruptcy outcome.  The fact that 
many firms choose to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy (reorganization) rather than Chapter 7 
(liquidation) supports this proposition.  Research shows that Chapter 7 filings result in 
only “token” recoveries to unsecured creditors (Lubben, 2007).  Although recoveries in 
Chapter 11 vary widely, simply being in Chapter 11 indicates that creditors’ probability 
of some recovery is higher than zero (Lubben, 2012).  Of course, a Chapter 11 filing 
involves higher professional fees and other expenses, which represent the cost of moving 
to that higher recovery. 
In the perfect world envisioned by early researchers who proposed capital 
structure irrelevance, firms in financial distress (with insufficient assets to satisfy claims) 
could simply renegotiate their obligations and move on (Lubben, 2012).  In reality, debtor 
firms face a world with incomplete contracts, incomplete information, and uncertain asset 
values.  In this environment, financial distress is not costless, and corporate 
reorganization structures are important tools to avoid economically disruptive liquidation 
of assets (Baird & Bernstein, 2006; Pulvino, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1992).  Critics of 
the Chapter 11 process argue that managers can make sub-optimal decisions in 
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bankruptcy, such as promoting reorganization over liquidation, to preserve their 
employment.  According to Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992, p. 1067-1077), a Chapter 11 
petition is “a way to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitoring of 
creditors, thereby permitting management to extract wealth from the firm’s various 
security holders.” 
While it is true that reorganization allows managers to exercise some power and 
leverage they would not otherwise have, it also introduces new constraints on managerial 
authority (Korobkin, 1993).  Most major transactions require the approval of the 
bankruptcy court, and Chapter 11 provides for the appointment of committees to 
represent the interests of creditors and shareholders.  The most common type of 
committee is the creditors’ committee, which acts as a “statutory watchdog” that 
monitors the conduct of the debtor’s management.  Specifically, Section 1103 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code gives such committees the authority to “investigate the acts, conduct, 
assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor”; “participate in the formulation of 
a plan”; and “request the appointment of a trustee or examiner.”  Through the exercise of 
these powers, the creditors’ committee has significant influence in the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy process.  As a fiduciary for creditors holding unsecured claims, the 
committee’s charge is to increase returns to creditors.  This objective can be 
accomplished through negotiating a favorable plan of reorganization or encouraging the 
debtor to sell its assets on a piecemeal or going-concern basis.  According to Harner and 
Marincic (2011), support of the creditors’ committee is necessary for the debtor’s 
successful reorganization, because the various creditors (who vote on the plan) and the 
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bankruptcy court (which ultimately approves or rejects the plan) rely to varying degrees 
on the committee’s recommendations. 
Although reorganization is thought to preserve value, this value is unknown.  
According to Bebchuk (1988, p. 778), “It is generally impossible to place an objective 
and indisputable figure on the value that the reorganized company will have.”  Because 
the reorganization value is unknown, it is difficult to decide how ownership in the new 
entity should be divided among the existing claimants.  This challenge is what Bebchuk 
(1988) refers to as the “division problem.”  Bankruptcy law has dealt with this problem 
by leaving the decision to a process of bargaining among the claimants, within a set of 
established constraints (Bebchuk, 1988).  Under existing rules, a plan of reorganization 
will obtain judicial confirmation if all classes of claimants approve it.  These rules dictate 
how participants can be grouped into classes, how their votes can be solicited, and what 
level of majority constitutes class approval.  The rules also limit the concessions that a 
class of claimants can make.  Specifically, the class cannot, without unanimous 
agreement among the members, vote to receive less than the class would get in a 
liquidation. 
Policy reflects the belief that liquidation is the least favorable bankruptcy 
outcome.  As summarized above, the underlying rationale of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is 
that reorganization may allow the firm’s stakeholders to capture a greater value than 
could be obtained in liquidation.  This notion was highlighted by the House Judiciary 
Committee that proposed Chapter 11 in 1977:  “The premise of business reorganization is 
that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they are designed are 
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more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.”2  The U.S. bankruptcy system, 
unlike other systems around the world, places the bankruptcy outcome largely in the 
hands of the interested parties, who have superior information about the firm’s finances 
and future viability (Warren & Westbrook, 2009).  It is presumed that the parties 
themselves are best positioned to determine the outcome that collectively preserves the 
most value.  Moreover, the procedural confines of Chapter 11 work to limit the ability of 
any individual party to thwart value-maximizing outcomes.  Thus, a firm’s decision not 
to liquidate in bankruptcy suggests that liquidation was an unfavorable alternative.                              
Scholars are also in agreement that liquidation destroys value.  According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), an important cost of bankruptcy is the cost of being forced to 
sell assets to less efficient producers.  When capital market imperfections exist, forced 
liquidations do not result in allocations of assets to highest-value users.  This results not 
only in a socially inefficient allocation of resources, but also in a lower amount of cash 
available to pay creditors and shareholders.  Liquidation discounts are especially severe 
for industry-specific assets, due to a reduced population of buyers (limited to other 
companies in the same industry) and the effects of any industry-wide pressures that 
contributed to the seller’s insolvency (Brown, 1997; Stromberg, 2000).  Pulvino (1999) 
identifies two reasons why bankrupt firms receive lower prices in asset sales than non-
bankrupt distressed firms.  First, bankruptcy status attracts low-ball offers from 
opportunistic buyers.  Second, the structure of the bankruptcy law encourages managers 
to accept low bids.  Managers seeking to protect their jobs have an incentive to raise 
capital at any price, to temporarily fund ongoing operations. 
                                                          
2 H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 220 (1977). 
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In contrast to the consensus regarding the inefficiency of liquidation, the literature 
does not clearly identify either of the other two bankruptcy outcomes—reorganization or 
acquisition—as the best alternative.  As previously noted, it has become increasingly 
common in recent years for firms to enter bankruptcy for the purpose of pursuing an 
acquisition, sometimes with a specific buyer in mind.  According to Baird and 
Rasmussen (2002, p. 751), this trend evidences the fact that “corporate reorganizations 
have all but disappeared.” Their article, titled The End of Bankruptcy, states: 
In the nineteenth century, no single group of investors could amass the capital 
needed to buy large firms, and the market for small ones was underdeveloped.  
Today, both small and large firms can be sold as going concerns, inside of 
bankruptcy and out.  The ability to sell entire firms and divisions eliminates the 
need for a collective forum in which the different players must come to an 
agreement about what should happen to the asset.  That decision can be left to the 
new owners (Baird & Rasmussen, 2002, p. 756). 
 
To be effective, bankruptcy must solve two problems of the bankrupt firm:  excessive 
debt and illiquidity.  LoPucki and Doherty (2007) explain how these objectives can be 
accomplished via a bankruptcy sale or reorganization.  They contend the principal 
difference between the two methods is that, in a reorganization, a judge rather than the 
market determines the debtor’s valuation.  As reflected in Baird and Rasmussen’s (2002) 
statement noted above, economic scholars favor sales over reorganizations because they 
consider market valuations more accurate.  What advocates of going-concern sales fail to 
recognize, according to LoPucki and Doherty (2007), is the fact that any buyer able to the 
supply the liquidity necessary to purchase and rehabilitate large public companies would 
demand a substantial return on investment.  The advantage of reorganization is that it 
preserves value by eliminating the need to pay this return on investment. 
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Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) proffer that, when a firm is unable to generate 
any acquisition interest pre-bankruptcy, the Chapter 11 process actually discourages 
acquisitions.  Due to agency conflicts, managers may seek to extend the bankruptcy 
process rather than pursue an acquisition.  Firms with complex debt structures are not 
attractive acquisition targets in bankruptcy, given the greater probability of friction from 
creditors’ objections.  Finally, the choice of acquisition versus reorganization is impacted 
by the “lemons” problem.  Bankrupt firms with better future prospects are likely to 
pursue reorganization as independent companies rather than attempt a sale in a market 
where good firms, pooled with bad firms, may sell at a low price.  Even when a bankrupt 
firm does seek an acquisition, this information asymmetry suggests that less-informed 
buyers will be deterred from bidding.  Consistent with this proposition, Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998) find that bankrupt targets are most often acquired by firms in the same 
industry.   
LoPucki and Doherty (2007) identify several additional reasons why going-
concern sales may occur at depressed values.  First is a conflict of interest that impacts 
the financial professionals (often investment bankers) that arrange the sales, who are paid 
“success fees” based on the sale price.  Like real estate agents and contingency-fee 
lawyers, they have little incentive to maximize the price:  the incremental fee earned from 
a higher price is not worth the extra effort necessary to obtain that price.  As with IPOs, 
the investment banker may even have an incentive to minimize the sale price if the bank 
has a relationship with the buyer. “Underpricing creates value that the investment banker 
can deliver to a grateful buyer” (LoPucki & Doherty, 2007, p. 35).  If this occurs, why 
don’t creditors or the court intervene?  The answer, proffered by LoPucki and Doherty 
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(2007), is two-fold.  The creditors may not even be aware of the underpricing, given their 
informational disadvantage and the expense that would be required to obtain an 
independent valuation.  Assuming they are aware and do object to the sale, such an 
objection is highly unlikely to prevail in bankruptcy court.  Although the law requires 
debtors to prove they have “good business reasons” to sell firm assets without plan 
formalities and disclosure, LoPucki and Doherty (2007) suggest that competition among 
bankruptcy courts for “big cases” has created passivity in the courts’ evaluation of sale 
proposals.  To support their propositions, LoPucki and Doherty (2007) also present 
empirical results.  In a study of large public companies that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in the period 2000 to 2004, they found that recoveries from reorganizations were more 
than double recoveries from sales.
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CHAPTER III 
       
       
Hypotheses Development 
 
Context of Financial Distress  
As highlighted in the governance literature, the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms is dependent on the firm’s circumstances.  Because the value of 
corporate governance should vary with the potential severity of agency conflicts, the 
impact of governance mechanisms should be more pronounced during periods of greater 
conflict (Chi & Li, 2010).  An example of such a period that has been identified in 
previous research is severe financial distress, when the firm’s survival is in question 
(Dowell et al., 2011).  In this situation, the firm becomes a takeover target, and the CEO 
faces a high probability of job loss (Khanna & Poulson, 1995).  Distress often does lead 
to the dismissal of the CEO, which places the distressed firm in the difficult position of 
needing to recruit a new CEO (Gilson, 1989).  In recent decades, as general skills have 
become more important than firm-specific skills, an active and competitive external labor 
market for CEOs has developed (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004, 2007).  Although external 
recruitment enhances the firm’s access to managerial talent, it also introduces the 
challenge of assessing skills and abilities of candidates who have no performance history 
with the firm (Martin, 2005). 
An insight gained from our CEO interviews is the specialized nature of 
management in distress.  Several of the individuals we interviewed considered 
themselves to be “turnaround managers” and were characterized as such in the press.  
According to one interviewee, distressed companies do not necessarily seek “good
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 CEOs, since such managers “don’t have experience with disasters.”  Moreover, it is not 
necessary that the manager have experience in the particular industry.  As this CEO put it, 
“I’m not there to tell them how to make toasters.”  Rather, the firm is looking for 
someone who is able to quickly “size up the problem” and take decisive action.  This 
description of the qualifications of a turnaround manager suggests two counteracting 
effects on the pool of potential candidates – smaller due to the specialized 
skills/experience required and larger due to the absence of industry-specific qualifications.   
 
Value of the CEO 
Even without a strong theoretical basis, it is widely believed that CEOs have 
substantial influence on corporate policy and identity.  This notion is supported by 
numerous empirical studies that identify heterogeneity across CEOs in various individual 
characteristics and link such variation to corporate performance (Ang et al., 2003; 
Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Graham et al., 2013, Kaplan et al., 2012).  The practical 
implication of such studies is that paying a premium to a high-quality CEO is rational 
because such CEOs increase firm value.  This proposition reflects the optimal contracting 
view of managerial compensation, which holds that premium wages are simply a 
response to the demand for and value of managerial talent (Elson & Ferrere, 2013).  
Managerial talent is especially critical for firms in financial distress, when resources are 
limited and decisive action is required (Leverty & Grace, 2012).   
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Reputational Capital 
Because managerial ability cannot be directly observed, boards must rely on 
measures such as education and experience.  Reputational capital, which captures such 
human capital factors, plays a key role in hiring decisions, expectations of job 
performance, and evaluations of job performance (Jian & Lee, 2011; Martin, 2005).  
Although a manager’s reputation is determined by past actions and accomplishments, it 
has value in the labor market as an indication of likely future performance (Fulmer, 2009).  
Aside from this information content, perceptions of a manager’s reputation can enhance 
his or her marketability for more symbolic reasons.  In selecting a CEO, boards may 
exhibit a form of herding behavior, gravitating toward consensus perceptions of the “safe 
choice” (Lublin, 2005).  Such tendencies are likely to be exacerbated in financial distress, 
when agency conflicts and corporate governance come under enhanced scrutiny. 
The distressed firm requires a capable CEO to facilitate its survival, but a capable 
CEO will perceive this offer for employment as a very high-risk proposition.  If the firm 
cannot be saved, the new CEO will likely bear the blame, regardless of any actual 
culpability (Khanna & Poulson, 1995).   A manager who is fired or forced to resign faces 
not only a loss of current income, but also damage to his or her reputation that can 
diminish prospects for future income (Jensen, 1988).  Thus, human (or reputational) 
capital value can be characterized as the present value of all future compensation gains or 
losses attributed to the manager’s performance (Nohel & Todd, 2005).  According to our 
CEO interviewees, turnaround managers face even more risk due to the enhanced 
expectations created by the specialized nature of their expertise.  Since a distressed firm 
hires a new CEO for a specific task (i.e., to steer the firm through treacherous terrain), 
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failure at this task is particularly harmful to the CEO’s reputation.  As stated by one 
interviewee, “It is potentially very damaging to attach yourself to a failing firm.”  This 
same CEO disclosed that his experience at the subject firm did in fact negatively impact 
his professional reputation, “even more so than I expected.”  Given the inherent 
instability of reputations, managers seek to convert reputational capital to financial 
capital via compensation contracts (Martin, 2005). 
 
Contracting for Incentives 
Executive compensation has long been recognized as a tool for influencing 
managerial incentives, thus serving a role in corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  A proposition of the optimal contracting view of 
executive compensation is that boards are able to design compensation schemes that 
provide managers with efficient incentives to take actions that maximize shareholder 
value.  The goal of such pay-for-performance mechanisms (e.g., equity-based pay) is to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders by tying executive compensation to 
shareholder wealth.  However, research shows that managers are not incentivized 
exclusively by compensation.  As previously noted, they also have an incentive to protect 
their human capital value (or reputation).  In the presence of such career concerns, the 
optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives, both implicit incentives from 
career concerns and explicit incentives from the compensation contract (Gibbons & 
Murphy, 1992).  
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Golden Parachutes 
Although contracting is usually discussed in relation to routine annual 
compensation, understanding top management incentives requires considering other 
forms of compensation, including contingent pay related to one-time events such as 
mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies (Yermack, 2006).  An example of a contingent 
compensation contract is a golden parachute, which offers protection to managers upon a 
change in control.  Given the enhanced agency conflicts that exist in corporate takeover 
contexts, this protection can serve to align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
Such reasoning is the basis of the incentive alignment hypothesis, which suggests that 
golden parachutes enhance shareholder value by allowing the firm to attract/retain 
managerial talent and decreasing resistance to beneficial takeover bids (Jensen, 1988; 
Harris, 1990; Knoeber, 1986).  In contrast, the entrenchment hypothesis argues that 
golden parachutes have the adverse effect of increasing slack on the part of managers by 
insulating them from discipline in the market for corporate control (Manne 1965; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1989). 
 
Compensation Contracting in Financial Distress 
Equity-based pay (e.g., stock and stock options) serves not only to minimize 
managerial shirking and shortsightedness, but also to promote managerial risk-taking 
(Haugen & Senbet, 1981).  Due to their high level of firm-specific human capital, CEOs 
have a tendency to be more risk-averse than diversified shareholders.  Agency theory 
suggests that equity-based pay helps overcome this risk aversion by allowing CEOs to 
participate in unlimited upside gains, while providing a floor for losses.  To accept the 
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risk attached to employment at a distressed firm, a reputable CEO (i.e., with high 
reputational capital) will prefer a compensation contract that offers commensurate upside 
potential in the form of substantial equity-based pay.  Although risky firms generally 
offer less equity-based compensation due to its higher long-term costs, a firm in severe 
distress will do so because:  a) it has limited cash resources; and b) short-term survival 
trumps any long-term cost considerations (Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  Moreover, the new 
CEO’s interest in equity compensation implies an expectation that the firm can be saved 
(i.e., the upside potential can be realized) and that he or she can influence the outcome.   
One of our interviewees highlighted an important factor in contract negotiations 
for the CEO position at a distressed firm:  the expected tenure of the position.  He 
explained that such positions are sometimes short-term in nature (i.e., an interim CEO), 
with the immediate goal of stabilizing operations.  In this situation, the CEO is interested 
primarily in fixed (cash) compensation, because there is limited opportunity for stock 
price appreciation.  According to this interviewee, “Growth can’t occur until the bleeding 
is stopped, and these are two different missions.”  He advised that “big gains” are not 
realized until a transformational strategy is implemented – “something that investors can 
believe in.”  In contrast to an interim CEO position, if the firm and manager see the 
potential for a more permanent situation, equity compensation would be critical.  
 Facing the high risk of job loss (through failure of the firm, firing, or acquisition), 
the new CEO will also require protection in the form of a golden parachute contract.  
Such protection would be valuable in the event that a change in control or dismissal 
occurs after a turnaround is achieved.  Insight as to how or why this might occur was 
gained from our CEO interviews.  The interviewees explained that CEO positions at 
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distressed firms are often short-term (less than two years) for two primary reasons.  As 
previously noted, management in distress requires a different set of skills than 
management in general.  Thus, the CEO who leads a firm from the brink of bankruptcy 
may not be the best person to lead the firm in the long-term.  Sometimes this is known 
from the beginning (in the case of an interim CEO appointment).  Other times, the board 
does not make this determination until later, after the CEO has already committed to what 
he or she perceived as a long-term appointment.  Distressed firms seeking a 
transformation are looking for someone with a new perspective.  As explained by one 
interviewee, “They don’t want the same kind of people.”  The downside of this approach 
is the possibility that the new person is not the right fit – “The board tries something new 
and decides they don’t like it.”   
Another source of uncertainty is the board dynamics of distressed firms.  
According to our interviewees, distressed firms are vulnerable to power plays and 
manipulation among board members.  This leads to a precarious balance of power that 
can shift against the CEO at any moment, often due to something as simple as personality 
conflicts.  Given this uncertainty, CEO candidates will require a golden parachute, 
regardless of the expected tenure of the position.  One interviewee advised that he 
required a GP “to protect me in the event the board and shareholders decided to sell the 
company and the new ownership wanted to go a different direction without me at the 
helm.”  Moreover, he stated, “It takes a serious amount of time to find other employment 
at this level, so the severance was intended to sustain my income during this break in 
employment.” 
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 Our interviewees described the pool of candidates who would even consider the 
CEO position at a distressed firm as quite small, giving the candidate a better bargaining 
position in contract negotiations.  Thus, the compensation requirements of the candidate 
are typically met.  One of the interviewees highlighted the limited options available to the 
board in this situation:  “If they aren’t willing to pay what I’m asking for, they can hire a 
consulting firm for ten million dollars.”   Due to the apparent high-risk nature of the 
employment proposition, it is understood by both the board and the candidate that 
commensurate rewards must be offered.  In the words of one interviewee, “If I think the 
risk is too high, I’ll walk away.” 
 
Research Hypotheses 
As explained above, a reputable CEO will require a golden parachute to accept 
employment at a distressed firm.  The distressed firm is willing to offer this benefit 
because:  a) it identifies the candidate as reputable, i.e., having the intent and capability to 
lead the firm out of distress; and b) it is necessary to recruit the reputable candidate.  This 
clearly creates value for shareholders if the reputable CEO’s efforts to achieve a 
turnaround are successful.  But what if the CEO is unable to avoid bankruptcy?  Based on 
our CEO interviews, this could occur for a number of reasons, such as overconfidence of 
the CEO, misinformation about the true financial condition of the firm, or unanticipated 
market developments.  An important unanswered question is whether a reputable CEO 
creates value for shareholders in bankruptcy.  If not, the value of the golden parachute is 
diminished because it has a high cost if the firm survives and no benefit if the firm fails—
essentially a lose-lose proposition.  Given this tradeoff, shareholders would prefer to “roll 
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the dice” with a lower-quality CEO.  They would be no worse off in the failure scenario 
and better off in the survival scenario. 
Because executive compensation contracts are usually nullified in bankruptcy, 
there remains no explicit incentive for the CEO to preserve shareholder wealth.  In other 
words, the compensation contract no longer has any power as a corporate governance 
mechanism.  However, a reputable CEO still has an implicit incentive driven by career 
concerns, i.e., the desire to preserve his or her reputational capital.  If this implicit 
incentive drives the manager to continue wealth-preserving efforts in the absence of 
explicit incentives, a reputable CEO does create value for shareholders in bankruptcy, 
and the golden parachute does have value as a tool for distressed firms to recruit 
reputable CEOs.  Thus, in our study, the golden parachute doesn’t explicitly incentivize 
the CEO toward a particular bankruptcy outcome; instead, it identifies and attracts 
reputable CEOs who have an implicit incentive to preserve shareholder wealth.   
Examining this research question requires ranking the favorability of the three 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy outcomes:  acquisition, reorganization, and liquidation.  Public 
policy clearly reflects the belief that liquidation is the least favorable outcome.  The 
underlying rationale of Chapter 11 bankruptcy (as an alternative to Chapter 7) is that 
reorganization preserves more value than liquidation.  Moreover, the fact that many firms 
voluntarily choose to pursue reorganization, with its higher costs, supports this 
proposition (Warren & Westbrook, 2009).  Although individual stakeholders may have 
incentives to thwart value-maximizing outcomes, the procedural confines of Chapter 11 
work to limit such efforts (Harner & Marincic, 2011; Korobkin, 1993).  Scholars, who 
recognize the forced sale of assets to inefficient producers as an important cost of 
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bankruptcy, also agree that liquidation destroys value (Pulvino, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1992).  Finally, empirical research shows that liquidation implies zero recovery for 
unsecured creditors and shareholders (Lubben, 2007, 2012).  Comparing reorganization 
and acquisition is more difficult, since the relative costs and benefits of each outcome 
depend on the unique circumstances of the firm.  Both reorganization and liquidation 
preserve value in the form of going-concern value, but the question of which outcome 
captures more going-concern value remains unsettled (Baird & Rasmussen, 2002; 
LoPucki & Doherty, 2007). 
Accepting liquidation as the least favorable bankruptcy outcome, we pose the 
following primary hypothesis: 
H1:  CEOs hired during times of financial distress who negotiate a golden 
parachute contract are more likely to guide the firm toward the avoidance of 
liquidation in bankruptcy. 
This first hypothesis tests whether reputable CEOs create value for shareholders in 
bankruptcy.  It contains a two-fold expectation:  1) that a reputable CEO will require a 
golden parachute; and 2) that a reputable CEO will pursue value preservation even when 
the golden parachute becomes worthless.  However, this hypothesis does not address a 
second key element of our argument:  the importance of the distress context in creating 
the information content of the reputable CEO’s demand for a golden parachute.  Our 
reasoning suggests that, outside the context of financial distress, the CEO’s negotiation of 
a golden parachute offers little information about his or her capability.  Thus, we propose 
a second hypothesis to test CEO risk considerations as the driver of the information 
content of the golden parachute: 
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H2:  CEOs hired during other times who negotiate a golden parachute are no 
more likely to lead the firm toward the avoidance of liquidation in bankruptcy. 
Another element of our argument is the nature of the information content offered by the 
golden parachute.  We reason that a CEO who accepts employment at a distressed firm 
absent a golden parachute demonstrates a lack of capability and/or intention to achieve a 
turnaround, leading to our third hypothesis: 
H3:  CEOs hired during times of financial distress who do not negotiate a golden 
parachute are no more likely to lead the firm toward the avoidance of liquidation 
in bankruptcy.
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CHAPTER IV 
       
       
Methodology and Results 
 
 
Research Approach 
We examine golden parachutes as a tool for financially distressed firms to recruit 
reputable CEOs, who have the capability and implicit incentive to lead the firm to a 
favorable bankruptcy outcome.  Unlike previous research, which has attempted to link 
general governance structure with broad measures of firm performance, our approach 
focuses on a single firm mechanism (presence of a golden parachute) that has clear 
implications for specific firm outcomes (avoidance of liquidation) in a specific context 
(distress/bankruptcy). 
 
Assumptions 
Expectation of Bankruptcy Filing 
An important assumption of our study is that the CEO does not perceive a 
bankruptcy filing as imminent.  Although the CEO recognizes the distressed firm as a 
takeover target, which creates the value of the golden parachute, the firm’s eventual 
bankruptcy filing is not known.  As previously discussed, the payment of a GP in 
bankruptcy is highly uncertain.  If bankruptcy were expected, the GP would have limited 
risk-mitigation value and thus limited effectiveness in recruiting.  Anecdotal evidence 
obtained from our CEO interviews supports this assumption, as all the interviewees 
expressed the belief that bankruptcy could be avoided with new leadership and the 
implementation of certain strategic initiatives.  One interviewee described bankruptcy as
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“all bad” (i.e., never a good scenario) and stated that, even for highly distressed 
companies, he always goes in with a goal and plan to avoid bankruptcy.  According to 
another interviewee, for an executive to take such a position, “he has to believe the 
problem is fixable.” 
 
Other Assumptions 
Our methodological approach requires several other assumptions, all of which are 
supported by the literature and our CEO interviews: 
• A firm that eventually files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy is known to be in financial 
distress prior to its filing. 
• Closer proximity to the firm’s bankruptcy filing indicates greater severity of 
financial distress. 
• The decisions and actions of a firm’s CEO can influence its bankruptcy outcome. 
• Liquidation is the least favorable bankruptcy outcome for a firm’s shareholders. 
• A reputable CEO has implicit incentives to maximize shareholder value, even 
without explicit compensation-based incentives. 
 
Sample and Data 
Sample Description 
We examine a sample of large U.S. firms that both entered and exited Chapter 11 
bankruptcy during the period July 2002 to June 2013.   
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Sample Formation 
The starting point for our sample is the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research 
Database (BRD).  This database includes all bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 11, 
either by or against a company, that:  a) had assets of $100 million or more (in 1980 
dollars) as of the date of filing; and b) was required to file annual reports (Form 10-K) 
with the SEC.  BRD represents the collection of data from a variety of sources, including 
bankruptcy court files available through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER) service and various SEC filings. 
 
Time Period 
The time period for the sample is restricted to the post-SOX period, beginning in 
July of 2002, based on research indicating that CEOs became significantly more risk-
averse following SOX (Wang, Davidson, & Wang, 2010). 
 
Other Sample Restrictions 
Following previous research, our sample excludes firms in the financial, 
insurance, real estate, and public utilities industries, because these firms have unique 
bankruptcy protocols.  Also excluded are firms whose bankruptcy filings are related to 
tort litigation (Dahiya, John, Puri, & Ramirez, 2003) and firms for which the necessary 
data were not available.  The final sample is comprised of 275 firms. 
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Data Sources 
The Bankruptcy Research Database provides basic information about the 
bankruptcy cases (e.g., date of filing, duration, prepackaged, etc.), select financial and 
industry data, and the outcomes of the Chapter 11 process.  For financial data not 
contained in BRD, we utilize Compustat.  All financial data for the sample firms are for 
the last fiscal year before the year of bankruptcy filing.  Other firm- and CEO-specific 
data, including executive compensation data, are obtained from the firm’s most recent 
proxy statement or Form 10-K filed with the SEC before the bankruptcy filing.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
In our sample of 275 firms, 47 (17.1%) were acquired in bankruptcy, 196 (71.3%) 
were reorganized, and 32 (11.6%) were liquidated.  This distribution (majority 
reorganized) is consistent with previous empirical studies of bankruptcy outcomes. Table 
1, which reports the time distribution of the bankruptcy filings, shows several patterns.  
Most notable is the cyclical nature of the filings, evidenced by a small spike in 2003 and 
a larger spike in 2009.  Both of these spikes follow declines in the U.S. economy, the 
latter representing the Great Recession.  Another observation is the increasing prevalence 
of prepackaged filings over time, comprising more than half of annual filings in recent 
years.  A decreasing trend is apparent in the duration of the bankruptcy filings, with an 
average of 12.2 months for the entire sample.  There is not a clear time trend in the 
liquidation rate, which ranges from a low of 0% in years 2004 and 2006 to a high of 25% 
in year 2012.  As previously noted, the average liquidation rate for the entire sample is 
11.6%. 
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Table 1 
Sample by Year and Bankruptcy Outcome 
Year Acqu. Reorg. Liqu. Total % 
Liqu. 
% of 
Sample 
# 
Prep. 
% 
Prep. 
Duration 
(Mos.) 
2002 4 15 3 22 13.6% 8.0% 7 31.8% 11.8 
2003 12 28 5 45 11.1% 16.4% 11 24.4% 19.7 
2004 3 22 0 25 0.0% 9.1% 12 48.0% 10.5 
2005 2 15 3 20 15.0% 7.3% 4 20.0% 16.1 
2006 1 10 0 11 0.0% 4.0% 5 45.5% 12.0 
2007 2 5 1 8 12.5% 2.9% 4 50.0% 5.5 
2008 6 11 5 22 22.7% 8.0% 3 13.6% 16.4 
2009 11 47 8 66 12.1% 24.0% 29 43.9% 13.8 
2010 3 13 1 17 5.9% 6.2% 9 52.9% 6.9 
2011 2 13 2 17 11.8% 6.2% 9 52.9% 8.8 
2012 1 8 3 12 25.0% 4.4% 6 50.0% 6.2 
2013 0 9 1 10 10.0% 3.6% 8 80.0% 2.4 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of our sample by industry, using industry 
categories employed in previous research (Barniv, Agarwal, & Leach, 2002).  These 
include agriculture, mining, and construction (SIC 01-19); manufacturing (SIC 20-39); 
wholesale and retail goods (SIC 50-59); and miscellaneous.  Manufacturing is the best-
represented industry in our sample, comprising 47% of the observations.  The liquidation 
rate for this industry category is 11.6%, consistent with the liquidation rate for the entire 
sample.  The liquidation rates for the other specified industry categories are higher, while 
the liquidation rate for the miscellaneous category is lower.  Finally, Table 3 illustrates 
the prevalence of GP contracts in our sample.  Of our 275 sample firms, 165 (60%) had 
GPs for the CEO at the time of bankruptcy filing.  There is no apparent difference in this 
percentage across the three bankruptcy outcomes. 
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Table 2 
Sample by Industry and Bankruptcy Outcome 
Industry                              Acqu. Reorg. Liqu. Total % 
Liqu. 
% of 
Sample 
Agric/Mining/Const  2 13 3 18 16.7% 6.5% 
Manufacturing  27 87 15 129 11.6% 46.9% 
Wholesale/Retail  6 20 6 32 18.8% 11.6% 
Miscellaneous  12 76 8 96 8.3% 34.9% 
 
 
Table 3 
Sample by GP and Bankruptcy Outcome 
Outcome # % 
Total 
GP % 
Outcome 
Acquired 47 17.1% 27 57.4% 
Reorganized 196 71.3% 119 60.7% 
Liquidated 32 11.6% 19 59.4% 
Total 275 100.0% 165  
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the outcome of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process, 
specifically the binary outcome pair liquidated v. not liquidated (reorganized or 
acquired).  Like Kalay et al. (2007), we categorize a firm as reorganized if it emerged 
from bankruptcy as an operating entity, as acquired if all (or substantially all) of the 
firm’s assets were purchased by one buyer, and as liquidated if the firm’s assets were 
sold to multiple buyers or the Chapter 11 filing was converted to Chapter 7. 
 
Independent Variables 
We consider three independent variables of interest.  First is a binary factor 
representing the existence of a golden parachute contract for the CEO at the date of filing.  
Following Lefanowicz et al. (2000), a firm is coded as having a GP if its latest SEC filing 
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preceding the bankruptcy filing indicates the existence of such an agreement, defined as 
any agreement providing for supplementary payments contingent upon a change in 
control of the firm.  The second independent variable is a binary factor indicating a new 
CEO.  A new CEO is defined as one hired within one year preceding the firm’s 
bankruptcy filing, when the firm was in severe financial distress.  Finally, we consider 
the interaction of these two terms, a binary factor indicating a new CEO with a GP. 
 
Univariate Probabilities 
Our three hypotheses predict differences in the probability of liquidation in 
bankruptcy, depending on whether the CEO was new (recently hired) and whether he or 
she had a GP contract.  Specifically, we expect: 
• A lower probability for new CEOs with GPs vs. new CEOs without GPs (H1); 
• No lower probability for incumbent (not new) CEOs with GPs vs. incumbent 
CEOs without GPs (H2); and 
• No lower probability for new CEOs without GPs vs. incumbent CEOs without 
GPs (H3). 
Table 4 illustrates the univariate probabilities (proportions) calculated from our sample, 
which are consistent with the expectations noted above. 
Table 4  
Univariate Probabilities of Liquidation 
 Tot NL L P(L)  Tot NL L P(L) 
New w/ GP 49 44 5 10.2% New w/o GP 54 44 10 18.5% 
Incumb. w/ GP 116 102 14 12.1% Incumb. w/o GP 56 53 3 5.4% 
New w/o GP 54 44 10 18.5% Incumb. w/o GP 56 53 3 5.4% 
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Other Univariate Comparisons 
 Our hypotheses focus on the interaction of two factors, new CEOs with GP 
contracts, specifically the impact of this interaction on bankruptcy outcomes.  Proper 
testing of this relationship requires controlling for other factors that may explain the 
relationship.  In an effort to identify such controls, we test for differences in various 
factors between two sub-groups of our sample population:  1) firms of new CEOs with 
GPs; and 2) firms of new CEOs without GPs.  Our total sample contains 103 firms with 
newly hired CEOs, 49 with GPs and 54 without.  We test both firm-specific and CEO-
specific factors, as illustrated in Tables 5 and 6.  Although we find no significant (at 5%) 
differences, several of these factors are utilized as controls based on findings from 
previous studies.   
 One firm characteristic that we were unable to test, due to data limitations, is the 
probability of bankruptcy as measured by Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score.  We 
could not apply the Z-score, since one of its inputs is the market value of the firm’s 
equity.  Many of our sample firms are not publicly traded and thus have no available 
measure of market equity.  Another constraint, which impacts the applicability of both 
scores, is the limited availability of quarterly data for the private firms (which are 
required to file only annual reports with the SEC).  Without such periodic data, we cannot 
measure the bankruptcy scores at a given point in time (e.g., one year) prior to 
bankruptcy.  This is not a substantial limitation for our study, given our focus on new 
hires (i.e., hired within one year of the bankruptcy filing).  At this point in time, we 
expect the firm’s financial distress to be apparent.  This apparent distress drives the high-
risk nature of the employment proposition, which is critical to our hypotheses 
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development.  Moreover, our interviews indicate that the CEO’s expectations of avoiding 
bankruptcy were based not on the firm’s existing financial condition but rather on the 
firm’s potential with implementation of a turnaround plan. 
Table 5 
Differences between Firms of New CEOs, with and without GPs   
T-Tests for Comparisons of Means – Scale Variables 
Factor #Obs. 
Tot. 
#Obs. 
GP Yes 
#Obs. 
GP No 
Mean  
GP Yes 
Mean  
GP No 
p-value 
Sales 103 49 54 2,769.54 5,059.34 0.448 
Log Sales 103 49 54 6.77 6.93 0.589 
Total Assets 103 49 54 2,531.10 4,445.44 0.361 
Log Total Assets 103 49 54 7.00 6.87 0.586 
Current Assets 103 49 54 759.93 1,304.09 0.509 
Log Current Assets 103 49 54 5.87 5.67 0.445 
Total Liabilities 103 49 54 2,452.49 5,375.80 0.406 
Log Total Liabilities 103 49 54 2.99 2.96 0.808 
Current Assets / Tot. Assets 103 49 54 0.39 0.37 0.670 
Current Assets / Current Liab. 103 49 54 1.72 1.19 0.083 
Tot. Liab. / Tot. Assets 103 49 54 1.1 1.15 0.778 
Net Income / Sales 103 49 54 -2.36 -0.22 0.209 
EBIT / Sales 103 49 54 -1.51 -0.01 0.281 
EBITDA / Sales 103 49 54 -1.22 -0.01 0.273 
Income Before Extr. Items / 
Sales 
103 49 54 -2.18 -0.22 0.243 
Log # Employees 101 49 52 8.28 8.07 0.862 
CEO Age 103 49 54 51.12 53.80 0.105 
Block Ownership 103 49 54 0.55 0.64 0.077 
CEO Ownership 103 49 54 0.02 0.04 0.370 
   
Table 6 
Differences between Firms of New CEOs, with and without GPs   
Chi-Square Tests – Categorical Variables 
Factor #Obs. 
Tot. 
#Obs. 
GP Yes 
#Obs. 
GP No 
Chi-
Square 
p-value 
CEO Replaced in Bankruptcy 103 49 54 0.59 0.444 
CEO Hired from Outside 103 49 54 0.50 0.481 
CEO Age 60+ 103 49 54 0.40 0.525 
CEO Age 64+ 103 49 54 3.34 0.068 
Public v. Private Firm 103 49 54 0.55 0.459 
Public v. OTC v. Private Firm 103 49 54 0.97 0.614 
CEO or President at Prev. Firm 103 49 54 0.94 0.334 
Chief Officer at Prev. Firm 103 49 54 3.31 0.069 
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CEO w/ MBA Degree 83 43 40 0.96 0.327 
CEO w/ Law Degree 83 43 40 0.21 0.651 
CEO w/ Graduate Degree (Any) 83 43 40 0.97 0.325 
CEO w/ Ivy League Degree 83 43 40 1.75 0.186 
Educational Field 83 43 40 1.57 0.456 
 
 
CEO Interviews  
As previously noted, we interviewed eight CEOs of our sample firms over a 
period of two weeks in September of 2014.  Six of the interviews were conducted by 
phone, and two CEOs responded via email.  Our questions addressed issues such as their 
decision to accept employment at the firm, the contract negotiation process, the condition 
of the firm at the time of hire, and the personal consequences of the bankruptcy.  Key 
characteristics of the interviewees are provided in Table 7.  Because most requested 
confidentiality, names are not disclosed.  All of the interviewees were new hires and were 
thus able to offer information directly relevant to our hypotheses.  Five of the eight were 
new hires with GP contracts, which are expected to have non-liquidation outcomes based 
on our hypotheses.  Four of the five meet this expectation, with either reorganization or 
acquisition outcomes.  For the one exception, the CEO explains his firm’s liquidation as a 
result of the board’s imprudent rejection of his proposed turnaround plan.3  In sum, these 
eight observations are largely consistent with our hypotheses.  More importantly, the 
information gained from the interviews confirmed the underlying reasoning for the 
hypotheses and offered insights that enhanced our understanding of the results. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Additional details regarding this firm and CEO are discussed in the final section of the paper. 
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Table 7 
Characteristics of Interviewees 
Interviewee New 
Hire 
GP 
Contract 
Bankruptcy 
Outcome 
1 Yes No Liquidated 
2 Yes Yes Acquired 
3 Yes Yes Liquidated 
4 Yes No Liquidated 
5 Yes No Liquidated 
6 Yes Yes Reorganized 
7 Yes Yes Reorganized 
8 Yes Yes Acquired 
 
Logistic Regression Model 
While the univariate comparisons are suggestive, it is also necessary to conduct a 
multivariate test.  Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, our 
hypotheses can be assessed with a logistic regression model of the following form: 
PROB = b0 + b1GP + b2New + b3(GP * NEW) + bkXk + E 
o PROB – dependent variable equal to one if the firm is liquidated 
o GP – dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a GP contract 
o New – dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was hired within one year 
of the bankruptcy filing 
o GP * New – dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has a GP and was 
hired within one year of the bankruptcy filing 
o X – a vector of control variables 
 
Based on our hypotheses, we expect no significant relationship for GP or NEW and a 
significant negative relationship for the interaction GP * New.   
 
Controls 
A number of control variables are included in the regression model, based on 
significant factors identified in previous research.  We include three firm-specific 
financial factors (measured as of the year-end preceding the bankruptcy filing) that may 
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impact the firm’s probability of liquidation:  size, leverage, and current ratio.  A negative 
sign is expected for firm size (SIZ), since larger firms have more resources to facilitate 
survival in bankruptcy.  A negative sign is also expected for leverage (LVG).  Although 
leverage drives a firm to bankruptcy more quickly, this implies less time for the firm to 
continue unprofitable operations and thus better prospects for a favorable bankruptcy 
outcome (Denis & Rodgers, 2007).  The expected relationship for the current ratio 
(CURR) is positive, since current assets have a higher liquidation value (making 
liquidation a more attractive proposition) and can be more easily diverted during the 
bankruptcy process for non-productive purposes (Dahiya et al., 2003).  In addition to 
these financial factors, we also control for two firm-specific governance factors:  block 
ownership (BLK) and CEO ownership (CEO Own).  Again, these are measured as of the 
year-end preceding the bankruptcy filing.  We expect a negative sign for both ownership 
controls, since greater ownership implies a greater incentive for the owners to exercise 
their influence to avoid liquidation in bankruptcy. 
The next group of controls addresses CEO-specific factors that may influence 
bankruptcy outcomes.  CEO age (AGE) is included, with a negative expected sign.  Since 
age proxies for experience, it suggests a greater ability to manage a firm in crisis.  Two 
dummy variables measure whether the CEO was hired from outside the firm (OUT) and 
whether the CEO was replaced during the bankruptcy process (REPL).  The expected 
sign for OUT is negative, since an outside hire is not entrenched in the problems that led 
to the crisis and is more likely to contribute a new perspective.  In contrast, we expect a 
positive relationship for REPL, because replacement of a CEO during bankruptcy is often 
concurrent with the realization that liquidation cannot be avoided.  In this case, the 
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replacement CEO is tasked with facilitating an orderly liquidation of the firm’s assets.  
The final two controls address characteristics of the bankruptcy filing that are known to 
be related to the outcome:  whether the filing is prepackaged or pre-negotiated (PREP) 
and the duration of the bankruptcy process.  Since a prepackaged filing indicates the 
existence of a specific plan to avoid liquidation, the expected sign for this control is 
negative.  The expected sign for duration is also negative, since reorganization and 
acquisition are more complex than liquidation and thus require more time to complete.  
All explanatory factors, including these controls, are identified in Table 8, which 
provides definitions, sources, and expected signs.  The regression model also controls for 
year and industry fixed effects, with industry measured using the four categories 
previously identified. 
Table 8 
Explanatory Factors 
Name Abbrev. Description Exp. 
Sign 
Source 
Golden 
parachute 
GP An indicator variable that equals one if the 
CEO has a GP contract and zero otherwise 
N/A SEC filings 
CEO new 
hire 
NEW An indicator variable that equals one if the 
CEO was hired within one year of 
bankruptcy filing and zero otherwise 
N/A BRD 
Firm size SIZ Natural log of books assets (in 2008 
dollars), as of the year-end preceding 
bankruptcy filing 
_ BRD 
Leverage LVG Total Liabilities / Total Assets (in 2008 
dollars), as of the year-end preceding 
bankruptcy filing 
_ BRD 
Current 
assets % 
CURR Current Assets / Total Assets (in 2008 
dollars), as of the year-end preceding 
bankruptcy filing 
+ Compustat 
Block 
ownership 
BLK Percentage of shares owned by shareholders 
with at least a 5% interest, as of the year-
end preceding bankruptcy filing 
_ SEC filings 
CEO 
ownership 
CEO 
Own 
CEO shares + options / shares outstanding, 
measured as of the year-end preceding 
bankruptcy filing 
_ SEC filings 
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CEO age AGE CEO’s age at the date of bankruptcy filing 
 
_ SEC filings  
CEO outside 
hire 
OUT An indicator variable that equals one if the 
CEO was hired from outside the firm and 
zero otherwise 
_ SEC filings  
Replacement 
of CEO 
during 
bankruptcy 
REPL An indicator variable that equals one if the 
CEO was replaced during the bankruptcy 
process and zero otherwise 
+ BRD 
Prepackaged 
bankruptcy 
PREP An indicator variable that equals one if the 
bankruptcy is prepackaged/pre-negotiated 
and zero otherwise 
_ BRD 
Duration of 
bankruptcy 
DUR Number of months in bankruptcy, from the 
date of filing to the date of plan 
confirmation 
_ BRD 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables, and pairwise 
correlations of the explanatory variables are provided in Table 10.  As illustrated in Table 
10, most of the correlations are low, and none are above 0.50.  The highest correlation is      
-0.49, which is between PREP and DUR.  This negative relationship is expected, since 
prepackaged bankruptcies are known to have quicker resolutions. 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
SIZ 6.818 6.529 1.101 5.073 11.423 
LVG 1.113 0.974 0.675 0.130 6.152 
CURR 0.352 0.335 0.198 0.016 0.924 
BLK 0.604 0.620 0.272 0.000 1.000 
CEO Own 0.065 0.010 0.168 0.000 1.000 
AGE 54.10 54.00 8.43 34.00 88.00 
OUT 0.487 N/A 0.501 0.000 1.000 
REPL 0.309 N/A 0.463 0.000 1.000 
PREP 0.389 N/A 0.488 0.000 1.000 
DUR 12.158 9.770 12.160 0.000 116.53 
NEW 0.375 N/A 0.485 0.000 1.000 
GP  0.600 N/A 0.491 0.000 1.000 
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Table 10 
Pairwise Correlations 
  
SIZ LVG CURR BLK 
CEO 
Own AGE OUT REPL PREP DUR NEW GP 
SIZ 1.00                       
LVG -0.08 1.00                     
CURR -0.21 -0.04 1.00                   
BLK -0.15 0.14 -0.10 1.00                 
CEO 
Own -0.09 0.06 -0.12 0.22 1.00               
AGE 0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.05 0.20 1.00             
OUT -0.00 0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.07 0.07 1.00           
REPL 0.03 -0.20 0.19 -0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.07 1.00         
PREP -0.09 0.22 -0.17 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.36 1.00       
DUR 0.21 -0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.39 -0.49 1.00     
NEW 0.08 0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.06 1.00   
GP  0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.22 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.20 1.00 
 
Logistic Regression Results 
 Results of the logistic regressions are provided in Table 11.  Model I includes the 
control variables along with our variables of interest, GP and NEW.  Consistent with our 
hypotheses, neither variable is significant in Model I.  This indicates that neither the 
presence of a GP for the CEO, nor the proximity of the CEO’s hiring to the bankruptcy 
filing, independently impacts the firm’s probability of liquidation in bankruptcy.  In 
Model II, we add the interaction term GP * New, which allows testing of our primary 
hypothesis:  that GPs are related to a reduced probability of liquidation only for newly 
hired CEOs.  The interaction term in Model II is negative and highly significant (less 
than 1%), which supports Hypothesis 1.  As with Model I, neither GP nor NEW is 
significant in Mode1 II.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, a GP contract does not reduce the 
probability of liquidation in bankruptcy unless the CEO is newly hired, i.e., hired during 
the crisis period leading up to the bankruptcy.  Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3, a 
newly hired CEO does not reduce the probability of liquidation in bankruptcy unless the 
CEO has a GP contract.   
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To test the economic significance of our findings, we compare the probabilities of 
four groups:  incumbent CEOs with GPs, incumbent CEOs without GPs, new CEOs with 
GPs, and new CEOs without GPs.  In calculating these probabilities from our logistic 
regressions, we assume a firm:  a) in the  goods industry; b) with the average level of 
CEO ownership, block ownership, firm size, leverage, liquidity, CEO age, and 
bankruptcy duration; c) without a prepackaged filing; and d) filed in year 2013.  For such 
firms with new CEOs that have GPs, the probability of liquidation in bankruptcy is less 
than 5%.  This probability increases to almost 25% for firms with new CEOs that do not 
have GPs.  Thus, for firms with newly hired CEOs, the presence of a GP decreases the 
probability of liquidation by 80%.  For incumbent CEOs with GPs, the probability of 
liquidation is 13%, more than twice the probability for new CEOs with GPs.  This 
comparison shows that GPs have information content (indication of capability) only for 
newly hired CEOs (i.e., hired during financial distress).  In fact, the presence of a GP for 
an incumbent CEO actually increases the probability of liquidation, from 2% to 13%. 
 
Table 11 
Logistic Regressions 
Liquidated v. Not Liquidated 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
GP Def. Any Any Salary Vesting 
 B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Intercept -0.2492 0.9288  -0.7729 0.7989  -1.0569 0.7419  -0.2806 0.9247  
SIZ -0.2281 0.3681  -0.2798 0.2833  -0.2246 0.4033  -0.2155 0.3904  
LVG -0.9703 0.1970  -1.3417 0.0961 * -1.7264 0.0515 * -1.2964 0.1029  
CURR 3.3649 0.0107 ** 3.1068 0.0311 ** 3.1670 0.0377 ** 3.3124 0.0186 ** 
BLK -2.4485 0.0244 ** -3.3116 0.0048 *** -3.5000 0.0038 *** -2.9505 0.0097 *** 
CEO Own 1.4511 0.4223  3.2663 0.1168  4.0131 0.0624 * 2.1867 0.2535  
AGE 0.0218 0.4719  0.0253 0.4193  0.0285 0.3670  0.0210 0.4938  
OUT 0.2001 0.6715  0.4287 0.3974  0.5309 0.3115  0.4284 0.3951  
REPL 0.5176 0.3122  0.7995 0.1475  0.9763 0.0896 * 0.5679 0.2860  
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PREP -1.6738 0.0229 ** -1.9063 0.0141 ** -2.0814 0.0097 *** -1.8771 0.0143 ** 
DUR -0.0298 0.2719  -0.0183 0.5271  -0.0285 0.3733  -0.0196 0.4754  
AG/MIN/ 
CON 0.0327 0.9711  -0.3617 0.7033  -0.6152 0.5275  -0.2324 0.8045  
MANUF -0.3924 0.4960  -0.2189 0.7204  -0.3057 0.6254  -0.3287 0.5777  
GOODS -0.4716 0.5406  -0.2580 0.7476  -0.2521 0.7585  -0.3721 0.6318  
NEW 0.5957 0.2436  2.8296 0.0033 *** 3.2980 0.0011 *** 1.7505 0.0138 ** 
GP 0.1711 0.7301  2.0443 0.0185 ** 2.5726 0.0052 *** 1.2427 0.0654 * 
GP*New 
    -3.8912 0.0026 *** -5.0123 0.0005 *** -2.8734 0.0123 ** 
 
   
  
 
      
Chi-Squ. 57.253 0.0000 *** 68.225 0.0000 *** 73.577 0.0000 *** 64.323 0.0000 *** 
Pseudo-R2 0.188   0.220 
 
 0.235   0.209   
# Obs. 275   275   275   275   
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 In addition to a general definition of a golden parachute (encompassing any type 
of benefit payable upon a change in control), we also test alternative definitions that 
reflect specific types of benefits. This approach follows the suggestion of Bebchuk et al. 
(2014) that future research should focus on specific types of golden parachutes.  We 
consider the two most common components of GP contracts:  cash payment based on a 
multiple of salary (Salary) and immediate vesting of restricted stock and stock options 
(Vesting).  Almost 91% of the GPs in our sample have a salary provision, and 65.5% 
have a vesting provision.  About 62% of the GPs have both a salary provision and a 
vesting provision, indicating that the two provisions commonly occur together.  We 
estimate the parameters of our model using two alternative definitions of GP:  one 
representing inclusion of a salary provision (Model III) and another representing 
inclusions of a vesting provision (Model IV).  Regressions with these alternative GP 
definitions produce results similar to our primary model using the general GP definition.  
Neither GP nor NEW is significant, and GP * New is highly significant with a negative 
coefficient of substantial magnitude.   
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Significant control variables include PREP, CURR, and BLK, each of which has 
the expected sign.  The coefficient for PREP is negative, meaning that firms with a 
prepackaged or pre-negotiated bankruptcy are less likely to be liquidated.  This finding 
suggests that advance planning (before the bankruptcy filing) is often successful in 
helping a firm avoid liquidation.  The coefficient for CURR is positive, meaning that 
firms with a higher current ratio are more likely to be liquidated.  This validates the 
expectation that higher liquidity makes the liquidation outcome more attractive for 
certain stakeholders, incentivizing such stakeholders to support this outcome.  Finally, the 
coefficient for BLK is negative, meaning that firms with a higher percentage of block 
ownership are less likely to be liquidated.  As expected, block owners have a greater 
incentive to avoid liquidation and exercise their influence to resist this outcome.  
Although the coefficient for each of these significant controls is high in magnitude, the 
coefficient for the interaction term GP * New is even higher.  This suggests that, of the all 
the factors tested, this factor has the strongest influence on the firm’s probability of 
liquidation in bankruptcy.  Another important observation is the greater pseudo-R2 for the 
models that include the interaction term GP * New.  This shows that adding the 
interaction term substantially increases the explanatory power of the model. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We focus on the binary outcome liquidated v. not liquidated because the latter 
outcome is clearly more favorable for shareholders.  To confirm our results, we also 
tested two other outcome pairs with the same contrast in favorability:  liquidated v. 
acquired (Table 12) and liquidated v. reorganized (Table 13).  For both of these outcome 
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pairs, findings for the explanatory terms of interest are the same as for our primary 
model, i.e., only the interaction term GP * New is (negatively) related to the less 
favorable bankruptcy outcome.  The two focused models have higher explanatory power 
than the primary model, as indicated by their higher pseudo-R2s (0.413 for L v. A and 
0.327 for L v. R, compared to 0.220 for L v. NL).  This reflects greater explanatory 
power of the control factors in the focused models, since the interaction term is highly 
significant with a high magnitude in all three models. 
Table 12 
Logistic Regressions 
Liquidated v. Acquired 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
GP Def. Any Any Salary Vesting 
 B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Intercept 5.4281 0.9745  5.1413 0.9759  3.7565 0.9824  3.9265 0.9816  
SIZ 0.6289 0.2098  0.4318 0.4226  0.6562 0.2763  0.7235 0.1560  
LVG -0.2755 0.6990  -0.6982 0.4250  -0.8541 0.3960  -0.5935 0.4603  
CURR 2.4141 0.2447  1.8552 0.4232  1.4797 0.5499  2.5181 0.2404  
BLK -3.3798 0.0308 ** -4.3792 0.0112 ** -4.7053 0.0088 *** -3.7294 0.0240 ** 
CEO Own 3.4130 0.1793  4.8140 0.1223  5.9985 0.0589 * 3.6848 0.1797  
AGE 0.0211 0.6427  0.0306 0.5409  0.0278 0.5908  0.0074 0.8756  
OUT 0.2461 0.7476  0.4242 0.6144  0.5557 0.5157  0.2661 0.7380  
REPL -1.3721 0.0991 * -1.2298 0.2128  -0.8424 0.4100  -1.4724 0.1246  
PREP 1.1422 0.4444  2.1940 0.1895  2.0671 0.2373  1.4783 0.3435  
DUR -0.0755 0.1058  -0.0750 0.1751  -0.0856 0.1196  -0.0570 0.2452  
AG/MIN/ 
CON -0.2060 0.9035  -0.8293 0.6740  -1.0959 0.6002  -0.3826 0.8282  
MANUF 0.0011 0.9991  0.3456 0.7467  0.2875 0.8046  0.2626 0.7925  
GOODS 0.5609 0.6278  0.9170 0.4744  0.9451 0.4856  0.6262 0.6122  
NEW 0.8448 0.2367  3.4070 0.0111 ** 4.1962 0.0046 *** 2.2555 0.0228 ** 
GP -0.0435 0.9491  1.9135 0.0884 * 2.8585 0.0211 ** 1.6149 0.0945 * 
GP*New    -4.6575 0.0116 ** -6.1897 0.0026 *** -3.5288 0.0353 ** 
 
            
Chi-Squ. 34.090 0.133  42.077 0.016 ** 46.914 0.010 *** 39.112 0.062 * 
Pseudo-R2 0.350   0.413   0.448   0.390 
  
# Obs. 79   79   79   79   
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13 
Logistic Regressions 
Liquidated v. Reorganized 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
GP Def. Any Any Salary Vesting 
 B p-value B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Intercept 2.1219 0.5211  1.8934 0.6133  2.0445 0.6103  2.1754 0.5579  
SIZ -0.5837 0.0653 * -0.6210 0.0565 * -0.5824 0.0780 * -0.5266 0.0920 * 
LVG 3.0636 0.0148 ** -3.1904 0.0141 ** -3.4991 0.0093 *** -3.3313 0.0093 *** 
CURR 5.4611 0.0021 *** 4.7238 0.0128 ** 4.9836 0.0131 ** 5.5119 0.0046 *** 
BLK -1.3376 0.2584  -2.6125 0.0520 * -2.7563 0.0415 ** -1.8825 0.1189  
CEO Own -0.4363 0.8711  2.1356 0.4880  2.3721 0.4557  0.4385 0.8773  
AGE 0.0295 0.4009  0.0295 0.4104  0.0259 0.4749  0.0239 0.4995  
OUT 0.2735 0.6404  0.4483 0.4741  0.5977 0.3597  0.6128 0.3295  
REPL 1.4258 0.0158 ** 1.6797 0.0112 ** 1.7729 0.0099 *** 1.3740 0.0247 ** 
PREP -1.7582 0.0339 ** -2.2167 0.0135 ** -2.3209 0.0107 ** -2.1742 0.0142 ** 
DUR 0.0055 0.9027  0.0024 0.9567  0.0013 0.9778  0.0060 0.8929  
AG/MIN/ 
CON 0.2297 0.8211  -0.4419 0.6857  -0.5630 0.6139  0.0205 0.9845  
MANUF -0.4823 0.4725  -0.3569 0.6088  -0.4042 0.5706  -0.4028 0.5584  
GOODS -1.6957 0.0944 * -1.5252 0.1422  -1.5741 0.1388  -1.4726 0.1598  
NEW 0.8242 0.2046  3.1864 0.0090 *** 3.5171 0.0053 *** 1.8499 0.0295 ** 
GP 0.3100 0.6282  2.4452 0.0321 ** 2.6752 0.0228 ** 1.1848 0.1548  
GP*New    -4.0157 0.0131 ** -5.1345 0.0039 *** -3.0583 0.0323 ** 
             
Chi-Squ. 83.137 0.0000 *** 90.338 0.0000 *** 93.746 0.0000 *** 88.109 0.0000 *** 
Pseudo-R2 0.306   0.327   0.337   0.321   
# Obs. 228   228   228   228   
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The three models have differences in the significance of controls, as illustrated in 
Table 14.  All of the coefficient signs are consistent with our expectations, which were 
based on implications for probability of liquidation.  BLK is significant with a negative 
coefficient for all three outcome pairs.  PREP is not significant for Liquidated v. 
Acquired, which is expected since prepackaged bankruptcies typically involve plans for 
reorganization, not acquisition.  CURR also lacks significance for Liquidated v. Acquired, 
which decreases the significance of this factor in the primary (combined) model.  For the 
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Liquidated v. Reorganized outcome pair, two factors are identified as significant that are 
not significant in the primary (combined) model:  REPL and LVG.  REPL has a positive 
coefficient, which is consistent with our initial expectations.  This suggests that 
replacement of the CEO during bankruptcy increases the probability of liquidation 
compared to reorganization, but not compared to acquisition.  Finally, LVG has a 
negative coefficient for Liquidated v. Reorganized.  Thus, leverage decreases the 
likelihood of liquidation compared to reorganization but not compared to acquisition.  
The negative sign of the relationship is consistent with our initial expectations and 
suggests that pre-bankruptcy leverage implies a greater ability to manage debt service, 
which helps to avoid liquidation but does not increase the firm’s attractiveness for 
acquisition. 
Table 14 
Significant Control Factors (5%) 
Factor L v. NL L v. A L v. R 
LVG   -- 
CURR +  + 
BLK -- -- -- 
REPL   + 
PREP --  -- 
 
We identified several observations in our sample where the CEO was hired 
shortly (only a couple weeks) before the bankruptcy filing.  For these cases, one of our 
key assumptions—that the bankruptcy was not expected by the CEO—is highly 
questionable.  Using a breakpoint of 30 days preceding filing, we identified 15 such 
observations.  These could be characterized as “immediate” rather than “new” CEO hires.  
None of the 15 immediate hires had GPs, which is consistent with the underlying 
reasoning of our hypotheses.  When bankruptcy is imminent, the CEO recruiting context 
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changes.  Most importantly, the risk faced by the new CEO is reduced.  Because 
bankruptcy is already a foregone conclusion, it does not negatively impact the CEO’s 
reputation.  Moreover, such an appointment is known to be short-term in nature, 
diminishing the CEO’s need for and expectation of a GP contract.   Since none of the 15 
immediate CEOs had GPs, their characterization in the regressions as New does not affect 
our main factor of interest:  the interaction term GP * New.  Thus, this issue has no 
impact on our primary conclusions. 
Another robustness check is the inclusion of two time dummies (in addition to 
year fixed effects) to the logistic regressions to control for events that could affect our 
hypothesized relationships:  the recent global financial crisis and the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA).  Since the 
number of bankruptcies increased in the aftermath of the crisis (as previously noted for 
our sample), it is possible that outcomes (e.g., the liquidation rate) changed as well.  
Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we define the post-crisis period as beginning in 
July 2007.  Similarly, BAPCPA, which revised several provisions of Chapter 11, may 
have impacted the probabilities of different bankruptcy outcomes.  Because BAPCPA 
was enacted on April 20, 2005, we define the post-BAPCPA period as beginning in May 
2005.  Although these time effects are not apparent on an annual basis (see Table 1), it is 
helpful to address the issue in a multivariate setting.  Upon such testing, we found neither 
time factor to be significant in any of our models.                     
 In evaluating our methodology, one may reasonably ask why we did not also 
consider distressed firms that did not file for bankruptcy—for example, by testing 
whether the presence of a GP impacts a non-bankrupt firm’s probability of filing for 
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bankruptcy.  The reason for this is two-fold.  First, a key assumption of our study is that 
liquidation is the least favorable bankruptcy outcome.  Such an assumption cannot be 
made for the event of bankruptcy filing, since neither outcome (filing vs. not filing) is 
clearly more favorable for shareholders.  As previously discussed, Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
offers various benefits that can facilitate the firm’s ultimate survival through 
reorganization.  Thus, for non-bankrupt distressed firms, there is no clear outcome that 
we can expect a capable CEO to pursue.  Our second reason for studying bankrupt firms 
is that bankruptcy provides a unique context wherein CEOs have no explicit incentives 
related to compensation contracting.  The absence of such explicit incentives allows us to 
evaluate the impact of implicit incentives on CEO behavior, which is the focus of our 
research questions.  Until the firm files for bankruptcy, the CEO still has explicit 
incentives from his or her compensation contract, along with any other implicit incentives 
that may exist.  In this context, we could not identify reputable CEOs, because all CEOs 
(whether reputable or not) would have incentives to take value-preserving actions.  In 
sum, our chosen methodology allows us to make to two key determinations:  which 
CEOs are reputable and which firm outcomes they should pursue to preserve shareholder 
wealt
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 For a sample of large U.S. firms that completed Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the 
period July 2002 to June 2013, we find that existence of a golden parachute contract for 
the CEO at the time of filing impacts the outcome of the bankruptcy process.  
Specifically, a firm that has a new CEO with a GP is more likely to avoid liquidation in 
bankruptcy.  This relationship is observed only for the interaction of the factors, not for 
the factors individually.  The presence of a GP contract is not significant unless the CEO 
is newly hired, and a newly hired CEO is not significant unless the CEO has a GP 
contract.  In addition to its statistical significance, the interaction GP * New has 
substantial economic significance.  Of all the significant factors identified in our logistic 
regression model, this interaction term has the highest magnitude.  Other significant 
factors include the firm’s current ratio (a common financial indicator) and block 
ownership (a common governance indicator), which are widely recognized in the 
literature as predictors of bankruptcy outcomes.  Importantly, we identify a previously 
untested factor that has an even stronger influence.   
 A remarkable aspect of our findings is the nature of this predictor variable.  
Unlike characteristics that describe firms and CEOs in general, which have been tested in 
previous studies (and were included in our model as controls), our variable of interest is 
context-driven.  Rather than considering what factors might impact outcomes for 
financially distressed firms, we consider a factor that boards actually expect to have a
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strong impact—the CEO.  Recognizing that distressed firms often replace their CEOs, we 
examine the process by which a new CEO is recruited.  This includes both the desired 
qualifications of candidates (quality indicated by reputation) and elements of the 
compensation contract that are necessary to recruit qualified candidates (golden 
parachutes).  In developing our hypotheses, we considered not only the what of the 
context (financial distress), but also the how—how it impacts both the firm and the CEO.  
In financial distress, risk is the primary dynamic that raises the stakes for all parties 
involved.  The firm faces the risk of failure, and the CEO faces both the short-term risk of 
job loss and the long-term risk of loss of reputational capital.  Our results suggest that 
when both parties properly evaluate this risk, the result is an efficient compensation 
contract that contributes to shareholder wealth preservation.   
 Another notable attribute of our predictor variable is its identity— the presence of 
a golden parachute contract for the firm’s CEO.  Although GPs are negatively 
characterized in both the academic literature and the press as indicators of managerial 
entrenchment, our results suggest a potentially positive effect on firm value.  Moreover, 
our results highlight the multifaceted role of GPs as a firm mechanism.  In this way, our 
study expands upon the existing literature, which has focused primarily on the 
governance role of GPs.  Like other forms of executive compensation, GPs can serve a 
governance role by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (e.g., in a 
corporate takeover context).  Regardless of their efficacy in this function (which has not 
been supported by research), we show that GPs are a useful tool for distressed firms to 
screen and recruit reputable CEOs.  This value is not dependent on the firm’s survival, as 
reputable CEOs have implicit incentives to continue promoting shareholder interests even 
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in bankruptcy, when explicit incentives from the compensation contract (including the 
GP) are nullified.   
 Because all the firms in our sample ultimately filed for bankruptcy, the newly 
hired CEO’s efforts to save the firm were clearly unsuccessful.  If the CEO was indeed 
capable, this suggests that either:  a) The CEO did not accurately assess the situation 
before accepting the position; or b) The CEO’s efforts were thwarted by factors outside 
his or her control.  Through our CEO interviews, we obtained anecdotal evidence 
supporting both of these explanations.  With regard to intervening factors, perhaps the 
most common are market factors such as economic and/or industry conditions.  One 
example of this scenario is the CEO of a construction firm who was hired on October 1, 
2007, shortly before the stock market began a 16-month nosedive.   According to the 
CEO, although the firm was already in trouble, “This sealed our fate.”  Even after the 
bankruptcy filing, market events continued to undermine the CEO’s efforts to facilitate 
reorganization.  Several months into the bankruptcy, a verbal reorganization plan was 
established with the firm’s creditors and shareholders that involved a primary lender 
taking debt in the reorganized firm.  However, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
caused the lender to change its mind and demand immediate cash payment.  The CEO 
states, “I literally got a call from the bank the day after Lehman’s bankruptcy was 
announced.”  Another CEO interviewee described a situation where an intervening factor, 
in this case a major supplier, derailed his turnaround plan: 
“The plan I developed with the help of my management team and a financial 
consultant would have avoided bankruptcy had it not been for the stubborn 
attitude not to participate in the plan demonstrated by our major supplier.  The 
plan was viable up to the final days before we filed our petition in court.  Once the 
supplier failed to come to the table, several of the remaining components fell 
apart.”  
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 A CEO candidate’s decision to accept (or reject) employment at a distressed firm 
is driven largely by an evaluation of the potential risks and rewards of the proposition.  
Although substantial risk is inherent, the CEO must determine whether the risk exceeds 
some threshold.  One interviewee explained that he requires a 30-day evaluation period 
during which he can “bail out” if he decides to the risk is too great.  During this time, he 
looks for “red flags” such as illegal activity and environmental issues.  Despite their best 
efforts, the risk assessments of CEOs can be undermined by incomplete or inaccurate 
information.  For example, one firm in our sample had not produced financials for some 
time, which obscured the dire reality of its condition.  Although the CEO perceived “a 
pretty good chance of avoiding bankruptcy,” it “turned out to be riskier than I thought.”  
In more than one case, our CEO interviewees described situations where the board did 
not accurately represent the facts.  In the words of one interviewee, “The board painted a 
rosier picture.”  Another CEO expressed strong skepticism of the board’s representations 
in the recruiting process.  Given the likelihood of obfuscation, he views board members’ 
“attitudes” as a more accurate indicator than their words.  For example, when a board is 
“defensive” and doesn’t recognize a problem, “This usually means there are major 
problems.” 
 A final example illustrates how board dynamics can interfere with both the CEO’s 
risk-assessment efforts before accepting the position and his or her strategic plans after 
assuming leadership.  In this case, the firm was clearly in distress, but the board was 
unsure of the best course of action.  According to the CEO, some board members were 
hoping the firm could survive, while others wanted to liquidate as soon as possible.  This 
CEO was charged with the immediate tasks (six-week timeline) of:  a) determining which 
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components of the business had value and which did not; and b) identifying any assets 
that could be sold.  During this time, the CEO determined that only one component of the 
business was profitable.  His proposed solution was to sell other non-performing 
segments and continue as a smaller company.  According to the CEO, this ultimately did 
not happen due to the divided state of the board.  Without strong commitment to the 
firm’s survival, board members were easily swayed by an activist bondholder who 
favored liquidation.  The CEO states that, after accepting the position, he soon learned 
the firm’s future was “pre-ordained.”  He believes that hiring a new CEO was just “going 
through the motions.”  More specifically, “The board members were trying to distance 
themselves from the decision” and “needed somebody in that role at the eleventh hour.” 
 These real-world examples highlight the various unique factors that can impact a 
firm’s ability to avoid bankruptcy, as well as the outcome of bankruptcy.  Consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Barniv et al. 2002), this suggests that predicting bankruptcy 
outcomes is more difficult than discriminating between healthy and distressed firms.  
Because all bankrupt firms are distressed, accounting variables commonly used for 
predicting bankruptcy filing are not as useful for predicting bankruptcy outcomes.  It 
appears that non-financial factors, especially sociological factors that capture behavioral 
dynamics, may have more explanatory value.  Our study examines one such factor—
executive leadership.  Although capable leadership is necessary to achieve favorable 
outcomes, our results show it is not sufficient.  Even so, the board of a distressed firm has 
a duty to take actions that maximize the firm’s prospects for survival.  Our study suggests 
that one such action is to utilize golden parachutes as tool for screening and recruiting a 
reputable CEO.   
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Although the focused nature of our study limits its widespread applicability, at 
least directly with regard to golden parachutes, we do not see this as a limitation of its 
worth.  We make no claim that golden parachutes generally enhance shareholder wealth, 
but we do find they can in certain circumstances.  This ambiguity is found in much of the 
empirical literature on corporate governance mechanisms, including executive 
compensation structures.  As previously discussed, studies have failed to identify a link 
between either the level or nature of executive compensation and firm performance.  
Perhaps these results have more meaning than is immediately apparent, in the sense that 
no relationship is observed because no such relationship should exist.  This does not 
imply that theory (e.g., agency theory) is wrong, but rather that it must be applied in 
context.  The literature has begun to recognize the contingent nature of corporate 
governance—that no governance structure is suitable for all firms at all times.  Our 
results support this proposition and offer some additional insights.  We suggest that, more 
broadly, all corporate policy should be contingent.  Similarly, general characterizations of 
firm mechanisms as “good” or “bad” are misplaced.  Although research should continue 
to address widespread problems, we must not let urgency lead to oversimplification of 
complex issues.  The goal of such research should not be universal prescriptions, but 
rather solutions and tools that can be tailored to the needs and circumstances of specific 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
ESSAY 2 
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and their impact on 
corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1404-1432. 
 
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. (1998). Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 219-239. 
 
Ahimud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981). Managerial incentives and corporate investment and 
financing decisions. Journal of Finance, 42, 234-254. 
 
Aivazian, V. A., & Zhou, S. (2012). Is Chapter 11 efficient? Financial Management, 
41(1), 229-253. 
 
Almazan, A., & Suarez, J. (2003). Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal 
governance structures. Journal of Finance, 58, 519-547. 
 
Altman, E. I. (1971). Corporate bankruptcy in America. Lexington, MA: Heath 
Lexington Books. 
 
Altman, E. I. (1984). A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy cost question. 
Journal of Finance, 39, 1067-1089. 
 
Anderson, R. C., & Bizjak, J. M. (2003). An empirical examination of the role of the 
CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 27, 1323-1348. 
 
Ang, J., Lauterbach, B., & Vu, J. (2003). Efficient labor and capital markets: Evidence 
from CEO appointments. Financial Management, 32(2), 27-52. 
 
Ayotte, K. M., & Morrison, E. R. (2009). Creditor control and conflict in Chapter 11. 
Journal of Legal Analysis, 1(2), 511-551. 
 
Baird, D. G., & Bernstein, D. S. (2006). Absolute priority, valuation uncertainty, and the 
reorganization bargain. Yale Law Journal, 115(8), 1930-1970. 
 
Baird, D. G., & Rasmussen, R. K. (2002). The end of bankruptcy. Stanford Law Review, 
55(3), 751-789. 
 
Baird, D. G., & Rasmussen, R. K. (2003). Bankruptcy at twilight. Stanford Law Review, 
56(3), 673-699. 
 
Bange, M., & Mazzeo, M. (2004). Board composition, board effectiveness, and the 
observed form of takeover bids. Review of Financial Studies, 17(4), 1185-1215. 
 
160 
 
 
 
Barniv, R., Agarwal, A., & Leach, R. (2002). Predicting bankruptcy resolution. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 29, 497-520. 
 
Bartell, L. B. (2008). Straddle obligations under prepetition contracts: Prepetition claims, 
postpetition claims or administrative expenses? Emory Bankruptcy Developments 
Journal, 25(1), 39-64. 
 
Bates, T., Becher, D., & Lemmon, M. (2008). Board classification and managerial 
entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(3), 656-677. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A. (1988). A new approach to corporate reorganizations. Harvard Law 
Review, 101, 775-804. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. (2014). Golden parachutes and the wealth of 
shareholders. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, 140-154. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 71-92. 
 
Bebchuk, L.A., Fried, J., & Walker, D. (2002). Managerial power and rent extraction in 
the design of executive compensation. University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 
751-846. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A., & Weisbach, M. (2010). The state of corporate governance research. 
Review of Financial Studies, 23, 939-961. 
 
Becker, G. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal of 
Political Economy, 70, 9-49. 
 
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Berkovitch, E., Israel, R., & Spiegel, Y. (2000). Managerial compensation and capital 
structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9, 549-584. 
 
Bertrand, M. (2009). CEOs. Annual Review of Economics, 1, 121-149. 
 
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without 
principles are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 901-932. 
 
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm 
policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1169-1208. 
 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., & Romano, R. (2008). The promise and perils of corporate 
governance indices. Columbia Law Review, 108(8), 1803-1882. 
 
161 
 
 
 
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Naveen, L. (2008). Does the use of peer groups contribute to 
higher pay and less efficient compensation? Journal of Financial Economics, 90, 
152-168. 
 
Born, J., Faria, H., & Trahan, E. (1999). Structuring more-effective executive severance 
contracts. Managerial Finance, 25(10), 13-21. 
 
Born, J., Trahan, E., & Faria, H. (1993). Golden parachutes: incentive aligners, 
management entrenchers, or takeover bid signals? Journal of Financial Research, 
16, 299-308. 
 
Bradley, M., & Rosenzweig, M. (1992). The untenable case for Chapter 11. Yale Law 
Journal, 101, 1043-1095. 
 
Brown, D. (1997). Liquidity and liquidation: Evidence from real estate investment trusts. 
Journal of Finance, 55, 469-485. 
 
Brown, M. (2006). Corporate integrity and public interest: A relational approach to 
business ethics and leadership. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(1), 11-18. 
 
Brown, P., & Hesketh, A. (2004). The mismanagement of talent. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Brusa, J., Lee, W. L., & Shook, C. (2009). Golden parachutes, managerial incentives and 
shareholders’ wealth. Managerial Finance, 35(4), 346-356. 
 
Buchholtz, A. K., & Ribbens, B. (1994). Role of chief executive officers in takeover 
resistance: Effects of CEO incentives and individual characteristics. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37(3), 554-579. 
 
Campbell, S. V. (1997). An investigation of the direct costs of bankruptcy reorganization 
for closely held firms. Journal of Small Business Management, 35(3), 21-29. 
 
Carr, L., & Valinezhad, M. (2004). The role of ethics in executive compensation: Toward 
a contractarian interpretation of the neoclassical theory of managerial 
remuneration. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(2), 81-93. 
 
Chang, Y. Y., Dasgupta, S., & Hilary, G. (2010). CEO ability, pay, and firm performance. 
Management Science, 56(10), 1633-1652. 
 
Chi, J., & Li, D. S. (2010). The conditional nature of the value of corporate governance. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 350-361. 
 
Clark, T. A., & Weinstein, M. I. (1983). The behavior of the common stock of bankrupt 
firms. Journal of Finance, 38, 489-504. 
 
162 
 
 
 
Cochran, P. L., Wood, R. A., & Jones, T. B. (1985). The composition of boards of 
directors and incidence of golden parachutes. Academy of Management Journal, 
28, 664-671. 
 
Coffee, J. C. (1988). Shareholders versus managers: The strain in the corporate web. In J. 
C. Coffee, L. Lowenstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Knights, raiders, and 
targets: The impact of hostile takeovers. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Coles, J., & Li, Z. (2010). Managerial attributes, incentives, and performance. Arizona 
State University, Working Paper. 
 
Cotter, J., & Zenner, M. (1994). How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 35(1), 63-97. 
 
Cremers, K. J., & Grinstein, Y. (2014). Does the market for CEO talent explain 
controversial CEO pay practices? Review of Finance, 18, 921-960. 
 
Custodio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2013). Generalists v. specialists: Lifetime 
work experience and chief executive officer pay. Journal of Financial Economics, 
108, 471-492. 
 
Dahiya, S., John, K., Puri, M., & Ramirez, G. (2003). Debtor-in-possession financing and 
bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 
259-280. 
 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of 
dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371-382. 
 
Datta, S., & Iskandar-Datta, M. E. (1995). Reorganization and financial distress: An 
empirical examination. Journal of Financial Research, 18, 15-32. 
 
Davidson, W., Pilger, T., & Szakmary, A. (1998). Golden parachutes, board and 
committee composition, and shareholder wealth. Financial Review, 33, 17-32. 
 
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (1989). Corporate financial policy and corporate control: 
A study of defensive adjustments and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 21, 29-59. 
 
Denis, D. K., & Rodgers, K. J. (2007). Chapter 11:  Duration, outcome, and post-
reorganization performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42, 
101-118. 
 
Dowell, G., Shackell, M., & Stewart, N. (2011). Boards, CEOs, and surviving a financial 
crisis: Evidence from the internet shakeout. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 
1025-1045. 
 
 
163 
 
 
 
Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X. (2009). Is CEO pay really efficient? A survey of new optimal 
contracting theories. European Financial Management, 15(3), 486-496. 
 
Elsaid, E., Davidson, W. N., & Benson, B. W. (2009). CEO compensation structure 
following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns. 
Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance, 49, 1389-1409. 
 
Elson, C. M., & Ferrere, C. K. (2013). Executive superstars, peer groups, and 
overcompensation: Cause, effect, and solution. Journal of Corporation Law, 
38(3), 488-531. 
 
Evans, J. D., & Hefner, F. (2009). Business ethics and the decision to adopt golden 
parachute contracts: Empirical evidence of concern for all stakeholders. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 86, 65-79. 
 
Fahlenbrach, R., & Stulz, R. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 99, 11-26. 
 
Falato, A., Li, D., & Milbourn, T. T. (2011). To each according to his ability? The returns 
to CEO talent. Washington University at St. Louis, Working Paper. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288-307. 
 
Faulkender, M., & Yang, J. (2010). Inside the black box: The role and composition of 
compensation peer groups. Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 257-270. 
 
Fee, C., & Hadlock, C. (2003). Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for 
managerial talent. Review of Financial Studies, 16, 1315-1357. 
 
Fich, E., Tran, A., & Walkling, R. (2013). On the importance of golden parachutes. 
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 48(6), 1717-1753. 
 
Fiss, P. C., Kennedy, M. T., & Davis, G. F. (2012). How golden parachutes unfolded: 
Diffusion and variation of a controversial practice. Organization Science, 23(4), 
1077-1099. 
 
Frydman, C. (2007). Rising in the ranks: The evolution of the market for corporate 
executives, 1936-2003. MIT, Working Paper. 
 
Frydman, C., & Saks, R. (2007). Executive compensation: A new view from a long-term 
perspective, 1936-2005. Review of Financial Studies, 23, 2009-2138. 
 
Fulmer, I. S. (2009). The elephant in the room: Labor market influences on CEO 
compensation. Personnel Psychology, 62(4), 659-695. 
 
164 
 
 
 
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49-100. 
 
Gabaix, X., Landier, A., & Sauvagnat, J. (2013). CEO pay and firm size: An update after 
the crisis. The Economic Journal, 124, F40-F59. 
 
Gaines-Ross, L. (2000). CEO reputation: A key factor in shareholder value. Corporate 
Reputation Review, 3(4), 366-370. 
 
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career 
concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), 468-505. 
 
Gilson, S. C. (1989). Management turnover and financial distress. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 25(2), 241-262. 
 
Gilson, S. C. (2012). Coming through crisis: How Chapter 11 and the debt restructuring 
industry are helping to revive the U.S. economy. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 24(4), 23-35. 
 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M. (1997). Reframing executive compensation:  an 
assessment and outlook. Journal of Management, 23, 291-374. 
 
Gordon, R., & Dew-Becker, I. (2008). Controversies about the rise in American 
inequality: A survey. NBER, Working Paper No. 13982. 
 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Puri, M. (2013). Managerial attitudes and corporate 
actions. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 103-121. 
 
Graham, J., Li, S., & Qui, J. (2012). Managerial attributes and executive compensation. 
Review of Financial Studies, 25, 144-186. 
 
Gretchko, L. S., & Bogdanowicz, M. A. (2014). How to represent the client that wants its 
contract rejected. American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, 33(8), 24-25. 
 
Gretchko, L. S., & Todhunter, L. J. (2012). When a contract is rejected, does its 
noncompetition clause survive? American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, 31(8), 
24-25. 
 
Hall, P., & Anderson, D. (1997). The effect of golden parachutes on shareholder wealth 
and takeover probabilities. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24(3), 
445-463. 
 
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998). Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113(3), 653-691. 
 
 
165 
 
 
 
Hambrick, D. C., D’Aveni, R. A. (1988). Large corporate failures as downward spirals. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 1-23.  
 
Harner, M. M., & Marincic, J. (2011). Committee capture? An empirical analysis of the 
role of creditors’ committees in business reorganizations. Vanderbilt Law Review, 
64(3), 747-797. 
 
Harris, E. G. (1990). Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm 
shareholder value. RAND Journal of Economics, 69, 51-83. 
 
Hartzell, J. C., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (2004). What’s in it for me? CEOs whose firms 
are acquired. Review of Financial Studies, 17(1), 37-61. 
 
Haugen, R. A., & Senbet, L. W. (1981). Resolving the agency problems of external 
capital through options. Journal of Finance, 36, 629-647. 
 
Himmelberg, C. P., & Hubbard, R. G. (2000). Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: 
An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Presented at Tuck-JFE 
Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference. 
 
Hirshleifer, D. (1993). Managerial reputation and corporate investment decisions. 
Financial Management, 22(2), 145- 160. 
 
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 
234-340. 
 
Hotchkiss, E., & Mooradian, R. (1998). Acquisitions as a means of restructuring firms in 
Chapter 11. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 7, 240-262. 
 
Hotchkiss, E., John, K., Mooradian, R., & Thorburn, K. (2008).  Bankruptcy and the 
resolution of financial distress. In E. Eckbo (Ed.), Handbook of corporate finance: 
Empirical corporate finance, Vol. 2. The Netherlands: Elsevier.  
 
Hubbard, R. G. (2005). Pay without performance: A market equilibrium critique. Journal 
of Corporate Law, 30, 717-720. 
 
Jacoby, S. M. (1999). Are career jobs headed for extinction? California Management 
Review, 42(1), 123-145. 
 
Jackall, R. (1988). Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Jarrell, G., Brickley, J., & Netter, J. (1988). The market for corporate control: The 
empirical evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 639-658. 
 
 
166 
 
 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1988). The takeover controversy: Analysis and evidence. In J. C. Coffee, 
L. Lowenstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Knights, raiders, and targets: The 
impact of the hostile takeover (pp. 315-354). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-
360. 
 
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top management incentives. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264. 
 
Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J., & Wruck. (2004). Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how 
we got to here, what are the problems, and how to fix them. Harvard Business 
School, Working Paper. 
 
Jensen, M., & Ruback, R. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific 
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50. 
 
Jian, M., & Lee, K. W. (2011). Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments? 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 929-946. 
 
Kalay, A., Singhal, R., & Tashjian, E. (2007). Is Chapter 11 costly? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 84, 772-796. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., Klebanov, M. M., & Sorenson, M. (2012). Which CEO characteristics and 
abilities matter? Journal of Finance, 67(3), 973-1007. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (2012). How has CEO turnover changed? International 
Review of Finance, 12(1), 57-87. 
 
Kaplan, S., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside directorships and corporate performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 389-410. 
 
Khanna, N., & Poulsen, A. B. (1995). Managers of financial distressed firms: Villains or 
scapegoats? Journal of Finance, 50(3), 919-939. 
 
Khurana, R. (2002). The curse of the superstar CEO. Harvard Business Review, 80(9), 
60-66. 
 
Kidder, D. L., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2002). Can excess bring success? CEO compensation 
and the psychological contract. Human Resource Management Review, 12, 599-
617. 
 
 
167 
 
 
 
Knoeber, C. (1986). Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76, 155-167. 
 
Korobkin, D. R. (1993). The unwarranted case against corporate reorganization: A reply 
to Bradley and Rosenzweig. Iowa Law Review, 78, 669-720. 
 
Lambert, R., & Larcker, D. (1985). Golden parachutes, executive decision making, and 
shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 179-204. 
 
Lang, L. H., & Stulz, R. M. (1992). Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of 
bankruptcy announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 45-60. 
 
Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). The market reaction to corporate 
governance regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101, 431-448. 
 
Lefanowicz, C. E., Robinson, J. R., & Smith, R. (2000). Golden parachutes and 
managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: Evidence from the 1980s and 
1990s. Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, 215-239. 
 
Leverty, J. T., Grace, M. F. (2012). Dupes or incompetents? An examination of 
management’s impact on firm distress. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 79(3), 751-
783. 
 
Levy, F. S., & Temin, P. (2007). Inequality and institutions in 20th Century America. 
MIT, Working Paper. 
 
Li, Y. (2013). A nonlinear wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors around Chapter 
11 filing. Journal of Financial Economics, 107, 183-198. 
 
Lichtenstein, M. J. (2006, Fall). Bankruptcy courts’ treatment of severance agreements 
providing for continued payments to former employees. Business Law Brief, 28-
30. 
 
LoPucki, L. M., & Doherty, J. W. (2007). Bankruptcy fire sales. Michigan Law Review, 
106, 1-59. 
 
Lublin, J. S. (2005, Sept. 19). The serial CEO: Experienced chief executives are in 
demand as companies look outside for leadership. Wall Street Journal, B1. 
 
Lubben, S. J. (2007). Business liquidation. American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 81(1), 65-
85. 
 
Lubben, S. J. (2012). What we know about Chapter 11 cost is wrong. Fordham Journal 
of Corporate & Financial Law, 17(1), 141-187. 
 
 
168 
 
 
 
Machlin, J., Choe, C., & Miles, J. (1993). The effects of golden parachutes on takeover 
activity. Journal of Law & Economics, 36, 861-876. 
 
Manne, H. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy, 75, 110-120. 
 
Martin, B. (2005). Managers after the era of organizational restructuring: Towards a 
second managerial revolution? Work, Employment, and Society, 19(4), 747-760. 
 
Martin, B., & Wajcman, J. (2004). Markets, contingency, and preferences: Contemporary 
managers’ narrative identities. Sociological Review, 52(2), 240-264. 
 
Maskara, P. K., Maskara, A., & Aggarwal, R. (2013). Corporate governance: Known, 
unknown, and the wrongly known. Journal of Business and Economics, 4(2). 
 
Matsumara, E., & Shin, J. (2005). Corporate governance reform and CEO compensation: 
Intended and unintended consequences. Journal of Business Ethics, 62, 101-113. 
 
Meyer, M. W. (2001). What happened to middle management? In I. Berg & A. Kalleberg 
(Eds.), Sourcebook of labor markets: Evolving structure and practices, (pp. 449-
466). New York: Kluwer Academic. 
 
Milkovich, G. T., & Newman, J. M. (2005). Compensation. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York: Columbia University. 
 
Mishel, L., & Sabadish, N. (2012). CEO pay and the top 1%: How executive 
compensation and financial-sector pay have fueled income inequality. Economic 
Policy Institute, Issue Brief No. 331. 
 
Mogavero, D., & Toyne, M. (1995). The impact of golden parachutes on stock returns: A 
re-examination of the evidence. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 34, 
30-38. 
 
Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1999). New developments in models of search in 
the labor market. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor 
economics, Vol. 3 (pp. 2567-2627). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
 
Murphy, K., & Zabojnik, J. (2004). CEO pay and appointments: A market-based 
explanation for recent trends. American Economic Review, 94, 192-196. 
 
Murphy, K., & Zabojnik, J. (2007). Managerial capital and the market for CEOs.  
Queen’s University Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 1110. 
 
Nichols, D., & Subramaniam, C. (2001). Executive compensation: Excessive or equitable? 
Journal of Business Ethics, 29, 339-351. 
 
169 
 
 
 
Nohel, T., & Todd, S. (2005). Compensation for managers with career concerns. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 11, 229-251. 
 
Pulvino, T. C. (1998). Do asset fire sales exist? An empirical investigation of commercial 
aircraft transactions. Journal of Finance, 53(3), 939-978. 
 
Pulvino, T. C. (1999). Effects of bankruptcy court protection asset sales. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 52, 151-186. 
 
Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002). Empirical evidence on the relation between stock 
option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 33, 
145-171. 
 
Raykin, A. (2012). Section 363 sales: Mooting due process? Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal, 29, 91-144. 
 
Rodgers, W., & Gago, S. (2003). A model capturing ethics and executive compensation. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 48, 189-202. 
 
Rogoff, A., Sussman, R., & Cohen, J. (2006). Struggling with executive compensation 
incentives in Chapter 11 under the new code. 2006 Norton Annual Survey of 
Bankruptcy Law, 385-412. 
 
Rosen, S. (1981). The economics of superstars. American Economic Review, 71(5), 845-
858.  
 
Sanders, W. G. (2001). Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock 
option pay. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 477-492. 
 
Sanders, W. G., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO 
stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 50(5), 1055-1078. 
 
Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1990). Herd behavior and investment. American 
Economic Review, 80(3), 465-479. 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989). Management entrenchment: The case of manager-
specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1), 123-140. 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1992). Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market 
equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance, 47, 1343-1365. 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance, 52, 737-783. 
 
 
170 
 
 
 
Singh, H., & Harianto, F. (1989). Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the 
adoption of golden parachutes. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 7-24. 
 
Small, K., Smith, J., & Yildirim, S. (2007). Ownership structure and golden parachutes: 
Evidence of credible commitment or incentive alignment? Journal of Economics 
and Finance, 31, 368-382. 
 
Smith, C., & Mayers, D. (1982). On the corporate demand for insurance. Journal of 
Business, 55, 281-296. 
 
Smith, C., & Stulz, R. (1985). The determinants of firms’ hedging policies. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 391-405. 
 
Sokolyk, T. (2011). The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 17, 612-627. 
 
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-374. 
 
Stromberg, P. (2000). Conflicts of interest and market illiquidity in bankruptcy auctions: 
Theory and tests. Journal of Finance, 55(6), 2641-2692. 
 
Subramaniam, C. (2001). Are golden parachutes an optimal contracting response or 
evidence of managerial entrenchment? Evidence from successful takeovers. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28, 1-33. 
 
Tervio, M. (2008). The difference that CEOs make: An assignment model approach. 
American Economic Review, 98, 642-668. 
 
Wade, J. C., O’Reilly, C., & Chandratat, I. (1990). Golden parachutes: CEOs and the 
exercise of social influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 587-603. 
 
Wajcman, J., & Martin, B. (2001). My company or my career: Managerial achievement 
and loyalty. British Journal of Sociology, 52(4), 559-578. 
 
Walsh, J. P. (1988). Top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), 173-183. 
 
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate 
control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15, 421-458. 
 
Wang, H., Davidson, W., & Wang, X. (2010). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure, 
turnover, and risk aversion. Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance, 50(3), 
367-376. 
 
Warren, E., & Westbrook, J. L. (2009). The success of Chapter 11: A challenge to the 
critics. Michigan Law Review, 107, 603-641. 
 
171 
 
 
 
Wright, P., Kroll, M., Lado, A., & Van Ness, B. (2002). The structure of ownership and 
corporate acquisition strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 41-55. 
 
Yermack, D. (1997). Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news 
announcements. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 449-476. 
 
Yermack, D. (2006). Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41, 237-256. 
 
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives 
and monitoring in large U.S. corporations: When is more not better? Strategic 
Management Journal, 15, 121-142. 
 
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1995). Substance and symbolism in CEOs’ long-term 
incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 367-390. 
 
Zhang, G. (2010). Emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy: Is it good news or bad news 
for industry competitors? Financial Management, 39, 1719-1742. 
 
Wei, S. J. (2000). Local corruption and global capital flows. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 303-354. 
 
Wei, S. J. (2001). Domestic crony capitalism and international fickle capital: Is there a 
connection? International Finance, 4(1), 15-45. 
 
 
